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INTRODUCTION
I. HOCKING AND Tr-J:B PROBLEH OF :•IYSTIC."-L EXPERIEHCE
If few philosophers have so continuously and thoroughly addressed themselves to the meaning and structure of
mysticism as did William Ernest Hocking, philosophical concern with mysticism is nevertheless common and even traditional. The mere volume of literature on the subject testifies adequately to its availability for philosophical investigation.1 This should not be surprising if philosophy can
1 A representative but.hardly exhaustive sample of
modern and contemporary writings on mysticism would include
works such as David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Relioion and An Enguiry Concerning Human Understanding in
7he English Philosophers from Bacon to Hill, E.A. Burtt,
ed. (New York: The Hod ern Library, 19 39T;"G. ·~,i. F. Hegel,
Qn Art, Religion and Philosophy, J. Glenn Gray, ed. {New
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970}; Josiah Royce, The Porld and
the Individual, 2 vols. (New York: The Hacmillan Co., 1904);
William James, The Varieties of ReliTious Exnerience (~ew
York: New American Library, 1958 ed. ; Bertrand Russell,
Hysticism and Logic (London: Unwin Books, 1963 ed.); Henry
Nelson ~deman, Religious Experience and Scientific Method
(Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971
ed.); Joseph Narechal, s.J., Studies in the Psychology of
~ Hvstics (London: Burnes, Oates and 'i~'ashbourne, Ltd.,
1927); Henri Bergeon, The Two Sources of Horality and Religion (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, n.d.); Jacques
Nari tain, The Degrees of Knowledge ( Ne~v York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959); John Dewey, A Common Faith (~ew Haven:
~ale University Press, 1934); Etienne Gilson, The Hystical
Iheology of St. Bernard (Hew York: Sheed and ~iard, 1940);
Gabriel i-larcel, The f.!ystery of Being, 2 vols. (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co., 1960); Wilbur Marshall Urbant Humanity
~Deity (London: Allen and Unwin, 1951); Ninian Smart,
Reasons and Faiths (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958);
H.~. Lewis, Our ~xoerience of God (London: Collins, 1970);
W•. T. Stace, Hvsticism and Philosonhy (London: Hacmillan Co.,
1

2

be described as the interpretation of the whole of human experience and once mysticism is granted a place in the full
1
range of experience. I·loreover, mysticism is an appropriate
subject for philosophical exploration in so far as the mystics themselves can be considered philosophers since they,
too, as Hocking maintained, interpret the meaning of human
experience as a whole.

2

Hocking's particular importance regarding the philosophical study of mysticism lies first, I believe, in his
articulation of the fundamental structure of all human experience as a triadic, theistically-grounded relation, "IIt-Thou," which is brought to full awareness in mystical
experience. Further, his perception of the necessary con1960); John E. Smith, Experience and God (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968); i>.rthur c. Danto, Nystici.sm and
Horality (Harmondsworth, England: Pelican Books, 1976); J.
N. Findlay, "The Rationality of Mysticism," Contemporary
Studies in Philosophical Idealism, John Howie and Thomas
Buford, eds. (cape Cod: Claude Stark and Co., 1975), pp.
133 - 48; 'i'T •• Donald Hudson, Wi ttaenstein and Religious Belief (London: Hacmillan Co., 1975). A recent volume of The
Monist was also devoted to the subject of "The Philosophy
of Hysticism" (Vol. 59, No.4 [Oct., 1976]).
1 cf. "Hhat Does Philosophy Say?" Anthology of Recent
.
Ph1losophy, D. s. Robinson, ed. (New York: Thomas Crowell,
1929), p. 34; hereafter referred to as "1·iDPS." Cf. also
Types of Philosophy (third ed., revised in collaboration
with Richard Hocking, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1959), p. 313; hereafter referred to as TP.
2

cf. TP 255f. For a recent discussion, cf. Lawrence
LeShan, The Hedium, the Hystic and the Physicist {New York:
Ballantine Books, 1975) and Margaret Lewis Furze, Mysticism:
\·iindmv on A ~'lorld View (Nashville: Abingdon, 1977).

3

nection between authentic mysticism and social action constituted a distinctive and original contribution to the
study of religion. For although noted by Underhill and others as a function of heightened compassion, Hocking was
first to account for the mystic's activity as a structurally
integral phase completing a social process involving his
withdrawal from the world, a systematic re-evaluation of the
beliefs, goals and values of his society, and his return to
the world better equipped to contribute significantly to social development.
Like James, Underhill and others, Hocking described
the mystic's motivation in terms of compassion, which resulted from a deep realization of the unity of all human beings. But by articulating the meaning and structure of mystical experience in terms of both social process and individual psychology as complementary aspects of a unified system
of development,, Hocking went far beyond his contemporaries
and even later commentators such as Harcel, Buber, Hartshorne and more recent authors.
Hocking's account, while largely an original achievement, also incorporated the major elements of classical mystical theology -- particularly the interplay of action and
contemplation and the progressive development of mystical
experience through successive stages. Here, too, Hocking
went beyond contemporary accounts first, by refusing to sub-

4

ordinate either action or contemplation to each other and,
second, by showing that progressive development was no less
characteristic of the emergence of mysticism in historical
religions than it is of its manifestation in individual instances.
In accomplishing this agenda, Hocking had to struggle
against a conception of mysticism as a subjective cultivation of emotion and a form of social escapism which had
gained it the opprobrium of Protestant orthodoxy for over a
century. He also opposed the notion common to much Catholic
opinion which divorced the mystical element of religion from
the ordinary course of spiritual development. Against these
views, Hocking argued that mysticism and social (i.e., prophetic) action are not opposed in principle but are, rather,
successive stages of a single process in time. He likewise
maintained that the mystical experience of union with God
completed the course of spiritual development as the full
expression of religious experience. Hocking further upheld
the metaphysical validity of accounts of mystical experience
against psychologistic and other interpretations which attempted to reduce such experience to "interior" mental or
emotional events devoid of objective referential value.
1. Fundamental Issues
In this study I shall argue that despite recent objections, Hocking's account of the meaning and structure of

5

mystical experience was fundamentally cogent and correct.
The principal elements of his case as I shall present it can
be summarized as

follows~

1. All experience is radically intersubjective as
well as objective in origin.

~hat

is, the fundamental struc-

ture of experience can be adequately described as a reciprocal triadic relationship of "I, It and Thou" -- the Self,
the natural and social World, and Other Selves. Further,
this "nuclear experience," as the basis of all further experience, is itself grounded in a unifying theistic field.

1

2. Thus,. all experience is fundamentally and at
least implicitly religious: reciprocally, all explicit religious experience is intrinsically social, a further development of both the intersubjective and objective relations of
nuclear experience as perceived in the context of the bond
between the self and God. 2 This is to say that for Hocking
1 Hocking did not use the term"intersubjective" to
describe the "I-Thou" dimension of nuc.iear or explicit experience before 1920. As used in this dissertation, intersubjective as opposed to social refers to the qualitatively
distinct "I-Thou" relationship between human selves or between the human self and God in which the 11 other" is addressed directly, that is, vocatively. Intersubjectivity also includes the "consubjective" we-consciousness of true
communal experience, which may in fact embody the most profound form of personal union and is certainly an essential
moment in the experience of sharing a common world. Cf.
"Harcel and the Ground Issues of Hetaphysics," Philosoohy
and Phenomenological Research, 14 (June, 1954), pp. 58- 9;
h~-reafter ref erred to as "HGIH."
2By implicit I mean inherent or contained within the
nature of something, to be involved in something but not in

6

religious experience is the explicit development of the theistic relationship grounding all human experience.
3. Mysticism, as the practice of union with God in
direct and immediate experience, represents the full development of religious experience. As such it is the explicit
manifestation of the "deep" theistic and social structure
underpinning all experience, eventuating not only in a
heightened awareness of God's presence, but also in more
effective social action.

Thus mystical experience, epito-

mizing all experience, is social in expression as well as
in origin.
These fundamental themes will be addressed in chapters I through III below. In the concluding chapter, I shall
compare Hocking's account of mystical experience with those
of his contemporaries as well as those of more recent writers in order to evaluate his interpretation of the social
dimension of mysticism.
an open or manifest way. By explicit I mean precisely expressed, clear and evident. By explicitation I mean the process by which that which is implicit is made explicit or
manifest, i.e., clearly apparent, obvious. In terms of actual process, development means approximately the same thing.
The terms "latent" or "virtual" 'vill be used in approximately the same sense as implicit, i.e., to mean something present as a potential but not manifest, and, with regard to
virtual, something existing in essence or effect but not in
actual fact or form. This usage is based on The Oxford Engli!h Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 1971, compacted.)
and The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language-TNew York: Dell Pub. Co., 1970}. Hereafter the former
will be referred to as OED. For instances of this usage, cf.
Hocking, The .Heaning of God in Human Experience ( Ne\v Haven:
Yale University Press, 1963 ed.), pp. 16, 303; hereafter referred to as MGHE.

7

Recently, several objections have been brought against Hocking•s conception of mysticism concerning its
character both as an experience of the presence of God and
as the full development of the "nuclear experience" grounding all actual experiences. To begin with, Hocking consistently maintained that in religious experience and especially in its mystical expression God is not only directly but
also immediately apprehended.

1

But it has been strenuously

argued, for instance by John E. Smith, that all experience
must be mediated, that is, interpreted, to be meaningful at
all. This seemingly precludes immediacy, especially absolute
immediacy, as a quality of an experience of God or anything
else if it is to be meaningful. 2 Hocking•s understanding of
mystical experience, immediacy, or both, is thereby called
1 In his magnum opus, Hocking wrote, for instance,
"God has a presponsiveness of his own, and herein lies the
immediate experience of the personality of God." (HGHE 336.)
In an essay from his "middle period," he similarly contended
that "Han has (or can have) an immediate a'<;vareness of God,
from which fact he perceives that he is under obligation and
must live his life in careful listening to the voice of duty. n ("The Hystical Spirit, II Protestantism: 7-. Symposium,
~iilliam K. Anderson, ed. [Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries
Press, 1969], p. 190; hereafter referred to as "MS.") In one
of his last works, he like\vise maintained that "If \ve ask
him how he can be certain, the mystic refers us to that
which is alt.vays better than proof, immediate experience."
(The Meaning of Irnrnortalitv in Human Experience.[~!estport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973~ pp. 213 - 14; hereafter referred to as MIHE.}
2
cf. John E. Smith, Exoerience and God (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1968).

8

into

.

quest~on.

1

I shall argue in this study that Hocking's claim
that mysticism involves an immediate as well as direct experience of God is not only intrinsic to his doctrine but
is defensible in light of Smith's critique and fully consonant with the traditional understanding of mystical experience. I shall attempt to show, moreover, how Hocking in
fact not only anticipated but surpassed Smith's critique of
absolute immediacy.
It has also been claimed by Hocking's major commentator, Leroy Rouner, that mystical experience is essential2
ly "extraordinary," an "esoteric, specialized vision,"
and
since "the whole point of Hocking's 'mysticism' is precisely its ordinariness," 3 Hocking himself "remains an outsider
4
to the mystic vision,"
and mysticism "remains an illustra1
In her dissertation on Hocking, Sr. ~ary E. Giegengack thus maintains that "God can be experienced, not immediately, but directly, in experiences of nature, of duty
and of human love, and can be known to exist as the condition for the possibility of such experiences. 11 Oiary Elizabeth Giegengack, o.s.u., Can God~ Experienced? A Study in
~ Philosophy of Religion of William Ernest Hocking [Dissertation, Georgetown University, iiashington, D.C., 1971],
"l1.bstract_, 11 p. 4.
2

Leroy Rouner, Within Human Experience: The Philosoof William Ernest Hocking (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1969), p. 242; hereafter referred to as WHE. Nuch of
~ouner's book is based on his doctoral dissertation, Ideal~. Christianity and a World Faith: William Ernest Hockinq:s.~ of Christianity and its Relation to ~-ChriStian
Rel~g~ons (Columbia University, 1961).

EhY

3
4

Rouner, :\'HE 241.
Rouner, WHE 242.

9

tion of Hocking's point, not the substance."

1

Against this position, I shall argue that mystical
experience, as Hocking himself expressly taught, is the natural extension and fullest expression of orcinary experience, differing in degree rather than in kind, and is thus
a common element in everyman's experience. Further, because
of the common and ordinary character of mystical experience,
Hocking himself can and should be considered a mystic, inasmuch as his religious experience as he reported it adequately fulfills the requirements he established for authentic mysticism. These requirements are, moreover, fully in
accord with the classical Western tradition of Christian
mysticism. Hocking, I contend, can also be shown to have
admitted being a mystic, if somewhat indirectly.
Hocking's status as a mystic is not peripheral to
the present study. For, first, if Rouner's position is correct, then Hocking's understanding of mysticism as a common
and ordinary aspect of experience must be in error, for the
t\vO views are directly contradictory. Second,· if Eocking
\vas not a mystic, then in so far as his understanding of
mysticism was, as I shall show, based on his own experi1 Rouner, WHE 243. A recent exponent of American mysticism, Eal Bridges, similarly places Hocking outside the
circle of mystics. Cf. American Nvsticism from \·Jilli am
James to Zen (~ew York: Earper and Row, 19~ pp. 6 - 7.

10

ence, h e \v as to that extent mistaken. Third, in so far as
Hocking also based his case for the common and ordinary
character of mystical experience on the classical tradition
of western and Eastern mysticism, either his reading of
these traditions or Rouner's claims must be considered suspect.

1

Whether being a mystic is a necessary condition for
philosophizing about mystical experience is a moot point.
William James philosophized eloquently about mysticism but
2
more or less denied that he was a mystic. Similarly, in
his study of mysticism, Bertrand Russell discouraged any
3 TJ lt
'
1 1 ean1.ngs.
.
conjecture as to possl.. bl e myst1.ca
;, a er St ace
1 Rouner's denial of Hocking's mystical status stems,
I believe, from his tacit adoption of a revisionist conception of mysticism developed in the eighteenth century-ironically, one which Hocking strenuously combatted. Consequently, Rouner fails to realize that Hocking's reconception
of mysticism constituted a recovery of the classical tradition developed between the fourth and sixteenth centuries,
rather than being a departure from it. For an account of the
separation of ascetical and mystical theology and the relegation of mystical experience to the periphery of theological concern following the controversies over Quietism at the
end of the seventeenth century, see R. Garrigou-Lagrange,
The Three Ages of the Interior Life (St. Louis: B. Herder
Book Co., 1947), Vol. I, pp. 225 - 28. Cf. also his Christian Perfection and Contemolation (St. Louis: B. Herder Book
Co., 1942), pp. 27ff. For an overvie\v of both Protestant and
Catholic reactions against mysticism at this time, see Ronald Knox, Enthusiasm {New York: Oxford University Press,
196l.)Cf. also~ Protestant Mystics, Anne Frernantle, ed.
(New York: Mentor, 1965) and F.C. Rappold, Mysticism (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970).
2

3

James, op. cit., p. 292.
Russell, op. cit., p. 16.
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also disclaims any nystical pretensions in his study.

1

Fritz Staal, a recent comnentator on the philosophical study of mysticism, holds, conversely, that some mystical experience is probably necessary for a
standing of the Beaning of

~roper

under-

~ysticism. 2 Ben-Ami Scharfstein

makes a similar if softer case for understanding mysticism
from within.

3

Asher Moore, writing in a recent issue of

~he

Honist, like•.,.lise comments, "Hysticism is indeed ineffable
to a degree that is not true of most philosophies.

~o

tent, it cannot be judged vlithout entering its vl0rld."

an ex4

In view of such conflicting opinions, my position is
that any genuine understanding of a phenomenon requires
some experience of it, that is, in James • terms, "knm.;ledge
of," not merely "knowledge about." To understand mysticism
fully, one would need to be a mystic. 7o understand mysti1

stace, op. cit., p. 6.

2

Fritz Staal, Exploring Mysticism {Harmondsworth,
England: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 125. But seep. 126: " •••
one need not be a mystic in order to study mysticism; but
one might have to become one •••. "
3
•• ••• mystical experience, or something quite close
to it, chaTacterizes every intense effort to create, including that of the scientist who analyzes and theorizes anxiously in order to solve an impersonal problem which has
somehow become personal to him. By means of the solution,
he arrives at a simultaneous outer and inner harmony. Perhaps our very desire to understand mysticism in its breadth
and depth is tinged with a mystical hope. 11 (Nystical Experi~ [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Herrill Co., 1973], p. 2.)
4

p. 499.

l'.sher Hoore,

11

Hysticism and Philosophy," ed. cit.,
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cism adequately, one would need to have had at least some
mystical experience. But with Hocking I believe that this
experience is always at hand, in every waking of the mind
to truth, beauty and goodness.

1

But this is to say in ef-

feet that mystical experience is indeed common and ordinary.
Consequently, I would add, also with Hocking, that the metaphysics of mysticism must be assessed according to the ordi2 Th
.
. h as no
nary canons o f reason an d exper~ence.
e myst~c
special claim on our assent to his vision of reality.

1

cf. The Corning World Civilization (Ne,.; York: Harper
and Row, 1956), pp. 101, 208; hereafter referred to as ewe.
2 cf. MIHE 216. Cf. also "Illicit Naturalizing of
Religion," The Journal of Religion, 3 ( 1923), p. 589; hereafter referred to as "INR."

II. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERF-..TIOUS

1.

Hocking's Approach to Religious Experience and Mysticism
In treating religious and mystical experience, Hock-

ing's method was eclectic but highly distinctive, being variously empirical, phenomenological, pragmatic, dialectical
and hermeneutical. With respect to his empiricism, first,
Hocking was profoundly respectful of ordinary human experience and the ability of the common man to grasp the meaning
of that experience. He was thus unwilling to concede to psychologists in particular the last word in evaluating experience, especially inasmuch as there was a common tendency on
the part of psychologists at the turn of the century (James
almost exclusively excepted) to reduce religious experience
to its psycho-physiological components. Hocking found Leuba's
influential writings particularly objectionable in this respect.

1

Nevertheless, he also felt free to draw on psycholo-

gical studies of the mystics by clinicians and physiologists
such as De.Hontmorand, Delacroix, Murisier, James, Starbuck
and even Leuba himself on occasion.
Hocking's earliest writings on mysticism were themselves concerned with psychological aspects of experience,
1

Cf. James H. Leuba, 11 The Immediate Apprehension of
God according to Hilliam James and William Ernest Hocking u
Journal of Philosophy, 21, 26 (Dec. 18, 1924}, pp. 701- i2.
Cf. also his Psychology of Religious Hysticism (New York:
Harcourt Brace and Co., 1926).
13

14

but from the outset he

app~ied

to mystical experience a de-

scriptive analysis similar to those of later, more overtly
phenomenological researchers. However, unlike his mentor,
Husserl, Hocking did not employ the ontologically suspensive
epoche. Epistemologically he was thus more a moderate realist
than an idealist, maintaining throughout

his career the real

(extra-mental) existence of objects of experience. Hence his
tendency to take the mystics seriously with respect to their
reported experiences not only of God but also of the world.
Here again, Hocking's rather radical empiricism was evident.

1

The pragmatic element in Hocking's method exercized
an almost exclusively negative function, looking to results
in living to assess the reality as well as the worth of the
mystic's experience: .. That which does not work is not true."

2

As he explained in his magnum oous,
if a theory has no consequences, or bad ones; if it makes
no difference to men, or else undesirable differences; if
it lowers the capacity of men to meet the stress of existence, or diminishes the worth to them of what existence they have; such a theory is somehow false, and we
have no peace until it is remedied. I will even go farther, and say that a theory is false if it is not interesting: a proposition that falls on the mind so dully as
to excite no enthusiasm has not attained the level of
truth •••• 3
While rejecting pragmatic criteria as a positive in1
2
3

cf. MGHE xxvff., 215 - 16, 229.
HGHE xxiii.
rbid. Cf. also TP 91.

15

dicator of truth, it seems not to have occurred to Hocking
that even a

11

negative pragmatism" entailed a positive prag-

matism. Nevertheless, although he never repudiated his doctrine of negative pragmatism, it found fewer and fewer references in his writings as time went on. Yet he continued to
search for practical verification of mystical

theor~es

in

the lived experience of individuals and societies.
Although keenly analytical, Hocking considered a primarily analytical method infertile, "preliminaries to preliminaries."1 As a reflection of his chief metaphysical thematic, the tension between the universal and the particular (the
whole and the part), his method stressed induction and synthesis -- the logical movement from a grasp of the relations
among the parts to the meaning of the whole.

2

Thus, Hocking's

method was above all dialectical or "cumulatively inductive,"
loving from thesis to antithesis toward a new thesis synthe1

cf.

"MS" 188.

Hocking also maintained that meaning "descended~ from
the whole to the parts. Hence deduction had a place in his
methodology. Overall, the meaning of experience as well as the
philosophical method by which experience is interpreted involve both induction and deduction related as alternating
phases, i.e., dialectically. Methodologically, deduction
alone remains hypothetical, presupposing the meaning of the
whole. Empirically, however, the meaning of the whole must
be discovered and verified by inductive stages which lead to
the formation of new hypotheses and require testing. Thus, dededuction represents the heart of scientific method but logically and metaphysically it is preceded and followed by induction. The hypothetical-deductive element is thus only a
part of the empirical method both in science and in any philosophy which honors empirical experience. Cf. MGHE 408 - 09,
475 - 77•, TF 295ff.
2
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sizing both, much as life itself as he saw it was an on-going
process involving cumulative stages which permitted advancement according to a "law" of alternation. Grmvth and development by means of positive and negative reciprocation became

-

a leit-motif of Hocking's investigation of mysticism, being
manifest especially in his "principle of alternation'' and in
his original interpretation of the mystic's .. negative path."
But his dialectical method was not slavishly hegelian despite
the evident influence of Hegel upon his thought and method.
Finally, Hocking's method was to a large extent hermeneutical -- relying on the interpretation and evaluation
of texts composed by mystics and their commentators in both
Western and Oriental traditions. While less thorough than
many later scholars of comparative religion and while not as
inclined to examine critically his theory of interpretation
as might be expected today, Hocking continued a tradition begun in America perhaps by Emerson and carried on by Royce.
He also anticipated the further development of religious hermeneutics by scholars such as Wach, Eliade, Ricoeur, Kitagawa and others.
2. Method in This Study
Hocking's disdain for rigidly systematic approaches
to philosophical problems, his skill in describing human
phenomena and as a dialectician, no less than his fluent lit-
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erary style, still challenge the student eager to analyze
and assess his thought. For it is first necessary to expose
that thought in its barer outlines, shorn of fine statement
and subtle detail. Accordingly, considerable attention is
necessarily given in this study to textual exegesis -- the
attempt to discover what Hocking in fact taught over his
long career and whether, for example, there are thematic undercurrents which occasionally surface but which nevertheless
represent a dominant trend in his thinking. Second, a large
part of the presentation involves hermeneutics -- the attempt
to fathom what Hocking meant, especially given conflicting
opinions about his teachings, and to determine whether his
doctrine remained consistent and coherent despite the intermittent character of his writings on mysticism. There is,
third, an effort to analyze and evaluate the relevant elements of Hocking's teachings thus exposed in terms of cogency and validity. The expository sections of this study
thus serve to provide material for argumentation, that is,
for the purpose of demonstrating not only why but

~

Hock-

ing was correct (or incorrect) in his appraisal of mysticism.
In many respects this approach resembles Hocking's
own methodology, which is not wholly coincidental. Nevertheless, there are important differences, particularly the effort of this study to organize many scattered references
thematically, to interpret earlier formulations in the light
of later, more carefully articulated versions, and to con-
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d compare relevant issues in Hocking's treatment with
trast an
other standard authorities. Further, whereas Hockthose Of
ing was inten t to discover the meaning of God in human experience by a descriptive analysis of religion and mystical
experience, I intend to explore and evaluate the implications of his teachings on mysticism with regard to the meta
1
physical structures of experience itself. overall, I con1 That religious and especially mystical experience
are subjects common to both the philosophy and theology of
religion warrants explanation inasmuch as the present study,
although philosophical, nevertheless relies on theological
sources to some extent~
A philosophical approach to religion differs from
that of theology. Fundamentally, the theologian considers
other religions from the privileged viewpoint of faith in a
specific religious belief-system. That is, despite a common
object in the material sense and even formally, the viewpoint of the theologian (objectum formale quo) is determined
by an antecedent commitment to the truth of a particular understanding of revelation, whether this be Christian or something else and regardless of whether this perspective admits
or rejects the possibility of religious truth in other traditions. Thus, for a Christian theologian, faith in Jesus
Christ as the definitive revelation of God and the truth of
the human situation predetermines any judgment about the content or validity of all religious experience and particular
religions themselves, Christianity itself included. Catholic
and Protestant viewpoints differ of course from one another
and even among themselves.
A Christian philosophy of religion differs essentially
from theology mainly in that the pre-commitment to a particularly Christian interpretation of experience is, in the Huss~r~1an sense, "bracketed." The Christian philosopher of re11g1on, while no less commited than the theologian to faith
in Jesus Christ and all which that entails, does not investigate either Christianity itself or other religions under
t~at precise formality but with regard to aspects intellig~ble from a common human viewpoint including empirical ori~1n, me~ing, structure, coherence, consist~ncy, historical
nfluence, effects, etc. Here the philosopher more closely
resembles the social scientist who studies religion than he

•
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elude that Hocking's case for the intrinsic sociality and
commonness of mysticism and mystical experience is based on
and inevitably points to the intrinsic intersubjective openness of human experience itself and its groundedness in an
implicit dialogue with God as the personal Field of all experience.

does the theologian as such. And like scientific material,
theological statements can be incorporated into a philosophical treatment of an issue without thereby compromising the
freedom of philosophical inquiry in so far as the philosopher suspends or "bracketsu the faith commitment presupposed
by the theologian qua believer.

III. HOCKING'S PLACE IN THE

~~ERICAN

PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION

As a student of Peirce, Royce and James, and as the

teacher of a generation of philosophers including Charles
Hartshorne, Marvin Farber, Dorion Cairns, Henry Nelson
Wieman and others, Hocking well represents the continuity
of the American philosophical tradition. As a student for a
brief time, then a life-long friend of Edmund Husserl, and
as a major influence on his "disciple," Gabriel Marcel,
Hocking also represents a vital link between American and
European thought in this century.

1

His philosophical con-

cern can be seen in this light as an attempt to synthesize
elements of idealism and pragmatism with those of phenomenalogy and existentialism. Whether called

11

0bjective ideal-

ism,"2 "widened empiricism," 3 or .. realistic mysticism,"

4

Hocking's philosophy is a richly complex, dialectical meta1

On Husserl, cf. "From the Early Days of the 'Logische Untersuchungen,'" Edmund Huss-erl 1859- 1959 (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 1 - 11; hereafter referred to as "FEDLU. '' Cf. also CliC 34. On Marcel, cf.
"MGIM" and CHC 76 - 77. For Narcel on Hocking, cf. "W. E.
Hocking et la dialectique de !'instinct," Revue Philosophique, 88 (Juillet- Decembre, 1919), pp. 19- 54, and
"Solips~s~ ~urmounted,u Philosophy, Religion and the Coming
World C1v1l1zation, Leroy Rouner, ed. (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 23- 31; hereafter referred to as PRCWC.
2

TP 178 I

314.

3 ••FEDLU" 7.

4

Living ReliTions and a World Faith (New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1940 , p. ~hereafter referred to as LRw7.
20
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physic of experience, similar in many respects to that of
his friend but frequent philosophical opponent, John Dewey.

1

Hocking's philosophy is remembered especially with
regard to its idealistic aspect, an element partly inherited from Royce, but which was ultimately Hocking's own creation. His interest in mysticism has often been identified
with this strand of idealism, overlooking its prior and
equal source in James' influence and personal experience.
underlying all, however, was a personal sensitivity to the
meaning of God in human experience which determined Hocking's career as an exponent of mysticism.

1. The context: Prophecy and Mysticism
Hocking's attempt to formulate a theory of mysticism
consonant with the American philosophical tradition involved him in an effort to undercut a prevalent view in
America and Europe which held mysticism to be opposed in
principle to the socially-active, prophetic character of
Christianity. 2 His thesis, and the occasion of his clashes
1

For Hocking on Dewey, see especially "The Transcendence of Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy, 3 (Jan. 4, 1906),
pp. 5 - 12, and "Action and Certainty,n Journal of PhilosoE!!,y, 27 (April 24, 1930), pp. 225- 38. Cf. also Hocking's
dedication to Dewey in The Lasting Elements of Individual!.!!!!. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937) and "Dewey's
Concepts of Experience and Nature," Philosophical Review,
49 (March, 1940), pp. 228- 44; hereafter referred to as
"DCEN. ••
2

Cf. Rouner, WHE 23 - 24.
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with neo-orthodcx theologians, affirmed the dynamic identity
of mysticism and prophecy, that is, that the meaning and
1
structure of mystical experience were radically social. For
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
idea of prophecy was identified by Protestant theologians
with social activism and reform. This understanding was
characteristic, for instance, of the HSocial Gospel" as set
1 Hocking's definition of meaning and structure are
as elusive as those of any of his basic categories. Looking
to his usage, he apparently took meaning to mean "intention"
or "purpose," and sometimes "significance" or "idea." Thus,
at least something of the nature of experience can be discovered by attending to its function, for ''The most fundamental explanation of anything will be the function it
serves." ("A World View," Preface to Philosoph)', William P.
Tolley, ed. [New York: The ~acmillan Co., 1946 , p. 474;
hereafter referred to as "WV.")The particular locus of meaning is the relation between the part and the whole, how "it
all hangs together." Meaning, Hocking was fond of saying,
descends from the whole to the parts and ascends from the
parts to the whole. Meaning moves and grows. (Cf. MIHE 110,
142. On meaning and intending, cf. Human Nature and Its Remaking [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923 ed:T, pp.~l,
57; hereafter referred to as HNR. Cf. also Man and the State
[New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926], p:-37~hereafter
referred to as MS. Cf. also "WDPS" 35, MIHE 162. As a relation between the whole and the part, cf. "Religion of the
Future," Religion~ Modern~, L. B. R. Briggs, ed. [New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927], p. 355; hereafter referred to as "RF. 11 Cf. also "DCEN" 230, MIHE 110 - 12, "Man's
Cosmic Status,"~ Search for America, Huston Smith, ed.
[Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959], p. 161; hereafter referred to as "MCS." For the movement of meaning, cf.
''WDPS" 36 and "MCS" 161.) In general, structure means "The
mutual relation of constituent parts or elements of a whole
as determining its peculiar nature or character •••• " (OED,
3104.) In the present context, structure can be taken to
mean an integral, self-regulating system of transformations,
here following the thought of Piaget. (Cf. Jean Piaget,
Structuralism, Channinah Maschler, trans. [New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1970], pp. 5 - 7 .
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forth by walter Rauschenbusch, a disciple of Ritschl and
Troeltsch, and refined by Reinhold and H. Richard Niebuhr.

1

It was no less associated with the nee-orthodox movement
inaugurated by Karl Barth and continued by Emil Brttnner and
Hendrik Kraemer, the latter's Christian Faith

in~

!£a-

Christian World (1938) being directed squarely against
Hocking's

. t '~on. 2

pos~

The fundamental opposition between the prophetic
character of Christianity and mysticism, according to the
nee-orthodox point of view, entails an essential conflict
between the historical, contingent, this-worldly but ultimately trans-cultural nature of the Christian mission and
the timeless, absolute, other-worldly and Hellenistic nature attributed to mystical religion.

3

With regard to soci-

al reform, this opposition is experienced as a tension between involvement and escape. With regard to faith and salvation, however, prophetic action was held to rely chiefly
1

c£. Herbert Schneider, Religion in the Twentieth
Century (New York:. Atheneum, 1964), pp. 98f~
2
For a discussion of the Hocking-Kraemer dispute, cf.
Rouner, WHE 235 - 38, 280 - 82. Cf. also Hendrik Kraemer,
"The Role and Responsibility of the Christian Mission,"
PRCWC 235 - 49.
3
c£. A. Leonard, "Studies in the Phenomena of Mystical Experience," Mystery and I-1ysticism (London: Blackfriars
Publications, 1956), p. 72: "The mystic and the prophet are
not only two irreconcilable religious types, but are representatives of two human tendencies that it is impossible to
harmonize: philosophy and religion."
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on God's grace and initiative, whereas mystical quietism represented a subtle dependence on "works,'' being a merely human endeavor to reach God.
Hocking's contention that mysticism and prophetic
action can be reconciled, being in effect complementary
stages within a unified process, thus involved him in a headon collision with some of the most influential theologians
of his time. While in many respects Hocking's view in fact
carne to prevail, some contemporary scholars such as Ninian

1
.
.
Smart cont1nue
to oppose prop h ecy t o mys t'1c1sm.
2. The Historical Background
Despite the long-standing liberal bias against mysticism in Protestant thought and its general neglect or even
suspect character in Catholic theology following the Quietism controversies at the end of the seventeenth century,
interest in mysticism was undergoing a renaissance in Europe
at the turn of the nineteenth century, just as Hocking was
entering Harvard. This renewed interest and the subsequent
reaction against it both had their antecedents in the Romantic movement, particularly in Germany and England in the
earlier part of the nineteenth century. The names most closely identified with the antithetical positions regarding mysticism at this time are those of Schleierrnacher and Troeltsch.
1

See below, pp. 360 - 64.
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Friedrich Schleiermacher perhaps gave first voice
philosophically to the Romantic interest in mystical aspects
of religion in his revolutionary Reden ~ die Religion
(l 7 99). Sensitive to Kant's anti-rationalistic rejection of
any speculative 1<nmvledge of God, Schleiermacher developed a
theory of religious experience based on the priority of feeling: if God could not be known, he could at least be felt.
Thus, human a>;vareness of God was conceived of as a fundamentally aesthetic response, a feeling of total dependence. Refined by generations of disciples, particularly by Rudolf
Otto, this pietistic conception of religious experience has
survived to the present.
Positions antithetical to Schleiermacher's were not
long in forthcoming, especially in Germany. A particularly
sharp rejoinder was delivered by Albert Ritschl, whose Die
Christliche Lehre

~

der Rechtfertigung und Verstihnung

(1870 - 1874) postulated a strong dichotomy between biblical
faith and any form of "natural religion" or mysticism, which
he claimed were Hellenistic incursions into pristine Christianity.
This view of mysticism, which set it over against the
prophetic elements of the Christian faith, was shared by
Ritschl's great disciples, Nilhelm Herrmann, Adolf Harnack
and Ern·st Troel tsch. The latter was especially influential
in the theological schools of turn-of-the-century America.
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Nevertheless a case for mysticism won a limited hearing in
America mainly be.cause of the prestige of its students and
defenders, notably Hilliam James, James Leuba, Rufus Jones,
Hocking and his friend Charles Bennett.
climate of

scho~arly

1

But overall,

th~

opinion in the United States remained

less congenial to mysticism than was that of Europe. Royce's
ultimate, if regretful, rejection of mysticism was indeed
more characteristic of the Harvard of Palmer, MUnsterberg
and Santayana than were James• and Hocking's defenses of it.

2

This may account for some of the subsequent neglect of
3
Hocking's work, as noted, for instance, by !·1arcel, as well
as for the failure of James' research to inspire a continuing investigation of religious experience.
Hocking's writings on mysticism thus did not appear
in a neutral setting, but rather one charged with deeply
felt issues and lively debate. How Hocking responded to
this situation, coming to it already convinced of the fundamental rightness of the mystic's vision, can best be seen
1

cf. Charles Bennett, A Philosophical Study of :t-1ysti1923).
-

~ {New Haven: Yale University Press,

2

c£. -r·Jarren E. Steinkraus, "A Furtber Note on Hilliam
Ernest Hocking,~~ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
28 (March, 1968), p. 443.
3

cf. Santayana's remark, "mysticism is the most primative of feelings and only visits formed minds in moments
of intellectual arrest and dissolution ... (The Life of Reason, Vol. III: Reason in Religion [Ne\v York: Charles Scribner's Sons~ 1905], p. 277. C£. Schneider, op. cit., 205.
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in terms of his own development as a philosopher of religion and, in fact, a mystic. For it was in the light of his
own experience that Hocking discovered the importance of
the classical mystical tradition, obscured by t't·Io centuries
of reaction. But his own experience was reciprocally illuminated by the writings of the world's great mystics. Significantly, hov.rever, Hocking appealed for support not only to
his own experience and to that of the great mystics,

but

also to the experience of "everyman," which he believed to
be the foundation of both.

IV. HOCKING'S

DIALECTIC~L

DEVELOPMENT

From the relatively scant information available concerning Hocking's childhood, it seems clear that his religious experience b egan a t

a very ear 1 y age. 1 H'1s parents

were devout Methodists, and young Ernest grew up in a housebold permeated by a strong sense of faith and duty.

2

Rouner

recounts a crucial ,.conversion experience" at a prayer meeting when Hocking was twelve, quoting Hocking's remembrance
of the event seventy-three years later:
Hocking did not long remember what the evangelist said
in his sermon, nor was he very much aware at the time.
But there was, he said, "a presence felt, a reality perceived" which was beyond the details of the service and
including them. When the call came to "come down and be
saved," this boy 'of twelve -- tears streaming down his
face-- suddenly saw things"in a new light." He saw
"the real," in a way which "combined a new resolve with
a new insight. 11 He saw himself as part of a "great procession of humanity in which each man had an immortal
soul." He had a vision, as he puts it, of "men like
souls walking."3
1

on Hocking's early life, cf. "Some Second Principles," Contemporary American Philosophy, George Jl.dams and
William P. Montague, eds. (New York: Russell and Russell,
1930), pp. 385- 93; hereafter referred to as 11 SSP." Cf.
also Rouner, WHE 1 - 12 and PRCWC 5 - 22.
2
Rouner, PRCWC 10.
3
Rouner, WHE 2. Rouner adds, "The effects of this experience -- probably his most important 'mystical' experience-- lasted two or three days. He reports no great excitement, but a tremendous sense of relief and the assurance
that he had broken through to a significant new perception.
It led to his joining the Methodist Church." Cf. also PRCWC

10 - 11.
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Whether or not this event
pattern of

~mystical"

conform~

to the accepted

experiences, Hocking was nevertheless

possessed thereafter of what he later called "the mystic's
1
sense of the universe. •• This view was severely shaken, however, when Hocking came into contact with the writings of
2
Herbert Spencer a year later. Several years of disillusionment followed, during which, however, he experienced another "mystical 11 insight into immortality. Hocking's powerful
description of this episode, while long, not only illustrates his own experience, but also represents the almost
prosaic kind of ordinary life-events that occasion mystical
experience:
The time is 1892, more or less. The scene is the rightof-way of a single track railroad, between Aurora, Illinois, and Waukegan ••.• It is a summer day. A lone figure carrying a pot of white paint and a brush, stoops
every 100 feet to cover a chalk mark on the inside of
the rail with a vertical line of paint, and every 500
feet to paint a number. The crew of the civil engineering department are measuring the track of the railway
for inventory purposes. The chalk markers, with the
steel tape, have moved ahead of the painter, who doesn't
mind being alone. He has become interested in the numbers.
He is, at this moment, in a cut. The banks rise
on either side of him above his eye level; the breeze
is shut off; the heat is oppressive. The only sounds

1
2

"SSP" 388.

"SSP" 387. Cf. also "A Philosopher of a Single Civilization," This Is~ Philosophy, Whit Burnett, ed. {London:
Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1958), p. 287; hereafter referred to
as TIMP.
'
'

30

are the humming of insects and the occasional nervous
flutter of a disturbed grasshopper 1 s wings. The painter is painting the number 1800. He is amused to note
the possibility of putting this number series into oneto-one correspondence with the years of the century. He
begins to supply the numbers with events, at first bits
of history -- Civil i·lar and family background. This
imaginary living-through-past-time becomes as real an
experience as the rail-painting, and far more exciting!
8

~~~~in~ {~ ~;r:~~d~~!~y !~:k,m~r~!r~~wy~~:=n::~;;~~ or
~~;2,i~h=n~~:~!:~:w~~~ ~:~~~~~7sh!~;~~y~n~u~h:e~~t~~~n,
1

story coincide: I paint the Now! Prom this point, memory is dismissed; it gives place to anticipation, dream,
conjecture -- there is something relentless in the onmoving of these numbers, to be filled with something -but with what? 1893 -- will it be the new Chicago University? 1900 -- where shall I be? 1950, fairly old,
very likely gone. 1973, a hundred years from my birth -surely gone: "Good-by, Hocking!" I see myself as dead,
the nothingness of non-being sweeps over me. I have been
for four years an ardent disciple of Herbert Spencer,
unhappily but helplessly convinced that man is as the
animals; the race moves on, the individual perishes,
the living something has become -- nothing; "And not
the pillow at your cheek So Slumbereth." For the first
time I realize, beyond the mere clack of words, the
blankness of annihilation. And no doubt, just because
of this swift sense of no-sense, the shock was intense
as I realized, with the same swiftness, that it ~ f,
~ surviving, who looked upon myself as dead, that it
had to be so, and that because of this, annihilation
can be spoken of, but never truly imagined. This was not
enough to free me from the spell of Spencer, but it
cracked that spell: the rest of the day was spent in a
new lightness of heart, as I had come upon a truth that
was not to leave me. I was glad to be alone.l
This "crack" in Spencer's spell was subsequently widened and Hocking's youthful confidence in the mystical vision of the world restored by his reading James' Principles

2! Psychology while an engineering student at Iowa State
1

MIHE 213 - 14.
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College in 1894, when he was twenty-one. Hocking later related that
I cannot say what its argumentative value was at the
time· it proved nothing, so far as I recall-- it was
mereiy a release: it left all the systematic work to do.
But it irrigated certain tracts that had become desert.
I began to regain confidence that the mystic's sense of
the universe is in substance a true sense, quite apart
from his theological symbols. I was sure that the real
world is more like the world of James• imagination than
like that of Spencer's, and from that time it became my
first business to define the difference and to capture
some rational account of it.l
Hocking was so impressed by James that he resolved
to go to Harvard.

2

Once there, however, he found not James,

who was in Scotland for his Gifford Lectures, but rather
Josiah Royce, whose critical-skeptical interest in mysticism stimulated the young Hocking's imagination further.
But James' return to Harvard in 1903, the manuscript of The
Varieties of Religious Experience in hand, provided the occasion for Hocking to pass beyond the critique of theoretical mysticism inspired by Royce. 3 Having begun to realize
that the active non-ego of our experience must also be a
self, he recognized in it
1
2

3

"SSP" 388.
Cf. Rouner, WHE 7f., PRCWC 14£.
Cf. "Lectures on Recent Trends in American Philoso-

phy," Scripps College Bulletin, 16 (1941), p. 11: hereafter
referred to as "LRT."
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the Absolute of Royce's teaching. But I also recognized
it as the object of that mystic experience whose significance James had begun to do justice to. With this
identification, a great strand of speculative and religious tradition could be interpreted and saved for human as well as philosophic uses. Royce's dominantly negative attitude towards mysticism, which he so profoundly interpreted, becomes unnecessary.!
It was thus in reconceiving mysticism that Hocking
began to reconcile elements of James' and Royce's antipodal
philosophies, creating in the process an original interpretation, indeed a mystical philospphy of human experience.
Hocking's overall interpretation of mysticism, the
outcome of a life-long reworking of positions first articulated in 1912, can be divided roughly into three periods,
following Rouner's suggestion regarding important shifts in
his thinking.

2

The first period extends from 1904, the year

of his dissertation, to 1918, when Hocking published his
second major work, Human Nature and

.!..:!:1! Remaking. The "mid-

dle11 period will be taken to span the years between 1920
and the publication of Living Religions and

~

World Faith

in 1940. The final period falls between 1940 and 1966, the
year of his death.
1. Hocking's Early Period: 1904 - 1918
The most influential event of Hocking's early career
was his marriage to Agnes Boyle O'Reilly in 1905. Not only

1
2

"sspu 392 - 93.

c£.

Rouner, WHE 188, 239 - 40.
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did Hocking dedicate his magnum opus to her, "an unfailing
source of insight," she was in no small way responsible for
1
11
much of its con t en t and eventual Shape." Even more fundamentally, in their love Hocking realized the truth of his
most important insight -- that the isolation of individuals
is a metaphysical illusion. All experience is, rather, radically intersubjective or, as Hocking described it in 1912,
"social":

2

I have sometimes sat looking at a comrade, speculating
on this mysterious isolation of self from self. ~vhy are
we so made that I gaze and see of thee only thy Wall,
and never Thee? This Wall of thee is but a movable part
of the wall of my world: and I also am a Wall to thee:
we look out at one another from behind masks. How would
it seem if my mind could but once be within thine; and
we could meet and without barrier be with each other?
And then it has fallen upon me like a shock -- as when
one thinking himself alone has felt a presence -- but I
am in thy soul. These things around me are in thy experience. They are thy own; when I touch them and move
them I change thee. When I look on them I see what thou
seest; when I liSten, I hear what thou hearest. I am in
the great Room of thy soul; and I experience thy very
experience. For where ~ thou? Not there, behind those
eyes, within that head, in darkness, fraternizing with
chemical processes. Of these, in my own case, I know
nothing, and will know nothing; for my existence is
spent not behind my Wall, but in front of it. I am
there, where I have treasures. And there art thou, also.
This world in which I live, is the world of thy soul:
1
2

ci.

Rouner, PRCWC 21. Cf. also TIMP 288.

social here means simply being united to or associated with other persons. (Cf. OED 2902.) Intersubjective,
as Hocking came to employ the term, refers to interpersonal
or social experiences which are characterized as "I-Thou" -a direct encounter with another person as a self in a mutual, intimate, non-objective manner. It is expressed in the
vocative rather than the indicative case. Social is the
Wider term.

34

d being within that, I am within thee. I can imagine
a~ contact more real and thrilling that this: that we
~hould meet and share identity, not through ineffable
inner depths (alone), but here through the foregrounds
of common experience; and that thou shouldst be -- not
behind that mask -- but here, pressing with all thy
consciousness upon me, containing me, and these things
of mine. This is reality: and having seen it thus, I
can never again be frightened into monadism by reflections which have strayed from their guiding insight.l
As Rouner relates, the "comrade" whom Hocking was addressing was Agnes herself.

2

In regard to his love for her

and its impact upon his philosophy,

~.;e

find here perhaps the

finest illustration of Hocking's reliance on his own experience with its assumed resonances in the common experience
of "everyman." As we shall see, such love is pre-eminently
a paradigm as well as a source of ordinary mystical experience.
When his magnum opus was published in 1912, Hocking
was an assistant professor of philosophy at Yale, having
moved there in 1908 from the University of California at
Berkeley where he had taken a position two years before. In
1914, he was called back to Harvard. During the First World

War, he saw active duty as a military engineer. Four years
'

later, he was appointed supervisor for Army educational
training programs in the northeastern United States, which
1

MGHE 265 - 66. This, perhaps the most famous and
W1dely cited passage from his major wor~ contains the nucleus of Hocking's personalistic refutation of solipsism.
2
Rouner, WHE 44.
.
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led to his

small book, Horale and Its Enemies.

1

Human Na-

ture !P2 ~ Remaking was published the same year.

----2.

Hocking's Middle Period: 1920 - 1940
In 1920, Hocking was appointed Alford Professor of

lil'atural Religion, Horal Philosophy and Civil Polity at Harvard. Between then and 1940, he produced eight major books
and over sixty articles and reviews. In 1930, he and his
wife were appointed to the Laymen's Foreign Mission Inquiry,
an investigating committee representing seven Protestant denominations concerned about the state of their foreign missions. Appointed chairman of the group, Hocking was enabled
thereby to travel widely in the Orient, broadening his understanding of Eastern religions and the possibilities of
ecumenical relations. The report which resulted from this
investigation,

~-Thinking

Missions, involved Hocking and

other members of the group in long and bitter controversies
with neo-orthodox theologians. Not the least factor in the
conflict was Hocking's manifest influence on the final report.2 One of the less controversial recommendations en1

2

Cf. Rouner, PRCWC xiii, xiv.

The eminent Church historian, Bishop Stephen Neill,
thus evaluates the report: "The controversial elements are
concentrated in the summary ••• which was in the main the
ha~diw~rk of the eminent philosopher W. E. Hocking. The
P01nt of view here expressed was as different as could be
imagined from that of the earlier missionaries. The report
distinguishes between temporary and permanent elements in
the function of a missionary. The task of the missionary to-
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. d
·ta1 1 e

"a serious inquiry into the religious value of medi-

tation, an d

a study of the ways in which a further place for

ction can be brought into the Christian Church •••• "
thiS fun
At the beginning of this period, Hocking's attention

1

began to shift from a preoccupation with religion toward so2
cial, legal and political issues. But his involvement with
the mission controversy awakened him further to the promise
of ecumenism among Christian denominations as well as among
different faiths. This in turn enabled him to reconceive the
role of the mystic as a harbinger of religious unity on a
world scale, a theme that would become dominant in the works
of his rast period, especially The Coming World Civilization.
In 1936, Hocking was honored with appointments to sevday, it was maintained, is to see the best in other religions, to help the adherents of those religions to discover,
or to rediscover, all that is best in their own traditions,
to cooperate with the most active and vigorous elements in
the other traditions in social reform and in the purification of religious expression. The aim should not be conversion -- the drawing of members of one religious faith over
into another or an attempt to establish a Christian monopoly. Cooperation is to replace aggression. The ultimate aim,
in so far as any can be described, is the emergence of the
various religions out of their isolation into a world fellowship in which each will find its appropriate place."
(~History of Christian Missions (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm.
B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1965J, pp. 445- 56. For an account
of the reaction against this position and its ultimate collapse, seep. 456.)
Re-Thinking Missions: A Laymen's Inquiry after~
Hundred Years (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1932), pp. 45f.
2
Cf. Rouner, WHE 188.
1
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era 1

lectureships which in effect crowned his academic ca-

The first of these was the Hibbert Lectures at Oxford
reer.
and cambridge, later published as Living Religions ~ ~
world Faith. In the same year, he also delivered the Ingersoll Lectures at Harvard and the Thomas Lectures at the University of Chicago, published together in 1937 as Thoughts

-

~

on Life

Death and revised and augmented in 1957 as

~

Meaning of Immortality in Human Experience. In 1938, Hocking
was invited to present the prestigious Gifford Lectures at
the University of Glasgow, perhaps his greatest accomplishment in the field of religious studies. >·Jhile never published in book form, these lectures, "Fact and Destiny,"
provided material for reflection which occupied Hocking until his death -- including his first insights into the self
as a "field of fields, .. the central concern of his mature
metaphysics. 1
1

In Scotland, I discovered that the accounts of the
Gifford Lectures published in summary form in the Glasgow
Herald are still accessible through back issues found at
the Glasgow Public Library. These summaries were submitted
by Hocking himself each day and only slightly edited; hereafter the Scottish version will be referred to as GL. Hocking later revised his notes and published them provisionally
as "Fact and Destiny," The Review of Hetaphysics, 4 (Sept.,
1950), pp. 1 - 12 --being the introduction to the whole
series, and "Fact and Destiny (II)," Ibid., 4 (March, 1951),
pp. 319 - 42 -- being an account of the first five lectures;
hereafter referred to as "FD I" and "FD II." The second
half of the.first series was not published until 1958 in a
97eatly revised form as 11 Fact, Field and Destiny," TheReV1ew .2! Metaphysics, 11 (June, 1958), pp. 525- 49; hereafter referred to as "FFD." The second series of lectures
;~i~tory and the Absolute," was revised and published i~
Ct'iC, pp. 423 - 63; hereafter referred to as "HA."
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3.

Hocking's Final Period: 1940 - 1966
\ihen Hocking returned from Scotland, he was then six-

ty-five and due to retire from harvard. He was, however, invited by President Conant to continue teaching for an additional five years. After his actual retirement in 1943,
Hocking enjoyed several guest professorships and an occasional lecture. His writing continued unabated; of the 294
items in Gilman's standard bibliography, fully 125 were
1
written after 1943!
World War II created a crisis period in Hocking's
life. Not only did the outbreak of war in 1939 disrupt his
plans to publish 1'Fact and Destiny," it significantly altered his outlook on world problems, deepening his understanding of the creative potential of suffering in the emergence of any future world community united in its shared experience of God's silent presence.

2

The war also provided

the occasion for his third major mystical experience, which
he related years later in the preface to The Meaning of Im-

mortalitv"in Human Experience.
He had been lecturing on metaphysics at Harvard during the autumn of 1941. The war was much on his mind. One
evening as he walked along the Charles River, "It was though
1
2

PRCWC 469 - 504.

c£. especially his Experiment in Education (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co., 1954), pp. 140- 50:-160- 63.
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tor a moment Nature were holding still -- caught in a spell
of quiet and tense glory, unwilling to fade."

1

In the fol-

lowing passage, he described his sudden insight into "a
truth about t he world, as well as about [the] self,

u

2

again

providing a paradigm of mystical experience, now mediated

by space as before it had been occasioned by a perception
of time:
Here was _quiescence -- no seminar, no discussion, no labor of categories, also no war. Time had stopped, and
the world was now drenched in unmoving space. Space was
endless; it was ~ space, running out far beyond the
solitary evening star; running also through the earth,
and out the other side. There were armies at night,
minds full of battle-plans for tomorrow's action. Was
it truly the same space?. Could that space, crowded with
fighters' strategies, be the same as my space, spellbound in peace?
Yes, it must be the identical space; it is the
same world for all of us. Yet it cannot be the same. For
no one else saw the world I saw; if I had not happened
along, that marvel of a sky-moment might have passed unknown. It was certainly not known to itself, was it?
Those colors, lights, shadows, shapes, could exist only
for a creature with eyes, stationed at or near where I
was standing.3
Falling back on a theme of plural spaces about which
he had theorized as early as 1912, Hocking was able to organize the elements of an actual awareness of plural spaces.

He passed by reflection from that recognition to a new in1

MIHE xiv - xv.

2
MGHE: 362. Cf. 450.

3

MIHE

xv.
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·nto the concept of interacting fields, inklings of
sight l.
whiCh had also appeared in previous works. He continued,
our various spaces, all infinite, must be and cannot be
identical. The answer7 Space is ~ single, but plural.
There is a world-space, identical for all included persons. But for each one, there is also a private space,
perhaps spaces, holding private responses to qualities,
holding also futurities, not yet existent -- plans, battle plans perhaps, plans that can be detained, modified,
canceled, as events in the identical world-space cannot
be.
Space must have a plural -- this we were saying
in the seminar. And more than this, each person envisages plural spaces. Then, ~ position of the person,
the self, toward this his plurality, how shall we describe it? Each space can be called a "field," a continuum on which infinite positions, potentials, etc.,
can be distinguished and held-together. Could the self,
as envisaging plural fields, be a field 21 fields?l
What he had merely thought before, he was ncwexperiencing.2 Out of that experience came a new assurance in the
reality of human freedom, immortality -- which had figured
prominently in both his

11

Conversion" experience and his en-

counter with time and death, and God, an assurance not the
result of an inference, but a conviction based on immediate
experience. 3
1

Ibid.

2

cf. "Theses Establishing an Idealistic Metaphysics
by a New Route," Journal of Philosophy, 38, 25 (Dec. 4,
1941), pp. 688- 91. Hocking had explored the concept of
space-fields as recently as hi~ article "Outline-Sketch of
a System of Metaphysics," Philosophical Essays in Honor of
Edmund Husser!, Marvin Farber, ed. (cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), pp. 251- 61; hereafter referred to
as "OSSM. n
3

MIHE xvi.
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Commenting much later on the philosophical signifiof this and similar episodes in so far as they are in

cance
some

S

ense extraordinary, Hocking noted that

The function of unusual experiences is, as a rule, not
so much to answer questions as to open them. They stir
us out of our habitual assumptions. They may illuminate;
but the final answers must be in the common experiences
of mankind -- this has become my firm conviction. If
there is any truth is "mystic experience," it is what
every man subconsciously knows, and what thought can
eventually validate.l
The specific significance of these events and Hocking's more ordinary experiences of love and duty will occuPY us later, when we return to the mystical status of the
man and his philosophy. It is important here to note his
own estimation of the criteriological function of ordinary
experience, but also his intimation that the roots of mystical experience lie in the depths of common knowledge. And
thus, what may be unusual or extraordinary with respect to
incidence or intensity need not be so with regard to either
capacity or extent. "Everyman 11 is fundamentally a mystic.
Having set out the basic problematic of this investigation in terms of its historical and thematic context as
well as Hocking's own development, we turn now to consider
his basic concept of experience as rooted in the triadic,
intersubjective relationship of the Self, the World and
Other Selves, grounded in God as the Field of all Experience.
1

MIHE 216.

CHAPTER I
THE DIALECTIC OF EXPERIENCE
INTRODUCTION

Hocking's concept of experience was developmental and
fluid; he proposed various formulations throughout his long
career, altering emphases and recasting the elements of his
definitions. One such formulation from his middle and late
periods, "The self meeting the world more or less well,"
has been taken as definitive by several commentators.

1

But

while perhaps adequately reflecting Hocking's basic concept
of experience, this was neither his clearest nor his final
formulation.
In this chapter, I shall argue that Hocking's concept
of experience involved a progressive clarification of early
formulations elaborated in conscious opposition to the classical, empirical concept. Inasmuch as this classical concept
consisted of the relation, usually specified as consciousness or knowledge, between an object and a subject, i t can
be called dyadic. Hocking's formulations, building on rather
than rejecting the dyadic concept, were typically triadic,
involving three elements-- the subjective, the objective and
1

cf. A. R. Luther, Existence as Dialectical Tension:
St~dy of ~ First Philosophy of ~ E. Hocking (The Hague:
Mart1nus Nijhoff, 1968}, p. 31. Cf. also Giegengack, op.
cit., p. 60.

!
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·ntersubjective (or social), related to each other in
the l.
distinctively different modes of consciousness, including
1
I also contend that in
knowledge, volition and feeling.
articulating this triadic notion of experience, Hocking not
only overcame some perplexing problems raised by the classical concept, but was thereby enabled to develop his doctrine
of "relative immediacy" by which he could in turn account
for the possibility of mystical experience as the full manifestation of the implicit theistic dialogue grounding all
experience, that is, as an immediate as well as a direct experience of God.
Hocking may never have achieved what to him was a
finally satisfying definition of experience. Nevertheless,
an analysis of the three principal formulations of his triadic concept, "!-It-Thou" (nuclear experience), "The Self
Meeting the World More or Less Well," and "Fact, Field and
Destiny," indicates that each incorporated the same elements
expressed differently according to differing priorities in
Hocking's philosophical concerns at the time. Further, I believe that these formulations were not in fact successive
attempts to formulate a single, all-encompassing definition,
but varying ways of expressing the same insight into the
fundamental structure of experience and refer as well to
1
cf. MGHE 252, n. 1 for the use of the terms
and "triad."

~tiyadu
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different aspects of experience taken in a general sense.

1

ilds upon and clarifies the others. Consequently, I
EaCh bu
hold that the primary value of Hocking's descriptive analysis of experience lies not in the progressive articulation
of a comprehensive, fully adequate definition, but in his
illumination of manifold dimensions of experience in regard
to its three-fold constitution expressed in terms of the
structure of the human psyche, the nature of social interactions, and their metaphysical ground.
Summarily, Hocking's elaboration of experience as a
system of relations between the Self, Nature and Society
(including intersubjective relations) grounded in a divine
"field of reference .. can best be viewed as a dialectical
process having three distinct phases -- the early, psychological formulations, their reconception in terms of social
transactions and, finally, their reinterpretation in metaphysical terms characteristic of Hocking's mature thought.
1 Among contemporary commentators, Andrew Reck has recognized a connection between "the Self, the Other and God"
and Fact, Field and Destiny, but relates neither to "Th&
Self Meeting the World More or Less Well." (Cf. "Hocking's
Place in American Metaphysics," PRCWC 47.) Further, his
first "triad" is not exactly equivalent to the "I-It-Thou"
of nuclear experience. Nor is God to be identified with the
"Thou" of nuclear experience too closely. For God is experienced as different from other (finite) selves, being
in fact not an element of nuclear experience so much as its
field or ground establishing the possibility of structural
relations between "I-It-Thou{s)." Cf. MGHE 298.
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Hocking faced two major problems in formulating each
of these concepts: first, to account for human intersubjectivity and, second, to account for the awareness of God
1
within human experience. Hocking's enterprise can be interpreted, therefore, as an attempt to articulate a radical
concept of experience adequate to the psychological and sociological dynamics of human existence and to establish a
metaphysical foundation for what might still be called a
"natural theology," especially with respect to its experientia! manifestation in mysticism. I shall attempt to show
that while perhaps not wholly successful, Hocking's reconceptualization of the classical concept of experience accomplished these objectives. I shall argue, moreover, that his
doctrine of relative immediacy still provides a penetrating
solution to the problem of how God can be immediately and
directly experienced.

1

For an explicit statement of this enduring two-fold
agendum, see the 1962 preface to MGHE, pp. xff.

I. THE EVOLUTION OF A CONCEPT
As Hocking began his study of experience, he found
it, as he later remarked, conceptually "tired" and ambiguous, having been exhausted, as it were, and bifurcated by
the analyses of Descartes, the English empiricists, Kant
1
and the German idealists. The previous three centuries of
investigation had, moreover, fostered several fundamental
misconceptions about the character of experience: subjectiv2
ity, passivity, shreddibility and indifference, coupled
with invariance and an overriding cognitive bias.

3

Underly-

ing these misconceptions was the classical concept of ex4
perience as sense-data interpreted by reason or thought,
that is, the empirical concept which had attained the status of an axiom in Western philosophy.

5

The inadequacy of the dyadic concept of experience
as facts plus consciousness was revealed to Hocking in the
1
2

cf. "LRT 11 16, "FD Iu 320.
cf. 'tLRT" 16 - 17.

3
cf. "FD I" 320.
4Cf. MIHE 51.
5
cf. MGHE 43: "Philosophers wonderfully agree in accepting the term 'experience' as a comprehensive name for
whatever is either real or significant. Facts and events
ma~ have their independent external existence; but they
ga~n living certainty and importance only as they impinge
u~o~ consciousness. Unless a fact is caught up in the sens~t~ve, irritable, responsive thing we call a mind, it is
nothing."
46
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major distortions which sprang from it. The first was subjective idealism, the "retreat into subjectivity," by which
experience was riven into separate realms, one or both poles
of which were removed from actual awareness. Important instances of subjectivism include Berkeley's reduction of the
objective world to a mental construct of the experiencing
subject and Kant's postulation of noumena and the transcendental ego.

1

A second major distortion was promoted by real-

istic naturalism, whether the atomistic phenomenalism of
aume, classical realism, or modern behavioralism, which conversely absorbed the experiencing subject into the factworld -- with the consequent denial of the reality of the
self.

2

As a result,

When \ve speak of experience, what is called to mind is
usually experience with the experiencers left out; experience just in so far as it can easily be common object and no farther. Hume, in his examination of experience found no self; he had gone out of his house, as
one noted rejoinder had it, and looking in at the window
was unable to find himself at home.3
In addition to either overdeveloping the subjective
or objective aspects of experience, or sundering them completely, subjective idealism and naturalism were incapable
of accounting for the experience of other selves, that is,
1

cf. MGHE 192 - 93.

2
3

cf. MGHE 194 - 95.

MGHE 280 - 81. Cf. 277ff., 282.
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trulY interpersonal relations .• Further, God was ruled out
as a possible object of experience.
For Hocking, an adequate concept of experience would
have to do justice to actual experience itself. It would
have to preserve the irreducible, felt reality of both the
thinking-feeling Self and the world of fact as met in lived
events of Nature and Society. It would neither radically dichotomize the subjective and objective elements, thereby
rendering their relatedness wholly adventitious or illusory,
nor collapse one element into another, thus no less effectively suppressing real relations.

1

Horeover, an adequate

conception of experience would be able to provide some understanding of our direct experience of persons as distinct
from non-personal objects of experience as well as the fact
that God continued to be reported as ingredient in experience, Kant to the contrary notwithstanding.
In order to preserve conceptually both the unity and
duality of experience "as an interplay between an active
Self and an active External Reali tyn· 2 \-lhile accounting for
interpersonal relations and the experience of God, Hocking
proposed a third element in the structure of experience,
the social (or, later, intersubjective} dimension. In referring to Hume's failure to find himself "at home,

11

Hocking

1
.
cf. HGHE 204: "Briefly, Sein and Bewusstsein together g1.ve Werden ...
2
MGHE 285.
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had noted that
In truth, it is not I alone, but ~ who go out, and cannot be discovered by ourselves in that house. And that
same reflexive turn of consciousness which takes notice
of Self, as of something always present, must, if we
are right, discover the Other also, my other I, perpetual sustainer of universality in my judgments of experience.!
In short, "Experience is always and necessarily social, or
never, -- these are our alternatives."

2

Hume's mistake, as

well as that of Descartes, Berkeley and Kant, lay in failing to recognize experience as intersubjective from the outset, indeed as "consubjective." 3 Without a third element,
the social dimension, in the very structure of experience
to balance the objective-subjective tension of opposition,
one aspect tended to become a prison, the other an illusion.
Hocking's argument was two-fold; first, our experience, even of Nature, is in fact social, that is, shared
with others and known to be so. 4 Second, the fact of present social experience implies not an emergence out of private experience, but the actualizing of a potential already
1

MGHE 281. ef. ewe 39, quoted below, p.
2
MGHE 282. Cf. also 273, 275 - 76.

3

ef. MGHE 242, 262. eonsubjectivity, a term appearing in Hocking's writings even later than intersubjectivity,
refers to this "we-consciousness" of the world and , as an
expression of the social dimension of experience, constitutes a distinctive type of relation which might be termed
"We-It" and conceivably even "We-Thou," although Hocking,
so far as I know, never did so. ef. n:HGIM" 458 - 59.
4 e£. MGHE 284: "~e look at Nature through the eyes
of a social world." Cf. 273 n. and 278.

•

1
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present from the beginning because an element in the very
nature of experience itself.
With regard to the first part of his thesis, Hocking
devoted many pages of his magnum opus to the description of
our actual social experience of the world, summarizing it
in terms both of a shared experience of I-thou relations
and also of a sense of universality as the extension of our
intersubjective awareness of a common world:
we see objects and truths in general through two pairs
of eyes; through indefinite multitudes of eyes, and
thereby acquire that deepest solidity of judgment which
we call "universality. 11 Universality is a social habit;
the necessary habit of looking at any truth as if not
I alone but the whole conscious universe were looking
at it with me.l
That is to say, natural and social objects exist in a realm
of common or shared experience which has unlimited scope.
As we shall see, that is what Hocking meant by the term
"world."
The second part of his thesis affirmed that the fact
of social experience rests not on a breakthrough into
shared experience from the isolation of privacy, which as
the classical empiricists realized, cannot be substantiated
in experience. It depends, rather, on the more or less progressive realization of a potential already there in the nature of experience itself: "If, then, experience even becomes actually social, it has, in more rarefied condition,

1

MGHE 282.
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been so·, and hence is, in the same fundamental sense,
.
..1
continuously so.
alway S

For Hocking, solipsism could only be the result of a
failure to realize one's deepest potential as a social being and therefore constituted either a moral lapse or, presumably, a psychological disorder.

~·le

shall return to this

point again. Here I wish only to note that this process of
actualizing the potential or implicit structure of all experience was the immediate basis of Hocking's controversial
contention that "In any sense in which I can imagine, or
think, or conceive an experience of Other [M]ind, in that
same sense I have an experience of Other 1·1ind, apart from
which I should have no such idea. 112 In other words, "the
Idea of a social experience would not be possible, unless
such an experience were actual." 3 This proposition itself
rests on a principle taken from communications theory and
its metaphysical correlate. The principle which Hocking
adopted from "the logic of communications" states simply
that "In order that any two beings should establish communication, they must already have something in common." 4 Today
1

I-1GHE 2 7 3 •
2
MGHE 274.

3
4

Ibid., original emphasized.

MGHE 272, original emphasized. The importance of
communications theory in Hocking's early philosophy is reflected significantly in the subtitle proposed for his dis-
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thiS shared ground required as the condition for the possibilitY of communication is generally described as "the
1
field of reference" or "field of experience." In similarly
describing this common field, Hocking anticipated much later developments in theory. He also thereby introduced the
theme which he would develop into a major metaphysical
statement and even at this date provided the basis for his
effort to ,.surmount" solipsism:
For when I consider the two beings, prior to their communication, as apart from one another, I must consider
at the same time the field through which they must pass
to approach each other: and this field is already a common field.2
The fact of communication thus entails an underlying
region of mutuality between communicators: "All actual approach implies a deeper-going presence as an accomplished
fact." 3 Here we find in different language the metaphysical
principle on which Hocking 1 s argument ultimately rests: all
possibility depends on a prior actuality.

4

Experience can

sertation: "Philosophy of Communication, Part I," which,
Gilman notes in the standard bibliography, "announc[es] its
central theme and indicat[es] the author's further plans
for research and publication on that topic." ( PRCW'C 469. Cf.
also Rouner, WHE 86f£.
1

.
Cf. Wilbur Schramm, 11 How Communication Works,"~
~ed7a ~ Society, Alan Wells, ed. (Palo Alto, California:
Nat~onal Press Books, 1972), p. 184.
2
MGHE 272.
3
MGHE 273.
4 This classical principle, actus prior ~ potentia,
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explicitly social because it was antecedently sobecome
.
that is, implicitly so by nature of the metaphysical
c1a1 , ·
structure of experience as a triadic relationship of I, It
and Thou(s). In a later article, Hocking would refer to

this in terms of a process of explicitation or specification of "that latent or unfulfilled intersubjectivity underlying the entire social life of mankind in which the individual Thou's of the •we• are a mere algebraic •x.'"l As a
universal capacity for social experience, this latent intersubjectivity needs only the appropriate occasion for its
actualization: "This • x• is always capable of specification,
and always finding i t as individual persons enter the scene

and constitute a wholly concrete group, with its own identity and very likely its own proper name...

2

Thus, Hocking

concluded, "if there were no [prior] experience of 'we'
there could be no [subsequent] idea of •we.• In some degree,
intersubjectivity is either everywhere or nowhere." 3
was first formulated by Aristotle {Cf. Metaphysics 1049b4 10Sla3) and, as refined by Thomas Aquinas, became a cornerstone of scholastic philosophy for centuries (cf. Summa
Theologiae, I, Q. 3, a. 1; Q. 77, a. 1; Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 16, 3 and elsewhere.) Hocking clearly appears-to
this principle in related contexts as well: ..... the inherent publicity of Nature, the fitness of all its objects
to be communally experienced, is no empty potentiality, but
a potentiality founded (like other potentialities) on some
actuality." (MGHE 278.)
luMGIM" 458.

2
3

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Hocking pursued this line of investigation beyond
the relationship of possibility to actuality. Already sensitized to the need for a field to ground the possibility of
communication, he realized. that the condition for the possibility of all intersubjective experience had to be a prior
agency possessing a social character which could constitute
a field of experience in which all further communication
could be grounded. For Hocking, only Gad could be such an
agency. For God alone could call the Self into existence
through the natural and social media of the World by first
establishing the Self in its fundamental intersubjectivity,
that is, as a Thou.

1

Moreover, all specific fields of ex-

perience are limited and relative with regard to space and
time. But if intersubjectivity is primordially universal,
as it has to be to account for the fact of universal social
experience, then there had to be an unlimited, absolute
field of reference to ground the possibility of all such experience. As the Field of all fields, God was for Hocking
the ultimate ground of experience. But by Hocking's logic,
such an idea of God implied an experience of God, and thus
arose his second problematic: does God ever enter human experience in any way recognizable as the ground of all experience? Turning to actual human experience, Hocking found just
such a claim in the writings of the mystics, who not only
1

Cf. MGHE 295 - 97.
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described their own direct and immediate experiences of God,
but also declared ·that such experiences were within the capacitY of everyone.
Thus, for Hocking the solution to the two-fold problem of modern philosophy came to hand early in his career
if, indeed, he would spend a lifetime elaborating its full
significance. Intersubjectivity is not merely an achievement
but

in a more radical sense, the pre-condition for the pos.
sibility of all experience. God, as the ground of experience,

'

is not simply encountered as an object among other objects,
but recognized or

11

discovered" as the Field of our experi-

ence of Self, Nature and Society.

1

Furthermore, God is so

discovered not merely as an impersonal background or fringe
of consciousness, but as "Thou" -- a distinctively unique
Presence addressing the Self in the depths of experience and
dimly perceived by all as an intimate, infallible associate.
The transition in experience from other minds to the
Other Mind (that is, God) as the "Thou of the

~·lorld"

and

"the heart of Fact, 113 constituted a problem which perhaps
most vexed both Hocking and his critics. He may well have
never satisfactorily resolved it, but I believe that he
1

c£. MGHE 321, 323, 332. Cf. also "The Meaning of God
and Human Experience," Experience (Evanston, Ill.: The Annual College of Preachers, January 1 - 4, 1935), p. 62; hereafter referred to as "HGHE."
2

c£.

MGHE 224.

3cwc 198.

2
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successfully articulated the principal factors in this transition by his analysis of mystical experience. And in doing
so, Hocking developed a general concept of experience which
overcame the misconceptions of previous interpretations of
it as atomistic, phenomenalistic, rationalistic, passive,
invariant, subjectivistic and devoid of divine influence.
For Hocking, experience was holistic, metaphysically intentional, aesthetic, active, dynamic., social and theistic.
That is to say, Hocking conceived of experience as a unified,
dialectical system of interactions between a changing Self
and a real but variable environment in which feeling entered as an intrinsic element and which was rooted in an
openness to other persons as well as the all-pervasive presence of the Thou sustaining all reality.
1. Initial Concepts of Experience: "I-It-Thou 11
Out of the wealth of denotations funded by centuries
of reflection,
1

1

Hocking incorporated three elements in his

In ordinary use, the English word "experience," derived from the Latin verb experiri, meaning "to put to the
test," acquired a variety of meanings: "The action of putting to the test; trial •••• Proof by actual trial, practical
demonstration •••• The actual observation of facts or events,
considered as a source of knowledge •••• The fact of being
~onsciously the subject of a state or condition, or of be~ng consciously affected by an event •••• ~lhat has been experienced; the events that have taken place within the knowled~e of an individual, community, mankind at large, either
dur~ng a particular period or generally •••• Knowledge resulting from actual observation or from what one has undergone •••• A piece of experimental knowledge ••• The state of
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reconception of experience: subjectivity -- a knowing self;
objectivity -- a fact-world existing independently of the
human mind; and intersubjectivity -- social interaction of
a direct and immediate nature; all united in a common field
of reference. As the manifold of structural relations between these factors, experience would find expression in
three somewhat differing formulations, the first of these
being an articulation of the radical psychological character of consciousness, or "nuclear experience," the "I-ItThou" triad. 'iihile he did not mention the term "nuclear experience" or the "I-It-Thou" triad in his magnum opus, Hocking later identified these as the fundamental experiential
thematic of that study.

1

Hocking's initial triadic conception was already
clearly operative in his 1904 dissertation, which was deliberately intended to overcome the idealistic view found
even in Royce, that individuals can know only their own
mental states, being forever barred from directly experiencing the personality of another Self. Hocking wrote in
his preface, "Idealism has been exercised to rediscover the
outer world which the individual self has absorbed: I wish
to restore the stinging reality of contact with the human
~aving been occupied in any department of study or practice,

ln affairs generally, or in the intercourse of life •••• "
(OED 930.)
1

Cf. the 1962 preface, HGHE xii - xiii. Cf. also 315f.
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which this same idealism obscures. 111

co111rade

From the beginning, Hocking identified the elements
of human experience in terms of a three-fold focus of attention: physical objects, ourselves (that is, our inner
2
states) and other minds. Further, he claimed, we cannot
make physical objects the pattern of our experience of oth3
er persons, nor can we make ourselves such a pattern. The
experience of another person as "thou" possesses a 11 primordial nature. 11

4

In his magnum opus he wrote,

All the (substantive) objects of human attention
and experience may be put into three fundamental classes:
the physical objects, which with their relations we sum
up as Nature; the psychical objects, which with their
relations we sum up as Self; and the social objects, or
other minds, which with their relations we sum up as Society, or still more comprehensively, as our Spiritual
World, ourselves being included. These classes of objects seem clearly distinguishable; not mixing or blending at their borders -- when I mean another mind I distinctly do not mean either my own mind or a physical
thing.s
1

~ Elementary Experience of Other Conscious Being
Relations !£ the Elementary Experience of Physical

in ~
!n2 Reflexive

Objects-TDissertation, Harvard University,
1904), p. iv; hereafter referred to as EEOCB.
2
3
4
5

EEOCB i.
EEOCB ii.
EEOCB iii.

MGHE 241 - 42. Here i t is important to note that for
Hocking the social dimension of experience has a dual character, the intersubjective, in which the other is referred
~0 vosatively as "thou" or "you'' (plural), and objective,
1 n Wh1ch others are referred to indicatively as "he .. "she "
and "they." The intersubjective aspect includes the'con- '
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The triadic character of these and subsequent formulations resulted not from some dialectical penchant for trinitarian conceptual play, but from the exigencies of widening the dyadic concept of experience sufficiently to include a neglected but irreducibly necessary factor in actual
human experience-- the social dimension, especially its intersubjective aspect.

1

Objectivity and intersubjectivity are both distinct
functions of social experience: "I do not know my physical
world as a world of objects and then as a world of shared
objects: it is through a prior recognition of Other Mind
that my physical experience acquires objectivity at all."
•
Reality was for Hocking clearly a social construction, a

2

view he called uthe realism of social experience. 113
The objectivity of the world as a whole is a function of its experientiability by all selves in space and
time

Other Mind as the collectivity of knowing subjects.

4

subjective 11 We 11 dimension also. In his earlier writings,
Hocking covered all three dimensions by the term 11 Social,"
making some ambiguity inevitable.
1

cf. MGHE 252, n. 1. Elsewhere, Hocking even went beyond a triadic formulation of the structure of experience,
including a fourth 11 field 11 alongside Nature, Society and
the Self: Ideals. (Cf. "MGHE" 65.) This, however, was in
~erms of a controversy concerning Dewey and was not retained
1n subsequent formulations. What this departure reveals, I
think, is that Hocking was by no means captured by the lure
of three's.
2
3MGHE 290. Cf. 298£.
MGHE 288. Cf. 284.
4 Hocking seems to claim in such contexts that by a
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subjectivity in the sense of individual consciousness of
self and other natural and social objects is likewise depenon a more primordial sociality: for Hocking, "we do
dent up
not begin as solitary beings and then acquire the arts of
solitude •••• "

1

His philosophy of self, which runs through

all his formulations

of the concept of experience, consis-

tently maintained that all experience is thus fundamentally
social, including our experience of Nature.
process of extension, the totality of possible (finite) other knowers of my world must have its own other Knower, for
otherwise it would be inconceivable. But unlike a "class of
all possible classes," the class of all possible knowers is
not unthinkable, for it is not self-encompassing and has a
finite basis. Thus anchoring his argument in the logical
priority of actuality over possibility, Hocking moved to
the conclusion that an actual Knower of all possible knowers exists if any actual knowers exist. Consequently, the
realization that my present act of knowing something as a
shared object entails other knowers can be an occasion for
an awareness of the presence of God as the active ground of
such knowledge, now knowing me. Thus the term "Other t-1ind"
primarily refers to God as the ultimate, t~holly active and
therefore creative knower of myself, other selves and the
world of Nature and Society. Hocking's distinction of two
aspects of Other Mind which are not reducible to each other, and his transition from other mind(s) to Other Mind is
a very difficult one to follow. But in both respects, the
point regarding objectivity remains the same: objectivity
implies a prior subjectivity. ( Cf. MGHE 294f., 332.)
Important here, too, is the implication that it is
impossible to encompass the totality of all knowers conceptually; an infinite abyss separates the finite knowers,
possible and actual, from the Infinite Knower. (Compare here
the treatment of the same issue by Emmanuel Levinas, Totali~ ~ Infinity [Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
1969j.) Significantly, Hocking's notion of God as the All~nower was conditioned by time. As he was fond of saying,
God does not know what I am going to do this afternoon. ••
( Cf. Rouner, WHE 107.)
1
MGHE 299.
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A Self for Hocking was a system of systems -- a sysand meanings (mind) interrelated with a
tero of behavior
(body) which is the interface between the
system of facts
of Nature and Society. Mind is
mind and the "exosystems"
balf of Nature and the body is part of Nature as well as an
instrument of mind.

1

The "whole" of reality is thus on one

level the community of selves and on another the Self toqether with its natural environment. But in so far as the
objects of Nature are common to many selves, the physical
environment is the overall context and yet also part of the
community of selves:
A self, we have said, is a process of intercourse with
reality: cut away the objects and there is no process,
the mind becomes a seeing without light. The empty mind
is equivalent to no mind; hence we speak of the outworld as its 'contents,• and draw the mind's boundary
not at the eyes but far and away in front of them. The
self must include something of its objects.2
But if the world of natural objects is part of the
mind, so also are its social objects: ..... among its objects are its fellow selves, its society; the boundary of
the self must be drawn as to include something of them also."3 Ul t~mately,
·
the Whole thus includes the community of
1

.
Cf. ~ Self Its Body and Freedom (New Haven: Yale
Un~versity Press, 1928), pp. 23£.; hereafter referred to as

SBF.

2

Ms 232. Cf. also the famous passage in MGHE 265 - 66.

3

Ms 343. Cf. HNR 173: " ••• social experience is an
int~gral part of individual experience, since individual exPer1ence has neither its complete data nor its working tools
apart from social interaction."
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selves,

the World of fact, and the Self conscious of both

as well as of itself.
Ingredient in each conscious Self are sensations,
emotions and will; ideas and feelings; and subconscious
elements: instincts, memories, habits and repressed factors.
These latter are a non-thinking aspect of Self, more akin
to feeling than to thought.

1

By the subconscious, Hocking

did not mean some special faculty or a "superhuman resource,"
but a marginal area of ordinary consciousness voluntarily
"condemned to death" to enable the Self to "gain firmness
in the saddle of practical self-possession," that is, to
become the "artificial self."

2

1 ch. MGHE lOS.
2KGHE 371, 414. For Hocking the subconscious has two
aspects, the allied and the critical. The former is subconscious in so far as "it is not being thought of, though it
is being thought with." (MGHE 527.) Its contents are, roughly, "the instincts that we inherit and the habits we form;
also the memories we store, and all the system of ideas with
which we do our perceiving. It contains the habits of appreciation we build up and the habits of decision -- in
short, our 'character.'., (Ibid.} Active in all experience,
the elements of the allied subconscious are always susceptible of becoming objects of reflective scrutiny. By contrast,
the critical subconscious is 'a consciousness of objects
wh~ch ~, the artificial person, have chosen not to be conSC1ous of. It is the unchosen or repressed, marginal life
Of the mind, maintaining an existence of protest, like a
sort of bad conscience." (MGHE 528.} This aspect of consciousness is also influential in everyday life, but not
susceptible to deliberate scrutiny as is the allied subconsciousness. With James, Hocking insisted that there are
no real divisions in consciousness; both aspects of the sub;onscious Self are within consciousness, so that the only
proper contrast is between the subconscious and the artif icial self." (MGHE 528, n. 1; cf. 537.}
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The artificial self is that "made" (or "remade")
Self consequent on the practical necessity of directing attention to partial aspects as opposed to the whole of experentiable reality. Conversely, the "natural self" is the
1
whole Self --"the stark and original self,"
the conscious

-

and the subconscious self, the full integrity of which seems
to be felt only in childhood and in rare moments of mystical
revelation.

2

The artificial self is the socially-constructed

self in its relations with others, especially as these relations are the result of the exigencies of social life itself: strenuousness, resistance to criticism and organic
qrowth. 3 (One function of mystical experience is rejoining
the artificial and subconscious selves by countering the
force of social demands, as we shall see.)
In both his earlier and later periods, Hocking thus
stressed the wholeness of the Self against any effort to
1 MGHE 438.
2
cf. MGHE 527; cf. 430.
3

cf. MGHE 531 - 33. Revising the concepts of the Self
and the subconscious some forty years later, Hocking replaced the term "artificial" with "excursive" and contrasted
the excursive self with the 11 reflective" self, the equivalent of the "natural self'' of his early works. The fundamental thrust of his argument was the same. However, rather
than finding the subconscious self peripheral to the excursive self, he now located it "at the center of selfhood, and
~he invidious term 'subconsciousness.'" he declared, "is an
~nept recognition of the fact that the primary springs of
~elfhood are not habitually at the focus of its outgoing
lnterests." (MIHE 50.)

64

fragment it. The Self is individual. But it is also integrated -- composed of differentiated functions and aspects.
The division between consciousness and subconsciousness is
a tension of opposition within a single conscious Self. Further, if the Self can only be truly grasped in its wholeness because it is primarily a whole, it must also be
grasped in its relatedness. The Self cannot be understood
in isolation because it does not exist in isolation. It is
structurally related to other selves by direct interactions
lov~

such as

as well as by the media of natural and social

objects.
The "I" of nuclear experience, the constant if often
"invisible" (i.e., pre-reflexive) "!-think" which can be
added to every fact of which we are conscious, is therefore
found in the specific, concrete events of Nature and Society
as a social Self. The "invisibility" of the Self is in large
measure the consequence of the social character of experience itself, for, as Hocking observed,

11

it is not I alone,

but~ who go out ...... l The we-consciousness of consubjective experience is prior to the !-consciousness of Cartesian
individualism and Kant'

S·

transcendental ego. As modern de-

velopmental psychology as shown, every "I" is a partial "We"
discovered by a gradual process of disengagement. The I-Thou
<-It) consciousness of intersubjectivity is already a step
1

MGHE 281.
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away from (or perhaps back toward} the primordial

a~vareness

of We{-It) •
In Types

2f Philosophy, Hocking acknowledged this di-

mension of primordial awareness in social experience to be
a psychological fact:
At the beginning of experience, whatever is other-thanself, acting on self, is other self; the infant's social
awareness is contemporary with his recognition of sensation as the inner aspect of an outer action, addressed
to him: his sense experience is a direct social experience.!
The newborn infant has no explicit awareness of the .. It"
world as different from its own being, nor does it have a
distinct concept of itself as separate from the environmen2
tal activity to which it reacts. In particular, the infant
fails to perceive itself as distinct from ita mother or other social "objects ... 3 Only gradually does the infant begin
to distinguish itself from other selves and from the factworld. For some years afterward, the child continues to personify inanimate objects.
The sociality of experience is not merely an adventitious psychological fact, however; it is rooted in the very
1
2

TP 192.

The "it 11 of Hocking's first triad is the World or
Fact of his later formulations. As the manifold collectivity
of natural and social objects and relations, "It'~ refers to
everything which is not 11 We," "I," or "Thou." For World as
Nature and Society, cf. MGHE 157, 230f., 236, etc.
3
Cf. Jean Piaget, The Construction of Reality in the
£hild (New York: Ballantine Books ed., 1954T, chapters 1 - 2.
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structure of experience. The infant's a\'v'areness of being a
kind of all-inclusive selfhood is a nascent reflection cf
~etaphysical

fact. Thus, taking an ordinary adult experi-

ence as his point of departure, Hocking could also observe
that
Love, an admission into identity with Being-other-thanself, the human-other in the foreground, includes the
world-other in its natural sweep: i t is our most direct
partnership with the life~within-nature, our most immediate awareness of the Real. Its most familiar form,·
that of ordinary human communication, is an experience
of receiving-and-invading in which the solitary I-think
of Descartes becomes spontaneously a We-think -- so simply that we fail to note the momeritous transition. In
it, we directly share the object world. It is "our"
world; it is universal. "Here we are," its most spontaneous language, contains the rejection of solipsism,
that spectre which modern philosophy, held by Descartes•
I-think,· has been unable to shake off. In this, our norman "intersubjectivity," we recognize, without analysis,
that the "objectivity" of this object-world is something
more and other than alien stuff. The silent, impersonal
"It" retains its abstraction for ~ purpose: the "It" discloses itself as a "Thou."l
All experience is thus radically social, from that of
the infant to the adult, being both a primordial and ultimate involvement with Other Mind actively addressing the
Self. But neither consubjectivity nor intersubjectivity nor
any other form of social experience exists without the contextual mediation of the world, whether adverted to or not.
If we experience other mind(s} in our awareness of natural
and social objects, so also we experience the World in our
awareness of other mind(s), for no mind can be truly empty
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and be known. Each functions as a "third .. for the other,
thus permitting the ego to escape its predicament of selfenclosure. The world, as shared, alone can bring human
selves knowingly into each other's experience. There is no
direct vision of another by some kind of psychic intuition:
Human beings can only approach each other by \vay of
third objects. We do not see each other: we see only
the outer shell -- the body, and the objects which we
have in common -- things and events in space. We are
like persons on opposite sides of a mountain, invisible
to one another; they cannot meet by direct approach,
they have nothing to aim at, but each can see along his
own path the point of junction, the rendezvous: by way
of this third object they meet. Likewise with all mental approach. There is no direct way of comparing ideas
and sentiments: agreement means a common attitude to a
common object: ultimate agreement means caring for and
serving the same causes -- worshipping the same gods. 1
All human approach of minds and wills is thus indirect.
Hocking is not denying here that we can have a direct experience of other selves -- a thesis which' had occupied so many crucial pages of his magnum

~. 2 Rather, he

is denying that there can be directness without mediation
exactly the point he had made before. The world is the
necessary medium of both our intersubjectivity and our consubjectivity. It is by restoring the objectivity of the
world without diminishing the independent reality of the
Self that

11

the stinging reality of contact with the comrade ..

1

LRWF 33 - 34. Cf. MGHE 256 - 57 and Marcel's commentary on this passage, art. cit., PRCWC 29.
u

2

This passage should be compared with the famous
comrade 11 passage in MGHE 265 - 66, cited above, p. 33 - 34.
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can be restored. Experience is always a relationship of
thirds-- I, It and Thou(s), and hence the necessity of
passing beyond the traditional dyadic conception of experience in order to describe i t adequately.
Hocking did not close his accounts with experience
'

by exposing its necessary triadic structure, however. The
second part of his program concerned discovering how God
could be ingredient in experience both immediately and directly. As social, that is, shared, experience was for him
capable of revealing its ground, the condition for the possibility of all social intercourse. That ground is first
disclosed as the underlying unity that constitutes the possibility of relations between I, It and Thou(s):
this everyday process of 'finding themselves sharing
the planet,' together with every mutual understanding
growing out of this discovery, implies that these
selves have always had some region of unity, or identical experience, known to be such. This aboriginal core
of unity cannot be the result of historical achievements: it cannot be the state. It is an object not of
social but of metaphysical reflection: our practical
dealings with it are matters not of politics but of religion.!
Similarly, in his magnum opus, Hocking unmistakably
identified the Other Mind perceived in our natural and social experiences as God:
The idea of God is not an attribute which in the course
of experience I come to attach to my original whole 1

MS 377. Cf. also MGHE 315, and "FFD" 545 - 46.
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idea: the unity of my world which makes it from the beginning a whole, knowable in simplicity, as the unity
of other selfhood.
God then is immediately known, and permanently
kno\vn, as the Other Mind which in creating Nature is
also creating me. Of this knowledge nothing can despoil
us· this knowledge has never been wanting to the selfkn~wing mind of man.l
our fundamental social experience is, therefore, an
experience of God, whether or not it is recognized as such.
Further, such experience "is not an inference, but an immediate experience. As simply as Nature presents itself as
objective, just so simply and directly is the Other Mind
present to me in that objectivity, as its actual meaning."

2

Society, too, composed at first glance of the multiple
selves to whom we are variously related, whether expressed
indicatively or vocatively, discloses the presence of a
t

1 MGHE 296 - 97. In a letter to an unnamed friend
(1920), Hocking identified God as the ultimate medium of interpersonal communication: "If we could understand the mystery of our human communication, we might get some light on
the Divine Mystery at the same time. Now it seems to me that
we perceive each other by the aid of objects which we have
in common, meeting in a common place and time, under a common sky, having some common interests and ideas, and most
fundamentally, common love of truth. And before we met each
other, or anybody else £or that matter, we knew that these
objects and interests were not our private property, but
were sharable -- yes, already shared with a companion who
does not come and go. In short, it is God who from the beg~nning shares all our objects, and so God is the real me~~urn of communication between one person and another. That
~s all." (Quoted by Rouner, WHE 41.)
2
MGHE 288; cf. 230ff. Importantly, Hocking insisted
t~at although objective in experience, just as God is not
d~scovered as "an object among other objects" ("MGHE" 62),
s(o also God is not found as an other mind among other minds.
Cf. MGHE 332.)
--
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ThOU calling to the Self through the exigencies of love and

dutY•

1

Precisely here arises the chief difficulty in Hocking's elaboration of social experience. If our knowledge of
God is not only inferential but also immediate, and God is
the ground of our experience, the very condition for its
2
possibility and its wholly active source, how and when
does the identification of this ultimate "field of reference" _!! God occur within human experience, that is, consciously?
In his magnum opus, Hocking held that our initial
knowledge of God as the wholly active Self communicating
to me through the events of Nature and Society is neither
conspicuous nor adequate. 3 But it is recognizable:
It will be present for the most part in no other.form
than as the abiding sense of what stability and certainty we have, as we move about among men and things; it
will be present for the most part just as our own force
of self-assertion and self-confidence is present, that
force by which we individually will "to maintain ourselves in being" in a world known, by what assurance \ve
do not ordinarily inquire, to be no hostile, nor ultimately alien, thing. It will be present chiefly in my
persistent sense of reality in that with which I am dealing, and in those fellow minds with whom I converse.4
1

2

cf. l-1IHE 89 - 92, 247ff., and MGHE 23lff.
cf. MGHE 295.

3 cf. MGHE 294,
300.
4 MGHE 296
- 97.
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AlSO present in "objectivity of mind," an empirical openness to experience, as well as in the sense of responsibility and dependence, this sense of an Absolute Other is inseparable overall from self-consciousness "and discernible
in all the dimensions and assertions of self-consciousness."!
Similarly, in his 1935 address entitled significantly "The Heaning of God and Human Experience," Hocking reiterated his position that experience was metaphysically intentional: "Experience is always 'of' something."

2

Ultimately,

what it is "of" is reality, the Real. Thus, "Whether experience reveals God at any point, then, depends simply on whether the real is God, or whether God is the real." 3
The two primary regions of reality, Nature and Society, are manifestly not God. But

~

experiences of Nature and

Society, especially in the latter respect of friendship,
there opens another region: "Where two or three are gathered
together in friendship there is always a third." 4 Ultimately
this third is not merely the common world, but another presence, found not as an object among other objects, but as
1

MGHE 296.
2
"MGHE" 61. In a brief article, "On Royce's Empiricism," Hocking again stated that being "is always a factor
in experience: ••• experience is always ontological, and •.•
ontology is always empirical. The real is not behind the
surface of experience but in it: a valid empiricism will include the 'what' as well as the 'that' of our perceptions."
(The Journal of Philosophy, 53, 3 [Feb. 2, 1956], p. 59;
hereaf:ter referred to as "ORE.")
3
4
"MGHE" 61.
"MGHE" 65.
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the Thou always there, once more, "the point of certainty
implied in all [human] experimental outreachings into the
1
world of flux, conf.usion and uncertainty. n
Here, Hocking is restating a position first proposed
in his magnum onus. God is ultimately disclosed not as an
impersonal item (It) in the constellation of environmental
factors we recognize in our dealings with natural events and
society, but as a personal dimension, an Other Mind of immense presence, unlike all finite objects and other minds.
This personal Presence is not encountered in a delimited
fashion as a "he" {or conceivably "she" or

11

they"), but as

a supportive, sometimes demanding Thou. But God as the 11 Thou
of the World" 2 is not circumscribed in experience, that is,
objectified among other objects of consciousness, even as a
vocative presence. He is a Thou of a wholly different character from all the other thou's, grounding, circumscribing
and non-finite.

The reality of natural and social experiences thus
depends on a more primordial reality, and it is in this
sense that God is the real. The limited, contingent reality
of our experiences of the world bespeak a source in which
all our lesser realities are gounded. In his magnum ORus,
this thesis became the basis for Hocking's original treat1

2

Ibid.
"RF" 365.
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ment of the ontological argument for God's existence.

1

At

a later date, he pressed on to characterize this Reality as
the field of experience, or, as it put it then, "the frame
of the universal":
There are those who doubt whether God can be given in
experience because, as they say, experience gives only
the immediate, whereas God is all. The answer lies in
the structure of experience. Experience is here and now.
But it is always more than immediate; for it is experience of an object. Now the objects which experience
deals with change; but the changing objects are always
placed; they stand in a context which is beyond change.
This context we have been calling "reality"; and we have
been implying that whatever else we are dealing with, we
are dealing with reality, and reality is one and whole.
It is this character, always dimly present, which religious experience makes salient. Experience gives us
change, yes, but change in the frame of the not-self;
it gives the particular, but in the frame of the universal; it gives the evil and the defeating, but in the
frame of the absolute assurance of substantial good.2
The structure of experience thus includes the "frame"
dimension, without which the fragmentary aspects of life
would not even have their relative coherence. There is a
reality beyond and upholding the three-fold elements of experience, a reality capable of being consciously if .. dimly"
perceived. Hocking elsewhere concludes,
1

"The ontological argument reasons that because the
world is not, God is. It is not from the world as a stable
premise that we-can-proceed to God as a conclusion: it is
rather when the world ceases to satisfy us as a premise
and appears as a conclusion from something more substantial
that we find God -- proceeding then from the world as a conclusion to God as a premise." (MGHE 312.)
211 MGHE" 65.
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Religion thus contains in itself the ultimate truth of
human psychology (not as a rule discovered by the psychologists), that the mental life of man is conversation
with an absolute object, apart from which the whole
sail-expanse of his several desires flaps loosely in
divergent winds.!
Nowhere is it clear in these passages, however, just
how the transition is made in conscious experience from the
immediate awareness of Presence in our experience as the
source of our fundamental certitude, objectivity of mind,
sense of reality and personal destiny, to the recognition

-

of God. It is conceivable that without a concept with which
to thematize the perception, the grounding Other Mind would

E2l

be recognized as God. Conversely, it would seem that by

"religious experience," Hocking understood just such a noninferential realization: that i t is God who is here and now
present as the ultimate ground of experience. And thus the
problem of the transition must be deferred at this point to
an inquiry into the religious dimension of experience.
In summary, the following elements can be discerned
as constituting the structure of experience according to
Hocking's fundamental conception. First, the Self or "I;'
including the plural ego or "We," being a unified composite
of body, ideas, feelings, will, instincts, memory -- both
conscious and unconscious, realizing itself excursively
(the artificial self) and reflectively (the natural self).

1

LRWF 34 - 35.
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second, a common world of fact -- Nature as physical and
animate environment and Society as the realm of persons and
relations experienced objectively or "indicatively" -- "he, ..
"she," or "they." Third, the world of other persons perceived intersubjectively as "thou 11 and "you" (plural) and
relating in turn to the "I" as "thou." Each of these three
dimensions of human experience is reciprocally related to
the others, functioning as a medium of disclosure. That is,
the World is the indirect object and medium of every IThou encounter and vice versa. Finally, these elements and
their relations are grounded in an encompassing field of experience providing the possibility of interaction and the
assurance of reality. This field, as the ground of experience, shares in its qualities in a transcendent manner
it manifests selfhood, objectivity and intersubjective presence as Thou. It is, in short, divine.
2. Reconceptions of Experience: The Self Meeting the World
More or Less Well
Hocking's second and third formulations of the concept of experience can be shown to have been modifications
of his fundamental concept rather than departures from it.
The first presages of the second formulation appeared in
his 1938 Gifford Lectures, fully three years before "Lectures on Recent Trends in American Philosophy" was pub-
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lished. There, he observed that
the term [experience is] full of false suggestions when
taken as a non-committal or peculiarly secure point of
beginning. It [is] not a primitive or unanalysable term.
We must take the risk of dissecting it, and of describing experience as a 'meeting between a self and a world.'
This indicate[s] that experiencing [is] active,
not merely receptive, and that it [is] done more or less
well.l
Experience is a doing, not merely a passive undergoing of
outer activity. Further, it is done more or less well because the "equipment," the experiential means by which we
meet the world, is ideas, which are always more or less ade2
quate to the task of relating the world to consciousness.
The watershed into which Hocking's initial and later
conceptions of experience were gathered was, as indicated
earlier, the essay "Lectures on Recent Trends in American
Philosophy" published in 1941. In it he identified certain
misconceptions which had rendered even the word "experience 11 tired: subjectivity, passivity, shreddibility and
indifference. 3

Against these misconceptions were being

1

GL Jan. 18, 1938. Past tenses have been rendered
present for the sake of uniformity with other writings.
2
Ibid. Hocking can thus be considered only a tenta~ive rationalist. However, he explicitly rejected the opin~on that our ideas of reality are ever completely inadequate, with the possible exception of our ideas of God. (Cf.
"LRT" 18.)
311

LRT" 16 - 17.
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lodged the complaints of Dewey, Whitehead and Wild, who had
prepared for "a new beginning which shall unite the elements
1
of these various protests." To this end, Hocking proposed

the three components of his definition: (1) The Self, (2)
Meeting the

~orld,

(3) More or Less Well. This conception,

he argued, "evades subjectivity because it brings the Self
and the World together... 2 Thus the misconceptions of subjectivism and naturalism were corrected.
Further, atomicity is corrected, for whatever else I
think of, I am thinking of the world as a scene for the
detail. Further, there is always an agendum and theretom solicitude. Whenever an individual has anything to
d~ he realizes it as part of a total unmastered task;
therefore there is concern; and where there is concern,
nothing is blank, neutral fact.3
Experience, from this perspective, is revealed to be objective, that is, metaphysically intentional; contextual, thus
implying a field of reference; active; and, finally, passionate.
As in his Gifford Lectures, for Hocking "Ideas are
4
the equipment with which we meet the world." But ideas are
always to some extent inadequate, if never totally so, and
thus our meeting with the world is itself always "more or
less adequate ... s
l"LRT" 17.
3
5

Ibid.
Ibid.

2

"'LRT" 18.

78

In his 1951 reworking of the first five Gifford Leetures, "Fact and Destiny (II}," Hocking similarly argued
for a widened conception of experience. "I propose," he
wrote, "that \-re consider all experience as experience .£y

a self, a 'subject,' and as experience of a non-self, an
•object.•n 1 Once again, Hocking was starting from rather
than rejecting the dyadic conception.

11

But," he continued,

taking the second step with the first -- all experience
is of a not-self -- we break out of the ego-centric enclosure and escape the subjective bias without repudiating the self-subject who seems to be always discoverable. [ ••• ] For simplicity and without doctrinaire implications, let us say that experience is of 'a world':
it is a special sort of meeting between ~ self and ~
world.2
Experience is thus metaphysically intentional or objective: it is of a world having its own "persistent character." Such an independent fact-world seems at this point
to bear its own warrant, however. The objectifying social
dimen~ion

of experience does not arise, although it might

well be presumed. In fact, I believe it was.
The specific misconceptions of experience Hocking
was concerned to correct at this time were passivity, a cognitive bias, and invariance, against which he countered: "Experience includes experiencing: and experiencing is an activity detailed at its maximum quiescence, in acts of atten.
3
t ~on."
Further, " ••• every item of experience is charged
1
3

"FD II 11 320.
Ibid.
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with feeling."l Horeover, not only is the "content of exat every point as better or
p erience ••• subject to judgment
.
2
worse, " but, once more, the "equipment of ideas" with
which we meet the world is more or less adequate. Thus experiencing itself can be better or worse. Therefore,
These observations enable us to enlarge our notion of
experience to an extent likely (and intended) to bring
consternation to any who regard it as a primitive term:
in experience, we venture to say, a self is meeting its
world always receptively, but also actively, passionately and more or less well.3
What is perhaps most significant about all three versions of Hocking's second formulation is that the social
and theistic dimensions of experience are at most implicit.
The issue of intersubjective knowledge simply does not
arise, nor does that of the field of experience. As we

shall see, however, Hocking had not retracted his contentions that all experience is radically social and divinely
grounded. Even in these references, the implicit inclusion
of ideas, the equipment for meeting the world, carries a
social dimension in so far as all ideas are in some sense
common. That is, we know the objects of natural and social
experience as known by others. Further, World, as we have
seen, contains the realm of both Nature and Society. But
1

2
3

Ibid.

"FD II" 323.
Ibid.
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despite such allusions, it is obvious that Hocking's conceptualization of experience during the period between 1938
and 1951 was less explicitly social in view of his overall
philosophical project. This may be because Hocking had earlier striven to bring the social dimension forward from a
psychological perspective and in view of the problem of
solipsism. In the following period, he was not only addressing the topic from the perspective of his own active social involvement, but was considering another set of problems,
including that of the intentionality of experience. But in
this regard the second formulation was perhaps even more
social than the previous conception in its presumed intersubjectivity.
At this time, in fact, Hocking's views on intersubjectivity and the religious dimension of experience were
being developed even further, but elsewhere.

1

With respect

to the social dimension of experience, in 1954 Hocking addressed himself directly to the tension between the direct
and imnediate experience of other selves versus the necessity of mediation and interpretation in all experience. In
a detailed analysis of some recent works by Gabriel Marcel,
he noted that the "illusion of directness'' has its correlative "illusion of indirectness," which obscures the con.

1

Hocking•s explicit writings on religion and reliexperience at this time will be considered in chapters II and III below.
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5 tant

reality of intersubjectivity.

1

That is to say, "in-

direct intersubjectivity," I-It relations mediated by Thou's
11

not the direct focus of attention,

iS possible only if

there is already a direct intersubjectivity somewhere."

2

The latter case would comprise I-Thou relations mediated by
"It's" no longer at the center of conscious attention. Hocking was here returning to the principle of the priority of
actuality over possibility. Similarly, he argued, the "fulfilled" intersubjectivity of direct I-Thou encounter in actual experience has as its ground a latent or "unfulfilled"
intersubjectivity which, below the threshold of full consciousness, is nevertheless "our native air."

3

That is, as

Hocking said elsewhere, we possess an actual capacity for
intersubjective experience of which we are ordinarily only
11

dimly" aware, if only because it, like the air we breathe,

is so utterly familiar as to escape notice until some striking alteration brings it to mind. This latent intersubjectivity, we are told, is our nuclear experience, in which
individual Thou's, as we have seen, remain "a mere algebraic 'x'" until in the intercourse of actual experience our
general intersubjective potential is uspecified," finding
fulfillment in a concrete I-Thou encounter.
1
3

"MGIM" 453.

2

"MGIM" 453 - 54.

4 "MGIM

4

Ibid.
11

458.

82

The experiences by which intersubjective latency
finds manifest fulfillment are those, generally, of love
1
and obligation, including a sense of destiny. Thus, for
Hocking the .. relatively unmixed experiences of intersubjectivity must belong either to the inaccessible beginnings of
mental life or to the mature revulsions from solitude."

2

Intersubjectivity thus exists in two forms: as a radical
but potential openness to others in nuclear experience and
also in actual encounters with particular persons in which
the acquired arts of solitude are surmounted. Hence,
our most primitive human illumination is a breaking out
of solitude into a possessed intersubjectivity, which
is also consubjectivity. Through the love born in it as
a response, the discovering and realizing self is under
pressure to spread its light.3
Hocking is here claiming that once the acquired solipsism of individual isolation is overcome, especially in
acts of compassion and love, there is a natural inclination
to expand the intersubjective-consubjective horizon, to relate to more and more persons as "Thou" and uwe." His argument is founded on a familiar principle. Indirect !-Thou relations imply direct I-Thou relations, inasmuch as consciousness of the world as mediated by other minds is epistemologically posterior to an awareness of other minds as mediated
l"MGIMu 457, 460.

2

"MGIM" 458.

83

bY

the world. Objectivity is, like solitude, an acquisition,

a property discovered by a shift of attention from " (I-)
Thou" to "(I-)It." In turn, direct and explicit intersubjective experiences are possible only because there is a primordial capacity for them which has been specified in the
concrete event. In both cases, the logic is the same: possibility implies prior actuality. Experience is always social or never. It is primordially social because the very
structure of experience itself is a dialogue with the Other
Mind mediated by the natural and social World as a whole
and in detail.
"Developed" or explicit experience as an articulation
of the nuclear I-Thou-It relation is a progressive disengagement of the three elements at one level of psychological rnaturity and a re-engagement of them later on in the following
order: objectivity, subjectivity and, finally, intersubjectivity and consubjectivity. Epistemologically, however, both
objectivity and subjectivity depend upon a latent or implicit intersubjectivity, which finds explicitation in a twofold psychological movement. First, the disengagement of
subject from object, followed by the full realization of
intersubjectivity, the discovery of other selves by a detachment of the "Thou" from the

11

It." That is to say, the

Psychological order of development reverses the epistemological order of priority.
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The field of experience remains a latent factor in
consciousness as the elements of experience are gradually
distinguished. But it is capable of being brought to awareness by a shift of attention from any of the three elements
of experience to the context which grounds them. In his
next major work, The Coming World Civilization, Hocking continued to insist that the intersubjective character of all
experience thus leads directly to an awareness of God by a
contextual reflection:
~ ~ ~ that brings the
~ brings the sharableness:

I-think into the picture
the simple thereness is
already common experience, common receptivity toward an
intersubjective action. Yet as action it is wholly different from any activity I might perceive in the field
of thereness: it is silent, unrelenting, with no insistence on change, more like a firm pressure-of-being
from the unnamed, unvocal, nonintrusive Other.l

In a shift of attention from the part, the self-conscious
ego, to the whole, the field of consciousness, the Other is
brought to explicit awareness in what can only be described
as a mystical experience: "I recognize it as the will of
another self, a purposive selfhood, purposing among other
things the being of this I-think. It is the Thou-art, immediately experienced as such." 2
On the basis of this discussion, to describe the process by which the structure of experience is explicitated
1

2

c1·iC 39.

Ibid. Cf. 40. The field of experience can also be

~rought to conscious awareness by reflex acts of attention
1 D dealing with other Thou's and the World itself.
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in the concrete events of life becomes possible in terms of
the creation of a Self by another s.elf in a process of selfcommunication mediated through the natural and social World.
ThiS process succeeds "more or less well" inasmuch as the
conceptual presentation of reality by ideas is more or less
adequate. (It is important to remember that for Hocking
ideas never exist in isolation from feelings.) The Self so
created is thus always a social Self.
3. Final Conceptions of Experience: Fact, Field and Destiny
Hocking's third formulation of the concept of experience was both more overtly metaphysical than the previous
two and also emphasized the contextual field of experience
more than they did.

The continuity between the concept of

experience as the interrelationship of Fact, Field and Destiny is perhaps not immediately apparent in Hocking's articulation of his final metaphysic, but I believe that a clear
line of convergence can be discerned. For in Hocking's view,
Fact came to signify the ultimate category of the World's
reality, the bald .. It" of nuclear experience. Field similarly assumed functions of the "I" and the "Self" of the former concepts. Field also united the World of Fact with the
Self, for facts do not exist in isolation, but as elements
in a field. Further, the Self is also a field in which Factfields intersect·, the Self is a "Field of Fields." The ulti-
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~ate

intersubjective or social dimension of experience came

to be embodied for Hocking in the notion of Destiny, the IfhOU relationship between God as the ground of experience
and the Self, expressed in terms of creativity and purpose.
fhe context of human destiny is the field of social interaction, particularly as manifest in science, love and justice. God is the Infinite Field ultimately binding Facts,
finite Fields and their Destiny together. And thus the concept of experience debouches, as Hocking might say, into

. .

that of re 1 1g1on.

1

i. Fact
The importance of Fact as an element in experience
was clearly stated in Hocking's 1951 version of "Fact and
Destiny," in which he related it to his second formulation
of the concept of experience. In so far as experience can
be described as "a meeting of a world by a self in successive acts of attention,"

2

then the "existent object of a

single act of attention is, in general, a 'fact.'" 3
1

The categories of Fact, Field and Destiny were not
to Hocking's final period of development, but had
f1gured more or less prominently from his earliest period.
Their convergence toward the end of his life as the major
metaphysical category-system must be seen as the culmination of a process of gradual, even dialectical development
in which the radically theistic character of experience became more pronounced.
n~vel

2
3

"FD II 11 322.
Ibid.
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Hocking had already introduced Fact in the preceding
article as a datum, something given in the course of experience as "simply there, without apology or permission,
with silent finality."! Its salient feature is its .. hardness" -- the quality or "whatness" by which "it irresistibly
2
displaces whatever we might imagine there in its place. 11
Fact is also characterized by existence, its "thereness" or
"presence in the realm of being!'"

3

A third characteristic

of Fact is its impenetrability: "it lends no encouragement
to understanding. u

4

Fact, Hocking later claimed, is always accompanied
in its singular particularity by its "shadow" -- the vague
presence of the whole.

5

Facts occur in context, ultimately

that of the World as a whole. The particular bespeaks the
universal. Whether in terms of existence or of meaning,
facts are elements in a field potentially infinite.

6

ii. Field
Field was also a category of Hocking's thought from
l"FD I" 2·I cf. MGHE 485, 106, 137.
2
"FD I" 4.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.

-

S"FD. II" 325
26.
6
Cf. "FD II" 328
29.

-
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hiS earliest writings.

1

His concept of the Self as a "Field

of Fields" was foreshadowed as early as 1926, when he described the unity of the Self as one in which Nature, SocietY and God interact: "The self stands as the vinculum between a plurality of space-time orders: i t is not completely absorbed in any one of them, and no one of them is for i t
2
exclusively real."
Hocking's awareness of the metaphysical importance

of the concept of Field with regard to the triadic nature
of experience was noted in 1940: "The content of experience
consists of (a) particulars exemplifying or embodying (b)
universals, and {c) the fields in which these particulars
lie." 3 In a note, he added, "Since these fields (such as
space, time) are particular fields, namely the fields of
these particular events, they may be dealt with for the present discussion as particulars."

4

iii. Destiny
The concept of Destiny had figured unobtrusively in
1

cf. MGHE 118 - 19, where Hocking refers to "object-

f~elds and field-contents ••• space-fields, cosmic force-

f1eld and one ultimate background-field of infinite time."
Cf. also 212, 298.
2
3

SBF 94; cf.

also 177f., "WM" 426, "MGHE" 65.

"0SSM" 257. It is hard to dismiss the possibility
t~at Hocking has here replaced the "form" mentioned in his
d1ssertation with its metaphysical equivalent. See below, p.
108.
4
Ibid. For an analysis of Hocking's use of the fieldconcept, cf. Frederick Werner, "Integrity," PRCWC 95 - 120.
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socking's

magnum~,

especially in its two concluding

chapters, where it was identified with the prophetic consciousness of God's providence:
unless the original sources of history, the ultimate arrangements of natural facts, the configurations of physical things which set the last limits to the hopes of
all living beings, are already subject to some other
control than our own, there is no such thing as absolute
certainty of historic action.l
While appearing in subsequent works, Destiny was not developed as a major category, however, until Hocking's last period of metaphysical reflection.
In Science and the Idea of God, Hocking referred to
nuclear experience, stressing the ethical element of call
and response which would eventually become the sense of Destiny. He began, however, by exposing in the concept of Fact,
the "datum" of sense experience, the implicit give-and-take
which gives rise to call and response and thereby to duty.

As a personal transaction, call and response implies a dimension of experience beyond the simple dyad of mind-meeting-object. The first stage in making manifest the intersubjective character of scientific experience is the rejection,
accordingly, of pure subjectivism: "As a 'datum,' it [i.e.,
fact] is something 'given,' and that means given to areceiving self by an outer activity~ it is a surface of con2
tact between a living mind and a living world." Such ada1
2

MGHE 516. Cf. also 488, 503, 5llf., 515ff.
science and the Idea of God (Chapel Hill: University
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tum of experience presents me with a moral alternative: do
1 take it as solipsistic, mere fodder for subjective selfenjoyment, or as a summons to think, a phase of an object,
the sign of an objective world? Hocking replied,
The life of the man and the life of science itself depend on rejecting the first alternative, and going in
for the second; it is the rejection of solipsism, and
therewith of solipsistic enjoyment; it is the beginning
of conversation.!
Here, Hocking clearly implies that experientially,
the rejection of solipsism is a matter of moral choice. This
l.• s

,

I believe,· a manifes,t reference to his notion of destiny

perceived as a call of duty to address and deal with the natural and social World as a dual realm of personal responsibility.

2

A "natural'• failure to do so would amount to some-

thing like deliberate autism; the moral refusal to come out
of one's solitary self-preoccupation and undertake the duties
of social life would be an act of fundamental selfishness.
Further, the fact of scientific enterprise itself asserts by implication that the outer agency is not only a
source of obligation but a "Thou." For
of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 113; hereafter referred
to as SIG. Cf. also "ORE" 61: "There are data in experience,
and the word datum refers not only to material accepted but
to a need to accept, an incapacity of our knowing processes
to operate without a raw material actually presented as gift."
1
2

siG 113.

c£ ewe 198: "God is the heart of Fact; and with this
Primary Fact appears my first duty, to come out of my self
and converse with him."

91

only a living self can be such a source. This is not argued out by the incipient consciousness of the infant;
its attitude is far more substantial and direct. It
does the primary ethical deed of living outward rather
than inward, as no proof could either require or reach,
because it already perceives that which is not itself
as a Thou, an Other, and accepts its destiny as a life
of conversation with that Other. This is the immediate
presence of purpose in the nucleus of the world, precisely there where science begins and also the mystic.l
Perhaps this view is not an extreme extrapolation of
the view of Eddington that
mind stuff."

2

~the

stuff of the universe is

Hocking is claiming that both the mystic and

the scientist, even the infant, are responding to what is
perceived as the call of a living self, not the bare facticity of a dead universe.

Only a living mind has such a

••pull." The mystic and the scientist differ from the infant
in reaching out deliberately, fulfilling with the fullness
of conscious decision what the infant normally does instinctively and effortlessly.
Similarly,

in~

Coming World Civilization Hocking,

moving closer to his explicit concept of Destiny, maintained
that
In the presence of the universal Thou-art, there is an
immediate summons to live by objective thought (including science) and by creative action: and in so far as
the individual resp~nds, partially or completely to
1
2

siG 114. Cf.

"WV 11 473ff.

Arthur Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931), p. 414.
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this imperative, God is literally, through him, at work
in history.l
The reworking of Thoughts 2n Life and Death (1937) as
The Meaning of Immortality in Human Experience in 1957 gave

----

Hocking the opportunity to bring Destiny explicitly forward
as an experiential fact. The sense of destiny, he observed,
is fundamentally an experience or feeling that one
is in the hands of an overnecessity which in the course
of his world line he could not evade except at the cost
of complete futility. The sense of power is to such persons a sense of obligation, and the quest not of inner
dimensionality, but of specific agenda, as of the thing
or things one was meant to do.2
In so far as this "overnecessityn is an experience,

more precisely a feeling, it is not exactly to the point to
account for it in terms of social demands, family expectations, education, etc. And this for two reasons. First, as
an "overnecessity," there is apparently some awareness that
Destiny is not of the same kind as the common necessities of
life, although perhaps implicated in them, but something
over and beyond them, something possibly on the order of
Kant's categorical imperative. Second, even if the immediate
occasion of the specific feeling of destiny were the ordi1

cwc 83. Cf. !>1GHE 5llff., HNR, Chapter 14 and 11 HA" 435.
2
MIHE. 95. Cf. also "A Brief Note on Individuality in
East and ~'lest," The Status of the Individual in East and
fest, Charles Moore, ed. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
ress, 1968), pp. 94- 95; hereafter referred to as "ABN. 11
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narY necessities imposed upon us by the demands of social
life, these might well be perceived as the media of some
higher call addressing us through them, a possibility which,
given Hocking's respect for ordinary experience and mediation, provides an attractive theoretical account. At any
rate, it is the force of conviction, not the specific occasion that Hocking has here singled out for consideration.
Further, those who express such a conviction are themselves
1
at a loss to d escr~'b e •;t accura t e 1 y.
Hocking's last metaphysical testament brought greater, perhaps final sharpness to the relations between the
fundamental elements of experience: the given aspect of
Fact, the Field which grounds Fact both as background and
as consciousness or Self, and the call of an Other, which
demands a response in the purposeful activities of the Self
in the fact-world of Nature and Society and ultimately
stands revealed as the Field of all experience.
Much of Hocking's treatment of Fact in "Fact, Field
and Destiny" is endebted to "Fact and Destiny (II)." He
added, importantly, however, that Fact

11

has the wide gener-

ality of both 'thing' and 'event• •••• 112 And here, even more
1

c£.

MIHE 95: "Let us designate such persons as the
They are led on by something they know not what.
l'hey are at a disadvantage in giving an account of it."
2
"FFD" ·527.

~ystics.
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importantly, Fact is no longer synonymous with datum: "The
Enqlish word 'Fact•

••• suggests an independent entity

standing pat toward our encounter -- offering itself, if at
all, only to our awareness. The self-giving of the particu1
lar pact is a piece of the self-standing of the world."
Fact is the fundamentally irreducible but non-deducible ele2
ment of extramental reality in our experience. But Fact is
problematic. While it is necessary that if anything is to
exist that there be a factual world, still, any singular
Fact is unnecessary and therefore contingent.

3

Facts may

well be prosaic, but they also have indisputable authority
when established.

4

In sum, -It belongs to the concept of a

Fact that a fact is identifiable -- and this trait implies
finitude, boundary, and presumably plurality. And if Fact
facts, there must also be relations among facts,

imp~ies

distinguishable from the facts themselves."

5

Such relations

are often considered "facts of a second order." But relations presuppose a background which is the context and
ground, not of themselves alone, but of their relata, Facts.
Therefore, Hocking brought forth the concept of Field for
consideration as a fundamental metaphysical category.
1

Ibid. Cf. 525: " ••• the business of Metaphysics is
to understand the world, that is to say, the given world
Which, as given, is one stupendous Fact."
2

Ibid.

3

c£.

"FFD" 528 -

S"FFD" 531.

29.
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Field is no mere mental construct; it is real and
factual: "Having no specific sense-properties of its own,
it is (in a sense) indistinguishable from Nothing, and has
often been referred to as 'The Void.' But unlike a Nothing,
1
it has properties such as continuity and measurability."
space and time are such fields. Hocking, however, congruently with his 1941 insight, found in Field a more ordinary
meaning: "the term Field is not originally technical but a
term of common speech, to which I now propose to return it,
but with an ideal emptiness!"

2

He advanced his case for the

metaphysical significance of field-theory by addressing the
knotty problem of necessity and freedom, especially as then
embodied in controversies over biological determinism. Hocking, ever-certain of the irrefragible reality of freedom,
utilized the concept of Field and the creativity it grounds
in order to overcome the philosophical impasse. The solution lay, he advanced,
in the circumstance that Fields, infinite Fields, may
plurals. Kant to the contrary notwithstanding,
there may be more than one total space, more than one
total time, more than one world-order. Because of this
valid pluralism, the apparent alternatives before us,
as we deliberate courses of action, are genuine alternatives -- not pantomime: the term "possibility" has a
literal validity, not to be dismissed as necessity in
disguise.3

~

1

2
3

Ibid.
"FFD" 532. Cf. MIHE xvi.
"FFD" 541.
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Further,"since fields do not exist in their own
right, but are derivative from events, as Relativity theory
implies, if there can be independent events, there can be
1
independent fields." But a plurality of independent fields
indicates an absolute ontological pluralism and its consequence, an ultimate lack of coherence, unless such a plurality can be contained by another kind of field. As Hocking
had realized on his lonely walk by the Charles River, the
self is such a field. Thus, even though there is "no physical transition from one field to another •••

-tion

11

there is transi-

and therefore the possibility of novelty,

namely by a movement of attention: the Self is, we may
say, the vinculum between one field and the other. On
the view of the general thesis that wherever there is
a homogeneous plurality there is a Field expressive of
the relationships between individual entities, the Self
here functions as a Field of Fields.2
The implications of this insight are important and
relevant to Hocking's final conceptualization of experience.
First, the Self is a metaphysical category of first priority, transcending the limitations of subordinate fields and
the closed cosmos of the conservative system:
the phenomenal world -- that of the conservative order
will maintain its rules; but ••• the rules are at every
point subject to alteration of field-reckoning through
the creative decisions of Selves. This implies that
1

2

Ibid.
"FFD" 541 - 42.
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while the phenomenal world is a closed system, the real
universe is to some extent "open toward the future."l
second, by means of the emergence of creativity and purpose,
Hocking prepared the way for a consideration of Destiny. He
pointed out that our creativity is radically limited and
actually nascent:
we human beings never create-in-toto: we bring into existence states of fact not otherwise involved in the
conservative system; we have indeed introduced novelty
into the world, but novelty of familiar kinds -- a novelty of rearrangement rather than of production ~ nihilo. Our creativity is fractional. The truth is, we
hiVe to learn how to create; and the value of the prodUCt is in proportion to the prior docility -- let me
say to the depth of the generating empirical plunge.2
We are, as he said elsewhere, "apprentices in creativity."

3

Human creativity is thus derivative. It is, further,
often spontaneous and unpredictable: "Not only is our ereativity dependent on a prior realism, the new idea we call
our own often arrives without intent or plan."

4

It is also

sometimes the response to excitations not entirely within
the scope of our voluntary origination and therefore implies
community: creativity occurs within a trans-personal field
of interacting agents. Art is a form of communication:
It is of the essence of human creation that its product,
like its gestation, belongs not alone to the author's
world but to our world. For as the lesser creativity of
2

l"FFD" 542.
3
4

Ibid. Cf. MGHE 299, TP 179 I
"FFD" 543

- 44.

"FFD" 543.
II

ABN"

95.
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free action implies a passage of telos from a private
to a factual world field, so the greater creativitY means a passage from the world of private conception into the world of every man. Each such decision,
and each such output of idea, is attended by the simple
certitude that one's private thought is in its nature
universal -- the natural, unquestioned intersubjectivity
of experience.!
~orld

-

Here, intersubjectivity refers not merely to I-Thou
or even social relationships in general, but to the intercourse between the finite mind and the infinite Other Mind

in the act of objective thinking. Creative thought is consequently a participation in the creative activity of God.
And with such creativity enters Destiny:

11

the creative self

perceives his product as having a destiny beyond himself.
This, its destiny, is part of its being; and also part of
his. The idea of destiny becomes part of our empirical outlook.''

2

The field-concept thus joins the concepts of Fact and
Destiny in a synthesis that includes the field of reference
as well as the Self, now clearly associated with the original notion of nuclear experience:
••• the Field-concept •••• underlies all discontinuities,
and, ••• once recognized, accounts for the simply felt
u~ity of the world. Within this felt unity, there is a
r~chness of experience which is at a disadvantage for
recognition, partly because it is too near us, beneath
the level of specific language, and partly because its
aspects are mutually involved. To refer to it, we must
use speech; and every translation does it some injustice.
l"FFD 11 544 - 45.
2
"FFD 11 545.
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Let me refer to this region as our nuclear awareness of
the world. ~d thin it there is, for example, a nuclear
awarenesa of our Self, so central, and so engaged, that
Hume and many after him, interested in separate impressions, not only fail to find it, but deny its existence.
There is a nuclear awareness of the intersubjective Thouart. There is also a nuclear awareness of bodily well-orill being, of certain instinctive powers, of a general
direction of process in time, involving what is now pertinent to us, a sense of destiny.l
\

Fact, Field and Destiny thus incorporate the elements
of nuclear experience, providing the bare "l-It-Thou" with
relational content. The psychological triad has become a
metaphysical one. Two items remained to be specified in
this metaphysic of experience, however; the content of the
category of Destiny and the relation between Destiny and
God as the Ground of experience.
Recalling his original, more descriptive analysis of
prophetic consciousness in his magnum opus, his characterization of objective thought in Science and the Idea of God
as well as of Destiny itself in

!a

.!:.!!.!!!.

Heaning of Immortality

Human Experience, Hocking found in Destiny at this point

a reconciliation of present quest and future attainment:
There is here something like an incipient sense of 11 duty"
(from which will come, in due time, science); but not of
duty alone: it is at the same time the way to fulfillment. Destiny, as the elemental End, is the natural synthesis of "duty" and "happiness." Into it, there comes
by degrees a specification, that of having an individual
1

"FFD" 545 - 46. Significantly, Hocking added, "Its

~ost tangible elements are the elements vaguely called feel-

7ng, at once cognitive and emotional, endlessly variable and
lntertwined."
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"calling," in which concept one detects (i) an undefined
something for me to do, an obligation, and {ii) an undefined promise, an assurance of possible success, authoritative!!
such purpose and fulfillment cannot escape our conscious
awareness if it is at all real within human experience, nor,
as Hocking argues, can we be ignorant of its source in a
''creative real, somehow akin."

2

Destiny involves us in are-

lation, both latent in the deepest structure of experience
and manifest in the imperative of scientist and mystic, Y.li th
an all-embracing Field of Fields. And our life thus finds
meaning as a response to a call: "It is a call to the finite
creator ••• to fill a need which is a world need, that meaning be realized in his unique and factual situation, a contribution to the life of God, as the hidden meaning of cre-

ation~ nihilo." 3
As Hocking's triadic concept of experience evolved,
the social character of experience was articulated in different modes, but was present in all three major formulations. As the concept of intersubjectivity became clearer
in his exposition, curiously, explicit reference to the
"thou-dimension" of experience diminished. It is only by
analyzing the concepts of Horld, Idea and Field that the
social dimension is in fact made manifest. In each instance,
l 11 FFD" 546 - 47.
2
3

"FFD" 54 7.
Ibid.
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the

S

ocial aspect is specified by the function of mediation:

fJorld-obje_cts, both inanimate and personal, ideas (by
the ~"~
whiCh the Horld is met) and fields of all kinds (and the
creativity they permit) are all common media

they unite

selves in shared experience. The possibility of such unity
is conditioned by the presence of a total Field which not
onlY grounds the elements of experience, but also enters into active relationship with those consciously aware of themselves, others and the Fact-world.
God thus enters the scene, not as Ralph Barton Perry
remarked, "at the point at which Other Mind is capitalized,"

1

but in moments of feeling-charged insight that this, my experience of whatever aspect of Nature or Society, is situated within a context which is not only itself social, that
is, related to other selves and known to be so, but laden
with a personal meaning for my own future happiness. I am
being addressed, called to become responsibly creative of
the coming world civilization by a Presence operating in
history and through me.
The specific manifestations of God in human experience are matters for treatment under the religious dimension of experience: the point Hocking has established in
his articulation of the structure of experience as such is
1

Ralph Barton Perry, "Contemporary Philosophies of
Rel1g1on," Harvard Theological Review, 7 (1914), pp. 385 - 86.
..
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that it is grounded in a divine Field which can become salient in human experience by a direction of attention either
inwards or outwards. In both cases, the sense of God's presence has an infallibly social character.
Religious experience thus becomes a mode of experience in general, the conscious manifestation of the theistic
ground mediated in whatever fashion. Mystical experience,
in turn, can be seen to represent the fullest realization
of that divine presence. Mediation remains the function of
experience which conditions the possibility of an awareness
of God in either case, if such awareness is to exist at all.
For all experience, as triadic, is mediated, whether direct
or indirect. There is no I-It relation outside the sphere
of other knowers. And the field of experience can become manifest only in relation to the figures for which it is the
ground. And thus we return to the problem of immediate experience~

how is it possible for any relation, not only with

God, but with anything or anyone, to be immediate, direct
and yet mediated? Did Hocking, by espousing a triadic concept of experience with its necessary implication of mediation, preclude the possibility of mystical experience?

II. THE PROBLEM OF IMl-!EDIACY

As noted before, John E. Smith's distinction between
immediate experience, mediated (interpreted) experience and
1
inference has direct bearing on the present discussion.
According to this view, both interpretation and inference,
as mediated, exclude immediacy in any absolute sense. Therefore Smith denies that an immediate experience of God is
possible, in so far as God can never be disclosed

withou~

some intervening medium. Moreover, absolute immediacy, meaning non-mediated experience, would negate the structure of
experience itself:
Absolute immediacy can never deliver what it promises
because some form of r:lediation -- concepts, language,
symbols -- always intervenes and makes it impossible to
pass from the experience to the reality of God; inference does not su=fice because it always takes the form
of necessity, which means not that God is experienced,
but that something else is experienced and that therefore God "must" be rea1.2
Thus Smith proposes an approach to experience between absolute immediacy and inference, "that of mediated
or interpreted experience in which both experience and interpretation are interwoven." 3 Smith does not consider, how1
For a direct application of Smith's critique to
Hocking, cf. Mary E. Giegengack, op. cit.
2
3

John E. Smith, Exoerience and God, op.
Ibid.
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cit~,

p. 53.

•
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ev er ,

whether in this interweaving some kind of immediacy

iS retained.

1

Hocking, on the other hand, as we have seen,

clearly stated that God is not only directly but immediately
experienced. Consequently, in attempting to discover the
-~

condition for the possibility of such an experience of God 1
~e

must inquire whether Hocking meant something other than

"absolute immediacy" when referring to an immediate experience of God.
It should be observed here that Smith's criticism of
an immediate experience of God extends to immediate experience in general. Hocking himself held, as we shall see, that
immediacy was to the contrary a property of all experience
and that therefore, taken as a criterion, insufficiently
distinguished mystical experience from other types of experience.2 But Hocking also held that all experience, ineluding the direct experience of God, was mediated, as Smith
cogently argues. Consequently, if Hocking could show how an
experience of God could be both immediate and mediated, a
possible case would be established for all experience. (The
reciprocal claim would not necessarily follow unless it were
shown that the experience of God is not exceptional, that is,
essentially extraordinary. This was, of course, one of Hock1
.
Following Smith, Giegengack clearly rules out any
7mmediate experience of God along with all other absolutely
1~mediate experience, thus contending that Hocking's posit1on is untenable. Cf. Giegengack, op. cit., pp. 68, 78.
2
see below, pp. 113 and 223.
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ing's major contentions.)
In the following section, I shall attempt to show
1

that Hocking anticipated Smith s objections by developing
hiS concept of "relative immediacy," which not only covers
smith's "third alternative," but also developed it further
and more carefully. This, I believe, established the logical
basis for Hocking's argument that religious and mystical experience are more developed forms of experience in general
in which the theistic element, the divine "field of reference," becomes progressively more salient. That is to say,
religious and mystical experience represent the explicitation of the religious dimension of all experience.
1. Hocking's Concept of Immediacy
Hocking nowhere offered a specific definition of immediacy. He was aware, I believe, that in general usage,
"immediate" means not only "unmediated," but also "present 11
-- in the sense of both spatial and temporal "proximity" or
intimacy -- "here and now."

1

It was to this latter, positive

1 According to the OED, uimrnediate" is "Said of a person or thing in its relation to another: That has no intermediary or intervening member, medium or agent; that is in
actual contact or direct personal relation." As such, i t is
opposed both to mediate and remote.
Immediate also denotes
"Having no person, thing, or space intervening, in place,
orde~ or succession; standing or coming next; proximate,
n~a~est, next; close, near •••• " With respect to time, it sign1f1es "Present or n~xt ~djacent •••• Uccurring, accomplished,
or taking effect without delay or lapse of time; done at
once, instant." (OED1379.) Similarly, the American Heritage
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aspect of direct and objective presence that Hocking's general use of t.he term primarily referred rather than to "unmediated" -- its negative meaning. In one instance, he noted tersely that "Experience is here and now."

1

He also

called this quality of experience "simple thereness," suggesting a mode of spatial presence or "place." In making

"An Appeal to Immediate Experience," he wrote, again, "We
do not ordinarily consider the world we perceive as an activity upon ourselves. We perceive it as a simple thereness
of ·the sense-presented expanse. 11

2

In a late work, Hocking

similarly invoked the temporal dimension of our assurance
of reality, simultaneous with our awareness of the presence
of God: urn my view, the assurance of reality is immediate;
because the experience of an actual world is at the same
time an experience of its active source, the self-authenticating Thou-art." 3 Thus Hocking opposed immediate experiDictionary of the English Language gives the following meanings of immediate: "1. Being without mediation or interposition; direct. 2. Intuitive. 3. Next in line or relation. 4.
Occurring or accomplished without delay; instant. 5. Near
to the present. 6. Near at hand.a (Op. cit., p. 352.)
l"MGHE" 65. Cf. also MGHE 203.
2

c~·iC 38. Cf. also 191 - 92, where, utilizing both
senses of immediate, Hocking further describes the "thereness" of God's immediate presence in terms of William James'
"quiet music playing in the back of the mind": " ••• the music is addressed to the mind it inhabits, and to many this
~resence takes companionly form, without any of the palpable
7ntrusions of human companionship. It means, at least, 1 He
ls there'; and because of this, my solitude can never be deserted and insignificant." Cf. also "RF" 360.
3

MIHE. 241.
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ence to inference or indirect or vicarious experience, in
'l¥hich an object of experience was not "here and now," but
separated by time or distance.
The earliest instances of the space-time proximity
connotated by immediate in Hocking's writings appear in his
unpublished 1904 dissertation. In developing the concept of
the "judgment of experience,

11

he raised the subject in the

following manner:

A rough description of
ence ••• is this: It is
sals. The more we know
more we see in what is
us.l

the current judgment of expericharging immediacy with univerand the wider awake we are, the
before ~, the more it means to

The simplest example of the judgment of experience
would be a predication such as "This is ice," about which
Hocking commented, "The subject is the 'this-now,• and the
predicate undertakes to characterize it by a general meaning found perhaps in some previous experience •••• "

2

Thus

judgment was for Hocking ua universalizing of the given" in
which he distinguished three elements:

1 EEOCB 37. Hocking first mentions "immediate experience" on p. 39. Roland Rice, in his dissertation on Hocking's
mysticism, claims in this respect that "Immediacy refers to
content already there and available for any future know~edge." (Mysticism in the Philosophy of William Ernest Hock~ng, Dissertation, Boston University, 1954, p. 22.) Rice is
definite in maintaining that even in his earliest writings,
Hocking was not referring primarily to simple or pure immediacy, but to immediacy as a result of interpretation. Cf. pp.
2, 24, 27, 50 and 153 - 54.
2

Ibid.
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(1) The immediate, "this-now" character;
(2) The universal character, which has various offices,
as classing, characterizing, signifying, associating;
(3) The form.l
In developing the positive concept of immediacy throughout
his career, Hocking never deviated far from this initial
position. The distinction between the positive and negative
sensesof immediate is, further, important, given the perhaps subtle but nevertheless significant difference between
their references.
In actual practice, Hocking used immediate to qualify
many aspects of experience, generally in the sense of "thisnow" or "here and now" proximity rather than of "non-mediated. " 2 ~ihile it would be inaccurate to say that Hocking
was uncritical in his employment of the term, immediate has
somewhat different connotations in different contexts, although within the general ambience of "presence." Thus, for
1

EEOCB 59.

2
At least the major instances of this usage fall under the following nine categories: immediate assurance ("How
Can Christianity Be the Final Religion?" Yale Divinity Quarterly, 5 [Mar. 1909], p. 287; hereafter referred to as---"HCCBFR .. •I TP 317 I· "LRT" 43 I· "DCEN" 242 I· "HA" 435) •I immediate
"
awareness (NGHE 390 •I MS 441 - 42 I 330 •I "MS" 190 I 194 •I LRvlF
87); immediate certainty (MGHE 449- 50 n. 1; MIHE 159); immediate experience (MGHE xxix, 410, 474; "RF" 365; TP 262 63, 316; RM 45; ewe 39; MIHE 3 7, 246; "FFD" 548; "HA" 460,
etc •); immediately felt meaning (MIHE 98, 159; "FFD" 545) ;
immediate knowledge (MGHE 297: "INR" 582, 588); immediate
perception (CWC 97 - 98; cf. also for "immediate insight"
MGHE 361) ·I immediate presence (CWC 198·I SIG 112 I 114·I "FFD"
5 4 8); and the immediate sense of God (CWC 198).
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instance in his magnum

~

he wrote, "The mystic finds his

absolute in immediate experience. 111 Elsewhere he noted, "The
ultimate evidence for the selfhood of the whole is not primarily the evidence of argument, however, nor of analogy,
but that of immediate experience, interpreted by the dialectic."2 In what is likely his last

arti~le, Hocking ob-

served, "The genius of the East has turned with even greater
emphasis toward a type of knowledge in which the distinction
between subject and object yields place to an experience of
unity, and immediate awareness of its theme."

3

.

2. The Problem of Pure Immediacy
Although willing to regard pure or absolute imrnediacy as a possible dimension of human experience, Hocking did
not find in it the satisfaction of the desire to know, to
love or to create. For pure immediacy lacks structure and
meaningful content. Here, Hocking clearly anticipated Smith:
A purely immediate experience would be empty of meaning:
our most nearly immediate experience,self-awareness, is
mediated by the current rill of sensation and the contents of memory and purpose. To find God in immediate
experience, which is indeed the substance of religion as
experience, is therefore to find him through some mediation.4
1

2

4

MGHE xxix.
TP 316.

cwc

99. Earlier, Hocking had played upon the para-
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God may well be present to us in the pure immediacy
of pre-reflexive, subconscious experience, but such absolute
and primordial communion is not available for understanding
without the intervention of some mental process. To be meaningful, immediate experience was for Hocking first of all
intentional and therefore relative: "Experience is always
here and now. But it is always more than immediate; for it
is experience of an object."

1

Such objects of experience

possess real and external relations to the perceiving Self
(and to each other), relations which are not only experienced but also charge all meaningful immediacy with relativity both in time and "place. 11 Thus, "The immediacy of
any experience must submit to interpretation by what is outsideit and related to it."

2

Even if understood as the su-

preme instance of immediacy, mystical experience, there is
no exception to this general rule: " ••• the immediacy of the
mystic experience has its external relations." 3 Further,
" ••• the immediacy of the [mystical] experience is never so
great as to be wholly free from outer reference,

••• some

dox implicit in the preceding quotation: 11 This present actuality of experience, 'pure experience,' finds me in living
~elation with that which is most utterly non-myself. Here,
7n the immediate, is my absolute escape from immediacy. Here
~n the given present is my escape from myself, my window
upon infinity, my exit unto God. 11 (MGHE 316, emphasis added.)
l"MGHE" 65.

2
MGHE 354.
3

MGHE 355. Here Hocking clearly departs from Smith.
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consciousness of the wor ldl y se lf- and o

.

~ts

.

t~es

.

rema~ns.

.,1

Hocking also clearly indicated the limits of immediacY with respect to other important aspects of experience,
notably knowledge, meaning and certitude. First, as early
as his dissertation, he asserted that experience does not
come in self-containedumts, but has its beginnings in previous experience and leads to further experience: "The immediate 'for itself' is not knowledge ••••

Knowledge~

we

-

know!! never begins out of immediacy; but always stands
upon a given piece of knowledge to reach out toward more ...

2

Knowledge was thus "funded" for Hocking by past experience
as part of a temporal system which entails the future inasmuch as our limited knowledge implies further experience -more to be known and done. Hence cognitive experience cannot
be immediate in the sense that it is devoid of connections
beyond its "here and now" presence before the mind. By implication, the objects of knowledge are intermediaries between this experience and further experience as well as between knowers.
Second, with regard to several paradoxes of meaning,
Hocking again both affirmed (relative) and denied (absolute)
immediacy: "There can be no meaning in life unless there is
1

390. Cf. 11 The Meaning of Mysticism as Seen
through Its Psychology, .. Mind, 21 (1912), p. 46; hereafter
referred to as 11 Ml4. 11
I-1GHE

2 EEOCB 40.
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an

J.·mmediate

meaning," he declared, explaining that "Meaning

cannot lie in postponed satisfaction in some future attainment. However we try to refer meaning to an 'end' or 'goal,'
it is the nature of experience to lure it back and weave it
1
in with the quality of the on-going present." On the other
hand, he was no less explicit in stating that
There can be no sufficient meaning in life in immediacy •
••• Meaning is not a taste, nor any sort of purely animal sensitivity; for a human being can take no self-enjoyment in a sub-human form of consciousness. And the
human form is actively referring to its present some
sort of a beyond which the taster fails to get.2
For Hocking, then, the immediately felt meaning that
endows life with hope is always limited and thus relative,
both with reference to time and in terms of its own adequacy,
which is always partial. Meaning is always provisional, and
because of that, third, the immediate certitude of the mystic
<and everyman) is likewise limited and provisional although
persistently aimed at fuller satisfaction and completion. 3
Clearly, Hocking envisioned not only the possibility
of an interpretative (or mediated) dimension of experience
as called for by Smith's critique, but in fact went on to
propose a model which did not jettison the dimension of immediacy associated with mystical experience. Nor did Hocking
1

MIHE 98.
2
Ibid.
3
on immediate certitude or assurance, cf. also MGHE
296, 453 - 54; MIHE 241, 200; and "ABN" 95.
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subordinate immediate experience to interpretation, a strategem of Royce which he had expressly rejected. For Royce had
held that God, as well as the Self and other selves were not
1
known in immediate experience but solely by interpretation.
Hocking held to the contrary that

~

meaningful experience,

including the immediate experience of God, the Self and oth2
er selves, was mediated.
3. Relative Immediacy
Relative immediacy was thus characterized for Hocking by a non-exclusive relation with mediation.

3

"Third'' ob-

1 For Hocking's criticism of Royce's doctrine, cf.
"ORE" 6lff. and "INR" 588. For Hocking on interpretation,
see below, pp. 282 - 91.
2 cf. LRWF: "The perception of God for us mortals is
always by way of something or through something: it is 'mediated.'" He added, significantly, "Through such mediation,
God becomes for our perception as real as the human world,
as real as things, as real as ourselves!"
3 Hocking expressly mentioned "relative immediacy" in
a discussion with John Dewey in which he described how by
reflection subsequent to an experience, immediacy is "lost":
"Accepting the maxim that the ingredients of experience are
first h!2 then thought about, this subsequent thinking deals
in general with the enquiries 'What is this object?' 'On
what does it depend?' In the course of these enquiries,
which are always pertinent, the relative immediacy of the experience of 'having' is lost; the immediate becomes charged
with 'mediation.'" ("DCEN" 236.} If, however, the ingredients of experience are not first had and subsequently
thought about, but simultaneously had and thought about,
e.g., recognized or conceptualized --an event definitely consonant with Hocking's epistemology-- then, presumably, the
mediation would not rob the experience of its immediacy,
that is, the felt presence of its objective ingredient.
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jects as possibly '*transparen-t" intermediaries between
selves, have a double significance. As he had observed in
his magnum opus,
Any connecting medium is apt to appear as an obstacle to
direct relationship; on the other hand, any obstacle may
discover itself to be a mediator, sign of unbroken continuity. The sea separates, -- or the sea connects; it
cannot do one without doing the other also. So Nature
may be interpreted in its relation to social consciousness as the visible pledge and immediate evidence of
our living contact with God.l
But, as Hocking also insisted, " ••• let us be clear that
whenever mediated and indirect relations are possible and
valuable, there presumably immediate relations are possible
and valuable as well."

2

Here again Hocking is building on

the axiom that actuality precedes possibility; immediacy is
prior to mediation as subjec.tivity is prior to objectivity.
In terms of God, this means that " ••• the assurance of reality is immediate; because the experience of an actual world
is at the same time an experience of its actual source, the
self-authenticating Thou-art." 3
God, therefore, can be encountered in immediate experience but meaningfully only if mediated by real "third"
entities which permit and indeed demand interpretation. In1

MGHE 266. Compare Hocking•s notion of concepts with
a "double boundary": GL Mar. 18, 1938; "l·lDPS" 37; "Response
to Prof. Krikorian•s Discussion," Journal of Philosophy, 55,
7 (Mar. 27, 1958), p. 276; hereafter referred to as "R.PK."
Cf. also Rouner, NHE 122, and "MS" 190.
2
3 MIHE 241.
MGHE 357.
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terpretation in this sense can be taken as the ability to
explicitate the implicit meaning (or "content") of an experience by rendering intermediaries transparent, that is,
bY recognizing them as "third" objects uniting knowing and
feeling selves. "Objects" are media of communication. Interpretation is the conscious, subjective aspect of media1
tion; both are essential parts of experience. The recognotion of the mediating and thus relative function of
"thirds'• becomes the means to known immediacy, which is
alone meaningful, being the more or less structured and "located" elevation of pure (absolute) immediacy to consciousness: " ••• reaching the non-mediated is a passage beyond mediation, !2,y aid of that mediation."

2

For the mystic and po-

tentially for everyman, therefore, anything -- indeed, everything -- can become such a mediator:
The mystic finds the absolute in immediate experience.
Whatever is mediated is for him not yet the real which
he seeks. This means to some that the mystic rejects all
mediators: the impli·cation is mistaken. To say that a
mediator is not the finality is not to say that a mediator is nothing. The self-knowing mystic, so far from
rejecting mediators, makes all things mediators in their
own measure. To all particulars he denies the name God,
-- to endow them with the title of mediator between himself and God.3
1

2

See below, pp. 182ff., 282- 91.

cwc

99. Regarding "location," Hocking observed that
as process, is essentially the work of placing a
g1ven experience within the entire system of experience."
("The Transcendence of Knowledge," art. cit., p. 22.)
3
MGHE xxix. Here and in the previous quotation, Hock"~nowing,
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The triadic

str~cture

of experience entails that all
~ystic

experience is mediated. It also enables the

(and

Hocking) to avoid pantheism, for even the Hhole of experience, when taken as an "object" of conscious reflection, is
not thereby identified with God, but mediates God. Every
"part" of the Whole is likewise a possible intermediary because of the actual mediation of the Whole.

1

4. Conclusion

In summary, Hocking's doctrine of immediacy can be
expressed in the following propositions. Pure or absolute
immediacy lies below (or above) the threshold of conscious
meaning and can be termed "experience" only in a limited
sense. All consciously meaningful experience is, conversely,
always mediated to some degree. Such interpreted experience
can either be

11

relatively 11 immediate or inferential, that is,

deductive or inductive. And thus, mediation is not an obstacle to immediate experience in the sense of direct presence
11

here and now," but a means to it, i.e., to known immediacy.
Hence Hocking could claim without inconsistency or

ing may have alluded to a third level of immediacy, a "pure ..
experience of God which transcends all consciousness of the
media which ''trigger" it. :·ihether such an experience could
be meaningful in its moment is doubtful by Hocking's criteria as well as Smith • s. The raptures of the mystics, 'tvhich
are subsequently identified as a pure awareness of God,
could readily fit such a description. Cf. Thomas Aquinas,
Summa Theologiae, II-II, Q. 180, a. s.
1

202ff.

See below for discussion, pp. 147f., 193ff., 197,
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adiction that God can be experienced first, in a direct
con tr
out restricted, pre-reflexive manner (i.e., in absolute immediacy) as a presence of which we are at most only "dimly"
aware. second, God can also be experienced in a direct but
mediated manner (i.e., relative immediacy), in which the dim
awareness of his presence is raised to fuller consciousness
by the interpretation of the media of s:elf, Nature and Society. Third, God can be indirectly experienced in the events
of everyday life as well as in rapturous experiences of absolute immediacy in so far as both are subject. to later interpretation or inference.
Consequently, it seems evident that it is not useful
to categorize experience as "immediate," "interpretedw and
"inferred" with Smith (and Giegengack) in so far as for
Hocking all meaningful experience, including (relatively)
immediate experience, is both mediated and interpreted. Even
absolute immediacy remains open to later interpretation.
Two alternatives are possible: experience can be distinguished either (1) as absolutely (purely) immediate, relatively immediate and inferential; or,

(2) as direct, com-

posed of both absolute and relative immediacy, and indirect,
that is, inference. In either case, absolute immediacy must
be sharply distinguished from relative immediacy. A difficulty lies in Hocking's reticence to refer to absolute immediacy as experience in any but a marginal sense since,
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being without known external relations, it is (in its moment} un-mediated, un-interpretable and therefore devoid of
meaning. Subject to later or even simultaneous interpretation, however, even absolute immediacy remains in some sense
related to both conscious, relative immediacy and inferential or reflexive experience.
If Hocking had used another term for either "'immediate" or "mediation," or if he had more systematically developed his concept of "relative immediacy," a good deal of
ambiguity could have been avoided. His occasional failure
to qualify immediate, allowing the context to provide the
appropriate connotation, is particularly liable to produce
misunderstanding, especially if one has a univocal concept
of immediacy.
Nevertheless, I believe that, overall, Hocking escaped the dilemma posed by Smith. Further, I believe that
the articulation of his doctrine of relative immediacy proposed above avoids the difficulty of how God can be experienced within human experience short of becoming an object
among other objects. In fact, Smith's rejection of the alleged immediacy of mystical experience, far from weakening
Hocking's position, virtually reiterates it:
A pure empiricism of immediacy such as can be found in
~ysticism, where God is disclosed without a medium, as
~t were, would seem to demand that the reality or existence of God be given along with the immediate experience itself. If, however, we deny that there can be an
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absolutely immediate experience that is also meaningful it follows that any supposed experience of God
wouid have to be mediated in some way.l
Hocking, of course, would simply deny that in mystical experience, God is ever disclosed without a medium. For
him, if God is to be meaningfully disclosed, it must be
!Prough some medium. In this, Hocking is in full agreement
with the classical Western mystical tradition, as we shall
2
have occasion to recall. Further, by elaborating the implications of his triadic conception of experience, Hocking
also established the logical basis for his investigation of
religious and mystical experience as well as his argument
that these forms of experience are not different in kind
from other experience, but represent the fuller development of the triadic character of all experience. As such,
they are at least potentially the common inheritance of
all human persons.
1

smith, op. cit., p. 52. Elsewhere Smith argues
against mysticism in even stronger terms but along the same
lines as above. ( Cf. 11 In ltfhat Sense Can We Speak of Experiencing God'?" Journal of Religion, 50 [1970], pp. 229- 44.)
However, as with the objections brought forward in his
book, the latter do not hold against Hocking's concept of
relative immediacy but only against claims that God is experienced in absolute immediacy. For a recent discussion
provoked by Smith's approach, cf. Robert A. Oakes, "Sensible Experience of God, 11 The New Scholasticism, 48, 2
(Spring, 1974), pp. 171- 84; Edward Walter, "Can There Be
Sensible Experience of God'?" Ibid., 48, 4 (Autumn, 1974),
pp. 519 - 26; and Robert A. Oakes, 11 Sensible Experience of
God-- Once Again," Ibid., 49, 3 (Summer, 1975), pp. 341 -43.
2
For Hocking and immediacy, cf. Reck, art. cit.; for
rn¥sticism as "the recovery of immediacy," cf. Furse, op.
C~t., pp. 14 - 17, 45, SOf., 186 - 201.

!II. l'HE t1ZriNING AND S·l'RUCTURE OF riU:1AH EXPERIENCE:
CONCLUSION

Following the line of argumentation so far exposed,
the meaning of experience in general, that is, the purpose
it serves and therefore the value it has, could only lie for
Hocking in the progressive realization of the intersubjective
unity of persons,· Nature and Society in God. The meaning of
experience is community, community which involves communion
with God or, rather, rests upon communion with God. In both
individual and social experience, this unification occurs
.
h.1story. l I nasmuc h as t h e un1. f y1ng
.
(or w1'11 occur } 1n
pre-

sence of God in individual and social history occurs in a
movement of progressive explicitation, it is likely that the
meaning of human experience will be most keenly felt in the
individual and social dimensions of that realm of experience
called religious.

For religion and religious experience

mark the frontier for Hocking between the latent and manifest awareness of God as Thou. In other words, in religious
experience we should expect to find the more explicit meaning of all human experience, its essence as well as its manifestation; For the structure of experience itself, as a
triadic interrelationship of the Self, the World and other
selves, is grounded in a field of reference which not only
1

515 -

see MGHE Chapter 33, "The unifying of History, .. pp.
24; GL Jan. 21, 1939; ,.HA 11 Lecture X, pp. 456 - 63.
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les the act of community, that is, communication, to
.
Ur but itself enters into communication and communion

enab

occ

,

as a personal agency.
Each of the three concepts of experience developed
bY Hocking to illuminate different aspects of human existence-- its psychological 1'interior," its sociological "exterior," and its metaphysical significance-- are also related to each other as moments of a dynamic, i.e., temporal,
process of development. That is to say, these aspects of
human existence succeed each other in the life history of
the individual as it unfolds in a progressive explicitation
of the meaning of. experience. The agency of explicitation
is the course of experience itself, the more or less adequate interplay in which the universal capacities of the
Self are particularized in actual encounters with individual
persons and the facts of the natural and social World. Experience is thus structured both as a state and a process.
As structural elements, Nature, Self and Society are
progressively related by antitheses of predominantly objective and subjective moments culminating in a unified subjective-objective synthesis of intersubjective or consubjective awareness. While vulnerable to criticism as an abstract
and somewhat forced conceptualization of the dynamic and
concrete process described at some length by Hocking, the
following sketch is intended to indicate the movement of
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con~cious

development from the objective to the intersub-

jective aspects of experience, beginning from the experience of Nature.
Taken as a whole, which is apparently how children
and "primitives" take Nature in large measure, the objective World manifests a character of power and sometimes of
threat. 1 The subjective response is one of a sense of helplessness, fear, often of reverence or fascination, but just
as likely of horror -- leading withal to a demand for justice addressed to the World of Nature as a primordial Thou:
2
the intersubjective moment.
As mysterious, further, Nature in its objective power
is revealed as somehow already known, for it is discovered
to be knowable, perhaps endlessly knowable. But it is never
discovered as knowable only by me; it is at least potentially known by others, even by all others. Such possible knowledge rests on some actual knowledge of the Whole. Accordingly, the change of person and voice grammatically from
"it is known" to "he knows it" has an apparently universal
range in actual occurrence.

3

The subjective correlate is

the conscious response to mystery-- the awareness of one's
own ignorance of what can be but is not yet known, although

1
For the "dialectic of Nature," cf. HGHE 6, 229ff.,
and TP 265.
2
MGHE 146.
3

cf. MGHE 334ff.; cf. also 308ff.
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"he knov;s it."

1

The intersubjective moment is the discovery

that the World is shared and belongs to us. In knowing the
2
common world, one knows the Other.
A third dialectical moment in Nature springs from
the discovery of the common world. Nature as knowable calls
forth the subjective sense of obligation actually to know,
the imperative of science.

3

The intersubjective or consub-

jective aspect of knowing the world as shared in terms of a
call to know it further is the emergence of "con-science"
a community of knowers morally interrelated as if knowing
were done in the presence of a universal onlooker.

4

Experiences of one's own self and of society are similarly structured by moments of objectivity and subjectivity, culminating (ideally) in an intersubjective or consubjective synthesis. First, one's inner life has its moments
of objectivity which include the contents of the mind, conscious as well as subconscious, such as ideas of things, in5
stincts, memories, internalized criteria, etc. The subjec1 MGHE 237.
On mystery, cf. MGHE 234, 398; TP 315;
"SSP" 397; '~MGIM" 448 - 49, n. 11; npn II 11 339.
2
3

cf. MGHE 288ff e

I

231, 236, 317

- 18.

c£. HGHE 409, n. 1.

4

c£. "Science in its Relation to Value and Religion,"
29 (1942), pp. 182- 191, 220.
Cf. also SIG 113ff. In Hocking's thought, science as arespo~se to Nature also represents a response to Society and
Ult~mately to God and has important parallels with religion
and art.
5 c£. MGHE 527 - 38; cf. also HNR 430, ewe 73.
The~ Institute Pamphlet,
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tive response to tha recognition of such psychic objects is
the mental or emotional aspect of •• interior" experience,
especially the sense of "I" achieved in peak. moments of reflexive awareness. The intersubjective moment is the perception (or apperception) of the essentially shared elements
of the World as the contents of one's own mind: each "I" is
also a uwe." There is no wholly private world, short of madness; nor is there a wholly public one.
Second, the major sectors of social experience fell
for Hocking under the general categories of love (or friendship) and duty (or justice), in which the objective presence of the Other(s) occasions a response which itself
leads to genuine, manifest intersubjectivity and the consub1
jective "We-consciousness" of true communi ty. Examples of
social experience -- death, birth, war and wedlock, dream,
disease, apparitions, etc. -- are as numerous as those of
Nature and follow a similar dialectic of development.

2

The

movement from the universal to the particular, from the impersonal to the personal, from objectivity to intersubjectivity, from latent to manifest -- clearly pertains here.
(It should perhaps be observed here that as a dynamic structure, the dialectical process is not itself the experience,
1
2

c£.

MGHE 231, 295, 317- 18, 431.

cf. MGHE 6, 230- 31. On love, cf. MGHE l97f., 431;
HNR 311; MIHE 88 - 92, 247ff.
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t
bU.

its general form in temporal perspective.)
The natural and social elements of experience are

also structured as media of God's self-revelation (communication) to human selves, the dialectic here being the transition from the opacity to the transparency of intermediaries by means of a shift of attention from the partial aspects of experience to the Whole. Here, the perception of
and response to God again moves from "It" to "He" to "Thou."
The underlying ground or field of all these types of
experience is the intersubjective field itself, existing
and perceptible as an infinitely expansive and progressive
matrix of creativity: God himself as the constant Thou present to and addressing us in all our experiences of Nature
and Society as well as of the Self. The two-fold (i.e.,
static and dynamic) structure of experience is thus not only
personal, it is dialogical -- an on-going communication in
which mutual self-disclosure reciprocates with mutual acceptance (or, conceivably, inadvertance or even rejection:
Hocking was not blind to the reality of sin and even the
possibility of ultimate loss 1 ). The structure of experience
is a pattern of communication, a dialogue.
Here we are already beyond the threshold of religion;
for the manifestation of the Thou of the World as God constitutes religious experience. And it is in examining reli1
350.

cf.

"HCCBFR" 280; MGHE 515, 523; HNR 125 - 68; "RF 11
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gious experience that the meaning and structure of human
experience must find its further scope and depth.

CHAPTER II
THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF EXPERIENCE
INTRODUCTION
All human experience, as we have seen thus far, had
for Hocking an intrinsic religious dimension -- here taking
religion as "man's relation with God."

1

God is ingredient

in experience not as an object among other objects, but as
the "field of reference" grounding all relationships among
selves and the natural and social World as the actual condition of their possibility. Given the structure of experience as thus articulated by Hocking, the relationship between man (or, better, men) and God can be expected to be
manifold rather than simple, both objective (i.e., intentional) and intersubjective {social) rather than merely subjective or "private,

11

aesthetic rather than merely cogni-

tive, active rather than merely receptive, and variable
rather than invariant. It is also latent as well as manifest in so far as the divine field of reference, as context,
1

The origin of the word is obscure. Modern scholars
generally associate it with religare, "to bind." (Cf. OED
2481.) Religion can bedescribed therefore as the "bond"
between man and God or, as Paul Ricoeur suggests, "The bond
bet";Yeen man and what he considers to be sacred." (The~
bol1sm of Evil, Emerson Buchanan, trans. [Boston: Beacon
Press, 196~p. 5.) Hocking's use of the word indicates a
general agreement with this traditional meaning. See below,
pp. 130, 13 7ff".
127
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ot enter our conscious awareness when we are preoccudoes n
pied with the ordinary objects of experience. However, the
latency of the relation can give way to manifestness through
a process of explicitation in which, by a shift of attention, the context or ground of experience becomes focal. And
this religious experience, the awareness of our relation
with God, is a development of ordinary experience as a
heightened consciousness of the most fundamental element in
the structure of experience, its ground. This is not to say
that the perception of the ground may not be surprising and
in that sense extraordinary. It is to say that the religious
dimension thus revealed is not added to ordinary experience,
but discovered within it.
It is this dimension of experience and its explicitation which we have before us now for consideration. The burden of the argument of this chapter will be to show that
Hocking adequately demonstrated that religious experience
is a development of ordinary experience as the explicitation of the relations between the elements of experience
and their ground or field of reference. Further, I shall
argue that he proved religion to be intrinsically social,
that is, originating in an intersubjective dialogue and manifesting itself in both corporate worship and public actiVity. Hocking also held that religion, as "the redemption
Of solitude,'' fostered individual human development. I
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shall also argue that Hocking's

progressive explicitation

of the concept of religion was positively related to his
development of the concept of experience. But ultimately,
religion in its ordinary manifestations fell short for Hocking of fully satisfying the desire for union with God. It
does not represent the fullest expression of the theistic
relation within experience. A further dimension of human experience is opened, however, by reaching the limits of ordinary religious experience --that in which it is claimed
that the quest for final satisfaction is fully met: mystical experience.
At the outset of this inquiry into the further dimensions of human experience, it will be important to note
the distinction in Hocking's thought between religion and
religious experience on one hand, and that between reliaion
and religions on the other. In turn, this will require attending to the social and individual aspects of religious
experience and the reciprocal relations between them. In
thus exploring the meaning and structure of religious experience, we are no longer asking whether but how God is
directly and immediately met in human experience and what
the effects of that meeting are on Self and Society.

I. RELIGION, RELIGIOt:S EXI'ERIENCE AND RELIGIONS

1

. Religion

and Religious Experience

Religion as a whole, that is, in its universal aspect, was evidently not simply identical for Hocking with
religious experience (a phrase he rarely used, as we shall
have occasion to note again). Fundamentally, religion is the
relation or bond, both latent and manifest, between the Self
and God as "the 'Thou' of the world."l Particular religions
are concrete instances of this universal dimension of human
experience, localized in time and space and necessarily conditioned by culture and history. As particular, religions
are institutions, being established ways of realizing the
human involvement with the totality of experience (the Whole
as the Holy) -- in codes, creeds, liturgical cult, buildings,
books, ministries, etc.

2

Nevertheless, each religion can

also be characterized as more or less universal in its scope
and outreach.

3

In this characterization, Hocking remained

well within the orthodox Western tradition.
l"RF" 365.
2

cf. LRi1F 63f. An institution for Hocking is 11 a more
or less settled way in which the members of a society have
come to satisfy their main interests, including property and
the family, education and religion, science and the arts,
the traditional ways of amusement and recreation." ( "vN" 3 7.)
For a discussion of religion and religions, see below.
3

See below, p. 134ff.
130
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Religious experience, on the other hand, signifies
the explicit awareness of the Self's relation to God, wheth-

er as a dimension of all experience or as realized in specific instances as religious experiences. Religious experi-

-

ence in either sense is, however, a phrase Hocking rarely
employed.

1

The reason for this is, I believe, that as we

have seen, for Hocking all experience has a fundamental, at
least implicit, religious dimension and, further, the instances in which God becomes most manifest in consciousness
were, for him, better described as mystical. At any rate, it
is clear that Hocking did not take religious experience to
signify a kind of experience different from ordinary experience:
Religious experience is not as a rule the object of a
special faculty; it is a development of ordinary experience, and religion invites men to take this ordinary experience not less but ~ realistically than those who
are content with its surfaces.2
The importance of this passage is difficult to overestimate. Its significance lies not only in the connection
between religious and ordinary experience, but in the implication that if mysticism is a fuller development of religion, then it, too, is rooted in ordinary experience.
As a development of ordinary experience, religious
l.,MGHE 11 62, 65 and
stances.

ewe

73 being among the few in-_

211 MGHE 11 62 C
• f. MGHE 49 - 50.
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ex,oerience refers then to the explicit manifestation of the

-

theistic dimension of experience, the divine "field of re-

ference" which grounds the interrelations among the Self,
the world and other selves but also enters the process of
experiencing actively. For, as was shown in the first chapter, this field and the relationship of the elements which
it grounds constitute the primary locus of the divine presence active in the structure of experience itself. Religion can be described, consequently, as the relation (i.e.,
"bond") between human persons, both individually and collectively, and God as the Field of experience. To understand
religion entails understanding the nature of that relation.
At this point, the question remains whether in fact the human experience of God reveals a presence which is both the
ground of Self, the World and Other Self, that is to say,
the ground of the Whole, and yet reveals itself as a Thou
(or, more accurately, an "I") calling persons to union
through the particular events of life.
1

1

It should be noted here that another, perhaps subtle
but nevertheless important distinction should be drawn between religion as the manifold relation between human persons and God, and religious experience in the form of a
heightened perception of God's presence. Presumably one can
be aware primarily of the relation, e.g., dependence, protection, favor, estrangement, etc., without thereby having
a direct awareness of God as "Thou ... I believe that this dist~nction constitutes a major difference between ordinary re11gion and mysticism. For religion as a bond among men, cf.
"INR" 576, HGHE 522, "HCCBFR" 270 and "Does Civilization
Still Need Religion'?" Christendom, 1 (1935}, p. 35; hereafter referred to as "DCSNR." Also see below, pp. 171- 75.
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On the basis_ of the preceding remarks, in this study
I shall take the terms" religion," "religious experience"
and "the religious dimension of (all) experience" to be
onlY roughly equivalent. Exceptions will be indicated, as
in re <=. . . er ence to "a" rel ...;gJ.· on or "a'' religious experience as
a particular instance of the explicit consciousness of God
as present. But the distinction between religion and religious experience as the tension between the latent and manifest dimension of all experience remains relevant. It is
based on the distinction already alluded to between the universal and the particular aspects of religion, the whole
and the part. For each individual exists in the particularity of culture and history, which constitute the finite context for the realization of all human potential.
2. Religion and Religions
The tension between the universal element in all religions and the particularity of each religion was present
in Hocking's thought from the beginning of his career. In
1909 he wrote,
The universality of truth seems the best and most natural security for the universality of religion. [ ••• ] But
the trouble is that the universal religion, when defined
on the basis of truth, is not identifiable with any particular religion, and hence not with Christianity except
by that courtesy which we by our birth are inclined to
concede.l
l"HCCBFR" 269 - 70.
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aradox of all religions,
the ...O

but especially those with a

claim to universality, is that of representing both the universal and particular aspects of human experience including
pre-eminently the theistic relation.
Hocking's insistence on the universal aspect of relic;Jion was most forcefully presented in his study of comparative religion, Living Religions and

~

World Faith, in which

he articulated two "postulates." The first was that "Religion must be universal":
It arises in a universal human craving directed to an
equally universal object. [Religion] is not a capacity
of special men or races. It belongs to the psychology of
man; that is, it is the response of human nature everywhere as it faces its finite situation in the great
world.l
Thus, even though religious expression is not equally distributed among human persons, "there are no natively unreligious peoples or individuals." 2
Universal here connotes, first, a capacity of human
nature as such. Religion in this sense exists within the
very structure of human experience. As a psychological fact,
accordingly, religion concerns both consciousness and behavior and, as such, it is related thematically to Hocking's
first, psychological formulation of the concept of experience. But it should be noted that Hocking also employs uni-
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in the secondary sense of pervasive distribution. Religion as a concrete manifestation of a funda.mental element
of human experience is found everywhere. Religion in this
sense is an obviously social phenomenon. The truly irreligious man is, by that token, in the same predicament as the
solipsist who refuses to acknowledge his native social relatedness, refusing to coma out of his acquired solitude to
converse with God.
Hocking's second postulate was that "Religion must be
particular."

1

In fact, it is because religion is universal

(in the first sense) that it must become particular.

2

For

Hocking the "abstract universal" belongs to the realm of possibility, whereas particularity is actual. Here he is endebted to Hegel:
everything in the realm of "spirit 11 - - thought, fancy,
feeling -- tries to take on bodily form: we can hardly
think at all unless our ideas wrap themselves in floating imagery, then attach themselves to words, then work
themselves into action.3
Religion thus tends to actualize itself as a universal capacity of human nature by taking on concrete form, in short,
by appearing in history, by becoming explicit. In so doing,

religion becomes concretely universal -- extended everywhere
1

LRWF 36.

2
3

Ibid.

LRWF 37.
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in the human realm, if actually diversified in particular.
For Hocking, a sense of obligation, a moral imperative, constitutes the human aspect c:: the diffusion of religion:

11

There is an element of duty in the situation which

coincides with the natural irnpulse of joy to overflow ...

1

Part of this motive is compassion for those who have not
yet perceived the truth of religious insight, part is con-

I,
I

II,

tingent upon the inherent social relatedness among men
which demands communication. For

11

Unless the discoverer

speaks, he is separated from his fellows by his insight,
rather than united to them. His enlightenment is socially
dangerous...

2

Dangerous because private, that is, sharable

but not yet shared. Hence the universal capacity for religion appears in particular historical form because men are

1

LRWF 39. Cf. 36: "In so far as [religion as] the
passion for righteousness reaches satisfaction, it becomes
a passion for the spread of righteousness. And this activity of spreading, as well as the search for and the practice of the right \vay, is conceived as a cosmic demand."
Cf. also p. 37: "The impulse [to spread religion] lies at
the root of much unique religious behavior whose meaning
tends to escape the polite academic mind, for example, the
strange activity of preaching, which naturally expands into
the founding of a religious community with its special organization, and into the mission."

2

-

LRWF 39 - 40. He continued, "His truth is potentially the deepest bond of himself with his fellows; but unless
thex ~· ~ truth, it alienates them from him. It is not
a bond unless it .. is made a. bond: he must become a teacher,
or else a hermit or ari""Outcast:''' Thus religion as an institution is a social constr~ction. r6r religion as a bond
amo;g.g men, cf. 't-1GHE 316. On compassion,· cf. LRWF 39.
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bY nature social beings:
in so far as one's moral destiny becomes ••• identified with the moral destiny of the group within which
one acts, the religion of the preacher will be immersed in regional character and regional history: it
will be religion in particular.!
Not even religious experience can remain private, despite
its rootedness in the depths of each person's consciousness.
Thus for Hocking religion tiberhaupt is a unity of
universal and particular elements as they appear in individual consciousness and history:
Our religion must be a particular religion as well as
a universal one. This is the real source of the casuistry of apologetic; -- for religion, like every other
live thing, is growing under the pressure of antagonistic requirements: it must be universal, and yet at the
same time particular, authoritative, continuous, historical.2
Summarily, the religious dimension of all experience
was of greater philosophical concern to Hocking than were

1

LRWF 43.

2
Hocking's insistence on the reality of the universal
character of religion, both as a native capacity of man and
as a cultural phenomenon, led to an express disagreement
With John Dewey, against whose rejection of religion in view
Of the ellegedly irreducible multitude of religions Hocking
devoted the opening argument of LR~iF. (For De'tvey' s position,
s~e A Common Faith, op. cit.) Contemporary studies of relig1on, especially phenomenological and structuralist accounts,
tend mainly to support Hocking's approach rather than Dewey's.
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episodes of particular "religious experience," not least
because the instances reveal an underlying and wider potential than is likely to be realized in any single episode.
Both religions and religious experiences are thus to be understood as the

~anifest

development, the explicitation, of

the manifold relation between the three constituents of the
field grounding the structure of experience. But common elements exist in both forms of manifestation which, while
rooted in the universal relation at the

found~tion

of all

experience, are truly universal in extension, that is, concretely.
Hocking's use of the categories of universality and
particularity to structure his phenomenology of religion
was not new; it is specifically endebted to Hegel, as noted
above. Obviously, these categories are related to Hocking's
reliance upon the whole-part relation, which he employed in
a variety of contexts.
As a relational scheme, this approach has its limitations and, as a result, fell into disfavor early in the
present century. It is somewhat forced and abstract, simple
and radically limited -- as are dichotomous relations in
general. nevertheless, it applies. So pre-eminent a schola:r.:

Of religions as the late Joachim Wach singled out Hocking's
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approach for qualified but definite endorsement, siding with
1
Hocking in more than one disputed interpretation. With
reservations, therefore, I suggest that as employed by
Hocking, the characterization of religion as universal and
yet particular remains plausible. For the philosophy of religion deals both with the common and with the universal
elements of all religions while recognizing the real differences among religions based upon fundamental differences
in human culture, history and even temperaments. The universal elements such as structures and functions are always
incarnate in particular manifestations. As such they are
accessible for consideration only by a process of abstraction. Nevertheless, as embodied such universals are always
concrete. Thus, to be adequate, any philosophy of religion
must deal with th.e idiosyncrasies and significant differences among various religions as well as their underlying
commonalities. In this regard, Hocking was more attentive
than Dewey to structural and functional similarities, but
less.attentive to differences.
1
cf. Joachim 'lilach, Types of Religious Experience
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 18ff.
Wach devotes ten pages of his classic work to Hocking's
later treatment of religion, specifically that. in LRW'E .. Cf.
also Wach's final work, The Comparative Study of Religion
( Ne"i·T York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 68 - 84.
Cf. ~lso Claude Levi-Straus, The Savage Hind (Chicago: Univers~ty of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 161- 190.
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Several preliminary conclusions can be drawn from
this purview of Hocking's investigation of religion. First,
the universal aspect of religion is consequent upon the
structure of human experience itself as a triadic relationship between the Self, the World and other selves, in which
God is present as the unifying ground or field of experience. As a ?ersonal presence, this trQnscendent Other Self
addresses the finite ego and calls it to its destiny
through particular natural and social experiences. Reciprocally, all such experiences are at least implicitly religious, that is, related to the ground and ultimate meaning
of one • s entire life, whether one is consciously a"tvare of
it or not.
Second, in so far as all experience is thus fundamentally religious, that is, entailing an implicit theistic
ground, any actual experience is a potential occasion for
11

a 11 religious experience, that is, the manifest awareness

of one's relatedness to God as mediated by this experience.
Further, these occasions of religious experience, given the
manifold relations possible (and actual) among the various
elements of experience (I, It, Thou[s]), can be expected to
be numerous rather than few, depending upon a person's abil-ity to attend to the context of relations by a shift of
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awareness rendering transparent the opacity of intermedi-

aries. This occurs in a possibly subtle but profound change
of consciousness in 'l',·lhich the holistic aspect of expe rience supercedes the particular. This ability can be greater
or less in different persons; it can also be increased or
"heightened"

a~d,

presumably, lost.

Third, religion is thus a common or ordinary dimension of everyman's experience as the explicitation of its
ground. Religious experience is extraordinary only in the
sense of its possible infrequency, suddenness or intensity
in particular instances. It is a different degree, not kind
of experience.
Fourth, as comQon, religious experience is thus inevitably social, in so far as all experience is both radically intersubjective and particularized by social activity, including our transactions with Nature. As the fuller development of experience in general, religious experience can be
expected to manifest more fully -- if not simultaneously -all the characteristic qualities of experience as such, not
only its social character, but as holistic, intentional,
cognitive, passionate, active, variable, dynamic and, of
course, theistic.
From these provisional conclusions, which may also
be taken as hypotheses for further investigation, it i.vould
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seem to folloH in addition that for Hocking the pa.rticular
fu~ction

-

of religion as a social phenomenon is realized in

furnishing interpretative schemata which facilitate the ex-

plicitation of God's presence by showing how the intermediaries can be made transparent. Further, religion provides
particular occasions for .. religious experiences" in the
form of prayer and worship. It also teaches persons how to
satisfy whatever psychological and moral conditions might
be required for "seeing" God. And, finally, religion provides opportunities for individual and social action as the
outgro-v;th of the receptive aspects of religious experience.
All this religion does by institutionalizing, that is, preserving in time and space the structures and events that
have successfully fulfilled these functions, for instance,
liturgical expressions, sacred scriptures, creeds, commentaries, moral codes, ascetical practices, authority structures and concrete forms of behavior such as preaching,
charitable works, social reform, etc.
The crisis of religion arises when the institutional
aspects cease to function properly, when modes of expression
gro-v1 outdated, when liturgies ossify, when the spoken and
written word rings hollow, when moral concern hardens into
casuistry and the rule of law becomes supreme, authority
overmasting service. In such a situation, religion can only
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die or rene1v itself by incorporating the energy of a fresh
vision of its deepest nature and recovering its original
purpose. To this end, as we shall see, religion needs its
mystics.
Thus circumscribing the topic of religion in advance
sets up certain parameters for a consideration of Hocking's
treatment of religion as a concept, that is, in its formal
aspects -- its characteristics, elements, structures and
functions, the present study is not intended to suggest
that he was
insensitive to the specific content of reli,
gious beliefs.
1 see TP 16 - 17, LRWF 227, 27f., 219.

II. HOCKING'S CONCEPT OF RELIGION
l. Fundamental Concepts

As already indicated, Hocking adhered to a basically
traditional notion of religion as the relation or bond bet~een

man and what he holds to be the divine element in the

whole of reality, the totality of experience. The work of
religion is to raise to consciousness that fundamental bond.
This it does by calling to mind the holistic character of
human life with respect to its experiential ground: "Every
one begins with his whole-idea; but it is the function of
religion to interpret this whole as divine; in brief, to
make the transition from the whole-idea to the idea of God. 111
The mediate character of all experience calls for interpretation; the agency of interpretation in the present instance is religion as in some sense institutionalized. The

1I-1GHE 142. Cf. 95: "The religious idea will be as
positive and primordial as any; will insist that it is possible to begin with the whole, as readily as with any fragment ... Cf. also 129 - 133 for the whole-idea as Weltanschauung. In SBF Hocking wrote, 11 Religion is man's intuition of
his destiny to have commerce with the ultimate powers of
the world, and the impulse which accompanies that intuition.
It nerves him to the audacious effort to match his thought
~gainst the whole of things, and to make that whole an obJect of contemplative enjoyment ... (SBF 5.) Cf. also 11 MGHE"
~5 and "Christianity and Intercultural Contacts," Modern
.:.rends in 'ivorld Religions, A Eustace Haydon, ed. (Freeport
New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1968), p. 146; hereafter referred to as "CIC." Cf. also "DCSNR" 39.
144

145

categories of interpretation are not innate but embodied
(as are all

~

oriori ideas) in the World.

Religion is not merely a cognitive activity, a "mere"
recognition of the ultimate meaning of the whole of the
Horld. The religious attitude is practical and unitive: "It
is a practical relation established between man and the totality with which he is destined to deal."

1

Further,

In religion the will of man seeks union with the simple
centerof power which is "beyond" and "within" the
world as the will of the world. The extravagant claim
of religion has been that union with God is itself a
good, and indeed, the supreme and sufficient satisfaction of the will.2
The function of religion in this regard will be "integrating
the human will in view of the whole. 113
Thus religion seeks a personal relationship of unity
with the power representing the will of the world, the only
kind of relationship which could satisfy the longing of the
human spirit for ultimate fulfillment. For Hocking" ••• religion thinks of the universe not in terms of 'It, • but in
terms of 'Thou.' It exists when man apprehends, beyond or
within the dark reaches of his environment, a controlling
power or powers in some measure akin to himself." 4 Thus religion is"the ability to say 'thou• to the universe, as God
l,.WV"

32.

2

HNR. 352. For religion as the Self-Uhole relation, cf.
296 I TP 315 - 16, "WM 11 415, ewe: 26 and SMN 207.
3

e~·lC

46; cf. 92

4

"WV" 33, emphasis added.
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iS the

1

'I'hou 1 of the

~~orld ... l However, the perception of the

personal character of the ground of the ';\'hole ( 11 Thou") would
seem to be a distinct moment dialectically from the recognition of this "Thou" as God, a recognition made possible by
th~

availability of a suitable concept of God in the concep-

tual armory of any given culture.
Summarily, the religious dimension of experience becomes salient for Hocking when the ground of experience becomes manifest not only as the infinite Thou of the World,
but~ God. In Hocking s thought,
1

as I understand it, this

occurs first when the whole-idea, the non-reflexive, working
concept of the world as the total context of experience (The
World} becomes focal in consciousness but, and most importantly, as a transparent medium of the known-felt presence
of God. The first phase of this process involves a psychological shift of attention from the part to the whole, an "induction" in which consciousness· of the ground of experience
replaces that of its elements: one 1 s own psychic objects,
natural and social objects or other persons as thou(s). The
second phase entails the recognition of the ground

~

God,

which involves not merely the God-concept (which we think
God with}
but a concept
of God -- an idea accessible to us
I
by which the God-concept and the experience of the ground

are recognized as coincident. It is in this sense that the
function of religion as an i~stitution is to provide the

l"RF" 365.
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concepts

~

God which thematize our experiences of God, that

iS, give them structure and definition, and thus to interEFe~

the Whole as divine. But as culturally conditioned, as

well as limited by their definiteness, all such concepts are
inadequate to the God experienced -- a point typically
stressed by the mystics, as we shall see. Such concepts reveal God to us in the immediacy of experience, but they likewise obscure the full transparency of the experience. The
more concrete and definite the concepts, the more restrictive they are in operation.

1

Conceivably, one's idea of God could be so limited,
so "small 11 as J. B. Phillips• would say,

2

that the God ex-

perienced is all but missed in being conceptualized. The
failure to recognize the presence intuited as God (i.e., as
11

God" is conceived in different cultures) could also result

from a deficient or simply different concept of God without
thereby affecting the initial moment of personal recognition
of the "Thou-character" of the presence felt. Hocking nowhere developed this line of thought, to my knowledge. But
it has importance inasmuch as the failure to achieve a manifest awareness of the presence of God as God could be attri1
compare St. Augustine's comment: "For God is more
truly thought than expressed; and he exists more truly than
he is thought." (De Trinitate, VII, iv, 7. Cited in ?;n
~Ugustine Synthesis, Erich Przywara, S.J., ed. [New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1945], p. 83.)
2
J.B. Phillips, Your God Is Too Small (New York: The
Macmillan co., 1961).
--------
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outable to influences largely beyond the individual's power
to control and therefore outside the

p~rimeter

of culpabili-

The second way in which the religious dimension of
experience becomes salient involves a movement opposite from
that just described-tion shifts frcm the

a~eductive"

~hole

process in which atten-

to the part, as it

~ere.

That is,

when the presence of God as the pervading Thou of the World
is discovered through the transparency of particular media
such as one's own psychic objects, some element of the
world, or an experience of interpersonal sharing. Hocking
was fully alert to the reality of such particular experiences,
in which the love of a friend, the beauty of a landscape or
~symphony,

perhaps an awareness of truth suddenly conveyed

to the astonished mind a sense of God's nearness.

1

This re-

cognition may well occur to a person "when in some use of
his whole-idea he suddenly notes God standing there."

2

He

may nevertheless have no explicit awareness of the Whole -passing from the "part" to God immediately.
In both ways, human consciousness comes to an awareness of God mediated by the World -- as a Whole or in part.
Hence, perhaps, the reason why to the mystic the part "gives"
or "stands for" the Whole; the experiences are ultimately
1

cf. HGHE 230ff.
2
HGHE 234.
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·valent. The intensity of religious experience may also

eCJU:L

,arY

tiOD

from an awareness of some aspect of the overall relaof the Self and God to an awareness of God's direct

and immediate presence, culminating in the experience of
union ...~n which intersubJ'ective consciousness of I-and-Thou
1
qi'leS way to the consubjective consciousness of We. This
perhaps is why the great mystics, although in the "unitive
way," have nevertheless been able to attend to worldly affairs without lising consciousness of God's presence: God's
presence and their own self-awareness are not experienced
as distinct. Thus, Meister Eckhart's aphorism might be paraphrased "The eye by which I see the World is the eye by
which God sees the World."

At this point, the chief difficulty I find in Hocking•s account is precisely its completeness. Its major lines
are clear, despite some internal fuzziness concerning the
transition from social knowledge to God as the supreme Other
Hind, as was noted before.

However, the communications mod-

el on which Hocking based his structural paradigm of experience is a relatively closed system, given the all-encompassing nature of the underlying Field of reference. An indefinite plurality of finite fields -- selves, time, space, etc.
-- prevents the system from being absolutely closed. But the
possibility of novelty, creativity and freedom in any but a
1

c£.

HGHE 279 - 80.
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highly relative sense seems radically limited by the absolute character of the divine field of (all possible) experience. Hocking's solution to this problem depended upon an
exploration into the exigencies of mystical experience, and
it is to a consideration of that dimension of religion that
we must defer further comment.

z.

Reconceptions of Religion
Hocking's method of precising the fundamental mean-

ing(s) of religion was to look to its primary functions in
life as a whole. 1 Thus in his magnum opus he initially investigated religion as
rical role.

2

~the

mother of the arts,» its histo-

But while a true function, fostering the arts,

like other social functions, cannot constitute religion's
ultimate meaning, for this is an effect of something far
more characteristic.

3

In this early period of Hocking's thought, religion
had as its primary function and therefore its basic meaning
"the anticipation of attainment. 114 By this Hocking meant the
1

cf. MGHE 4, 11 and passim.

2

MGHE 13 - 14, 18, 25.

3 "To define
religion by its function, that is,
pragm.-a ticall.y, ~s to define i t by its effects: but that is
quite different from identifying it with its effects. We
can only approach religion as we approach any other reality,
through things which are external to the thing itself, as
are the services which it renders to persons and society.
To identify it with its services, however, is to lose the
reality and thus, eventually, the services." ("HCCBFR 11 278.)
4
MGHE 3lf., 326 and passim.
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power of religion to make present in current experience the
goals, meanings and values which represent the highest aspirations of both individuals and the race.
Both concepts continued to occupy a place of importance in Hocking's later thought.

1

But as his philosophy de-

veloped, certain significant shifts in emphasis occurred, as
noted before. The early notions of religion were psychological and individualistically oriented, despite Hocking's emphasis on their intrinsic connection with social process.
As Hocking's interests. and activity extended to the fields
of law, politics and practical religion {e.g., missionary
endeavor), his attitude toward religion, like that toward
experience, became more socially conscious, especially in
its concrete manifestation. By 1936, when Hocking delivered
the Hibbert Lectures (later published as Living Religions
and a World Faith}, he had arrived at a new definition:
If, to agree on a name, we were to characterize the deepest impulse in us as a "will to live," religion could
also be called a will to live but with an accent of solicitude-- an ambition to do one's living well! or,
more adequately, religion is ~ passion for righteousness,
~ for the spread .2! righteousness, conceived ~ ~ ~
mic demand.2

-

1
2

cf.

"IHR 11 568, "WV" 33, "SSP" 399.

rn clarifying his notion of "righteousness," Hocking
observed that "The term 'righteousness' is not used in the
conventional sense of compliance with a known law. It is a
search for a law: there is a right way of living, it must be
found. There is a primitive assurance ••• that living is in~ended to be good; and an equally primitive denial that livlng as it offers itself is good! .. (LRI'i"F 27.)
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Beset with accident, passingness and disease, in addition to the other manifold woes of life, the religious impulse is the conviction that "There must be a way of life,
distinct from this, a right way."

1

And thus salvation, as

Hocking would later describe it, "means the discovery of
that way of life which makes it possible for us to realize
2
the potentialities of human nature." Ideas operate in this
regard as practical means to a=tion.
Similarly recalling the "passionate" character of experience as implied in his second formulation, Hocking's reference to "passion" in this description of religion .. implies not a disturbed state of emotion but the inescapable
urgency or 'seriousness' which belongs to the central stake
of human existence -- ivhether one lives or misses living. "

3

The existential urgency conveyed by this comment
serves to relate Hocking's second notion of religion to his
second formulation of experience, and also leads directly
1

Ibid.

2

"CJ:C" 150. And salvation is "given" when''it is seen
-- as the mystics have seen, and have best seen when the
course of experience has been most against them -- that all
.2£ experience is ahistory
of intercourse between the soul
of man and his God." ( 11 11GHE" 66.)
3 LRWF 28. He continued, " ••• human living proceeds under a tension of concern, anxiety, such as no anima~ can
feel; for it is only the human type of consciousness which
knows that living, in its chief dimension, may be a failure.
T~is anxious self-consciousness is the capacity for relig1on; and the depth of concern is the measure of the man."
{LRWF 29. )
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to the element which figures so strongly in his final formulation of experience, Destiny.
In this, Hocking's last work devoted entirely to the
subject of religion, he fused his notions of "cosmic demand"
with the consciousness of the world as a shared whole, strongly emphasizing the social dimension of religion. He also
avoided the trap of moralism:
Religion is a neighbor of morality, but it is not the
same thing. The difference lies first in that factor of
"cosmic demand." I\.nd then in the depth of the feeling:
when this cosmic concern fuses with one's own there arises that peculiar ardor for right living which dutifulness alone knows nothing about. For if right living, whatever it is, lies in the nature of things, not simply in
my free choice, then whether I go right or not is ~
solely ~ ~ concern: the total world, there, expects
something of me, and my effort becomes a response; the
moral scene acquires, as in binocular vision, a third dimension, a qualitatively new importance.l
Here Hocking was alluding clearly to the concept of
Destiny. Rather than a mere cultivation of solitude, the religious dimension of experience is a response to a summons,
"a step out of privacy, a rejection of the illusion of privacy."2 In a striking, familiar passage, Hocking went on to
1

LRWF 26.
2 compare Jantes • notion of religion as 11 the feelings,
acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so
far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine ... (James, op. cit., p. 42.)
~ot~ also vihi tehead' s characterization: "Religion is what the
lndlvidual does with his own solitariness." (Religion in the
Making [New York: The Hacmillan Co., 1926], p. 16.
---
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explain,
In a sense, each self is alone with its experience: it
issues its acts from a position of complete inner security; it enjoys 'subjectivity.' And subjectivity is opportunity. All the primitive iniquities ••• are the exploiting of the subjective opportunity in the interest
of my private gratification. Religion is the rejection
of this exploit from the root, because of an elemental
inkling that the privacy is conferred and therefore not
absolute: religion is the redemption of solitude.l
Thus, selfishness is the religious equivalent of solipsism;
a morally culpable failure to come out of one's solitude and
converse. The social function of religion does not suppress
but in fact enhances individuality, however: "Even in Hinduism, the most individualistic of all religions, the hermit
2
customarily leaves a path to his door."
Religion as a passion for the spread of righteousness
is therefore a response to a demand perceived as emanating
from outside the Self and directing the Self into society,
the realm not only of authentic experience, but of individuation and, ultimately, of salvation. As a particularized
phenomenon in the life of an individual, religion as Hocking
now conceived it, finds both its meaning and function in the
social \V'orld.
3. Final Conceptions of Religion
In his later writings, Hocking preserved the notion
1
2

LRHF 27.
LRI..ZF 40.
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of religion as the bond between men and God, for which
f_omin_9.

~vorld

T~e

Civilization provides ample evidence. Religion,

he wrote, is "whatever unites the soul of man with the
whole," 1 "the affirmation of the anchorage in reality of
ideal ends" 2 whose function is .. integrating the human will
in view of the whole •••• "

3

He explicitly stated at one point

that religion was, simply, the .. bond between the soul of man
and the Real ...

4

Further, religion was still particular and

yet universal:
Religion must somehow present itself as the persona1 intimacy of the Whole to the Infinitesimal, as an inversion both of the physical and of the conceptual perspectives, an inversion adumbrated by Cusanus in his strange
doctrine of the coincidence of opposites. In brief it belongs to the general essence of all religion that at
some point it escapes generality, clothes itself in particulars, descends to the shaping of personal deeds and
hopes, becomes "a" religion.S
Nor did Hocking forget his notion of religion as a
passionate concern for the spread of righteousness. In his
last book, a prophetic study of what he called a SovietAmerican detente, he wrote, at age eighty-six,
The deepest of issues pertains to the ultimate passions
of mankind -- the passionate hatred of evil and also the
passionate love of the infinite. It is the passion commonly called 11 religion" -- which we may simply identify
as "world passion" -- a reach of kinship tmvard the to1
3

5

cHC 26.

2 C'iJC

30.

c:qc 92.

4 c:·;c

46.

CHC 180.
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tality in ~hich at rare moments we not only feel but
know ourselves to be immersed. It is that inner passion
for what is beyond the evident that glorifies the mananimal and spurs him to build into history, through art
and faith, a fraction of his cosmic love -- which is,
in fact, his love of life.l
While understandably nuanced in a work on political
issues, this passage contains implicit references to the
major meanings of religion Hocking had hitherto explored
the anticipation of ultimate integrity, the passion for a
fulL life well-lived, the "cosmic demand" spurring man toward the unification of history in love, even the bond between men and God -- here, unless I am mistaken, implied in
"the passionate love of the infinite" and the

11

kinship" with

the totality in which we are immersed.
But despite the elegance and sophistication of its
reiteration, this conception of religion appears as restricted as was the second formulation of experience by a concern for "living well" which remains largely "horizontal"
and activistic. "The spread of righteousness" implies little
depth of experience. The encounter with God as the ground
of experience, the concern of Hocking's initial conceptions,
is at best an implication. The social dimension, while present, is limited to extending the "good life." The mediatory
1

Strength of Men and Nations (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1959), p. 207; hereafter referred to as SMN. Cf.
"Ernest Hocking," .!.!:!i2. is~ Faith, Stewart G. Cole, ed.
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), pp. 135, 145; hereafter referred to as TIMF.
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potential of Nature and Society is barely even implied. The
intersubjective and consubjective intensity of social relations is also implicit if not merely presupposed. In general, this conception reflects a preoccupation with external,
"excursive 11 activity and the interfaces between Church and
society.
However, Hocking's concerns had, as we know, shifted
at this time to the social world, wherein he exposed the
place and function of religion, especially as an institution. But this perspective did not permit him to incorporate the deeper aspects of experience. I detect little if
any advancement toward this end in further formulations of
the concept of religion after 1940. I think, however, that
there is a simple explanation for this apparent failure to
move the concept of religion into a phase of development
commensurate with Hocking's metaphysical appraisal of experience as the Fact-Field-Destiny constellation. In his final stage of philosophical reflection Hocking had come to
identify the fullest expression of religion with mysticism.
It is consequently in the investigation of that aspect of
religious experience that we should expect to find the equivalent of his third conceptualization of experience.

III. ·rHE ELEl1lENTS AND

STRUCTU~E

OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

As we have seen in the preceding exposition, in both
latent and manifest form the essential elements of religious
experience were for Hocking the Self, the World of nature
and society as the general medium of revelation 1 and God as
the Thou revealed in the World as well as in the depths of
the psyche as the ground or field of experience. Briefly,
the elements of religion are the same as those of experience
as such. If and how, in actual experience, especially its
social forms, the field of experience becomes manifest as
God, and whether perceiving the relationship with this field
is how religion arises in human consciousness can only be
determined by an inquiry into that realm of experience wherein such claims are found, especially its mystical territory,
whose occupants typically report having had a direct and immediate experience of God.
In any event, God enters the scene not when Other
Hind becomes capitalized, but in sudden or gradual "breakthrough" events involving the reciprocal character of natural and social experience. Having arrived at the point
where the elements of experience (I, It and Thou[s]) intersect,
All that is needed is a step of breaking through the
shell of human self-enclosure to the reality outside,
or that ·this reality outside break through to us. This
breaking-through, both ways at once, is, I believe, the
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point at which God appears in experience.

1

Hocking's structural description and analysis of religious experience, both as a general quality of all experience and as particular

11

breakthrough" events, addressed not

onlY the static (synchronic) dimension -- how religious experience involves a reciprocal relationship between the
self and God mediated by the World, but also the genetic
(diachronic) dimension -- "how the idea of God first arises
in human consciousness, "·

2

both in terms of individual aware-

ness and as a developmental social phenomenon.

1. The Static Dimension
'rhe development of religious consciousness through a
dialectical process involving an interpretation of experiences of Nature and Society concerns both the elements of
religious experience and their structural relations. As we
have seen, implicit in every experience, both in the infancy
of the person and that of the social group, is an awareness,
however "dim" (i.e., not fully conscious) of the grounding
presence of God not only in the World but also in the depths
of the psyche. This is the I-It-Thou relationship of nuclear
experience which,

raised to fuller awareness by reflection

on actual, concrete encounters in Nature and Society, gives
l"HGHE" 65.
2MGHE 144 - 45.
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explicit knowledge of the Self as a subjective field, of
the world as a real and objective system of facts, and of
the other as Thou -- first, as other selves in the immediacy of sharing a common world, then as a supreme and Other
Thou communicating his other selfhood as a personal call
through the events of reflexive, natural and social experience.
Two aspects of the Self are especially relevant here:
the subconscious and the reflective self. For Hocking it
seems safe to say that the nuclear experience of God and the
world has its locus in the subconscious self, in particular
the "allied" subconscious, that "apperceptive mass 11 which we
think with but rarely think

£!. 1

Inasmuch as something like

"pure immediacy" exists, it exists there, and as I read Hocking, God is indeed present to each Self in that subliminal
region of awareness, James' "back of the mind.

11

But God as

the Other Thou is consciously recognized, though not as dif2
ferent from what is "al\<lays dimly perceived," only by means
of the mediation of idea-feelings acquired and sustained in
social interaction.
Attending to God as the "frame of the universal," the
"Thou of the 'Ylorld," is an activity of the reflective self,
having withdrawn its immediate attention from the business
1

see above, pp. 62f.For the "allied" subconscious
and the "apperceptive mass," cf. tv1GHE 527, 534, 537.
2

1lHS" 191. Cf. "l•!GHE 11 65.
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of the World. But because the reflective self enjoys a wider
field of consciousness than the excursive self, in attending
to the whole of experience, it reduces the borders of the
allied subconscious so that the "God within .. can be apprehended with greater personal immediacy though in fact "always there." To that extent, the recognition of God in experience is not inferential, for the "God without," summoning the Self to greatar intimacy through the World, is discovered to be the same as the God present in the depths of
the psyche. The remo·te and transcendent God without and the
near and immanent God within coincide.
The character of the relations between the Self, the
World and God is multiform, but consistently reciprocal: the
Self is related to the natural world as knower and known
(cognition), as field and event (transaction), as exploiter
and exploited (labor), even as victim and predator (misfortune, suffering, death). The social world is related to the
Self primarily in experiences summarized as love (association) and duty (obligation), including science, art andreligion. Selves are interrelated by both natural and social
intermediaries; such mediation is best described as communication. This applies both to individual human selves in an
I-Thou relationship and also to the relationship between
the Self and God (revelation, adoration) in which all things
and anything can serve as mediators.
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Among the relations between the Self and God, worship, as the chief act of religion,

1

is the characteristic

response of the Self to its awareness of God's communication through the media of Nature and Society. In worship,
God is expressly addressed in the vocative case as Thou.

2

In worship, God is adverted to as present "here and now,"
and in that presence the manifold experiences of the excursive self are illumined in their character as intermediaries
between the Self and God. Hence, for Hocking, as we shall
see, mystical experience is the heightened awareness of God's
presence in the form of an extension of the act of worship.
Worship thus functions as the point of contact between ordinary religion and its mystical expression inasmuch as it
constitutes a conscious shift of attention away from the
daily agenda of partial deeds to the meaning of the 'ivhole of
experience.
~orship

is an activity of the reflective self in con-

trast to the activities of the excursive self. Nevertheless,
the events of daily life are the intermediaries which, refleeted upon as a whole, are rendered transparent retrospectively as media of the presence and activity of God. However,
the judgment that God is present is not a mere inference, because it is the God-idea now operating which illuminates
1

2

cf.

ct.

11

HH" 39

I

HGHE 341.

MGHE 342 -

44.
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these experiences and which coincides with the presence thus
revealed, of which the Self had heretofore been only "dimly
a\tlare •

,.1

In addition to explicitating man's bond with God,
worship has a social function: the "bonding .. of men in a
peaceful and prayerful "meeting of minds." It brings
the minds of individual disputants into a region of common human concern, and of common humility before that
which is above them all -- the sense of humility being
the psychological sign that the individual is being actually enlarged, restored to his normal dimensions, until his periphery can once more make contact with that
of his neighbor.2
we shall return to the social function of religion below;
here it is sufficient to note that for Hocking religion is
revealed in its social nature by its fundamental act.

~'lor-

ship reaches its perfection only in the society of selves
united in a common act of praise.

3

1

rn developed mysticism by contrast, God is immediately discerned as present in events of daily life and the
prayerfully reflective moment of 1-vorship is foreshortened or
abolished altogether. In mystical experience, as the fuller
development of the immediacy of religious experience, worship is in this sense made coterminous with the activities
of the excursive self.
2

"INR" 576. He continued, urn the contemplation of
worship -- assuming that human minds, released from their
prepossessions, tend to converge upon the same reality -there is always the possibility that my enemy will reach the
same premise from which I depart in refuting him, and so
Will at least begin the process of refuting himself."
3

cf.

HGHE 522: 11 Horship is imperfect unless when I
Worship, I am joining the race in worship."
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2.

The Genetic Dimension
The thought has long fascinated students of history

that each individual seems to reproduce to some extent in

hiS own career the progressive manifestation of religious
awareness that occurred historically in the collective experience of his culture. In both cases, the religious experience of mankind has a temporal structure, indeed a dialectic moving from stage to stage by affirmation and negation, that is, by overcoming obstacles in its forward movement in time. For Hocking, the historical development of religion consisted in a progression from general animism -the perception of the World as somehow alive and responsive
to human interests-- to spiritism -- the belief that the
cosmic forces behind and within Nature and Society are somehow personal-- to polytheism and monotheism -- the conception of superhuman personal entities (or entity) as sovereign master(s) of natural and social destiny-- and finally
to mysticism, the apex of theism -- the quest for and achievement of union with the god(s) with its culmination in
prophetic action. 1
1

Interestingly, Hocking seems never to have enterfor him, the
d~scovery of unity is subsequent to the perception of plurality. Cf. MGHE 6 - 7, 229 - 40, 317 - 37; GL Dec. 10,
1938; "Hl\" 433; and especially LRHF 190ff. In MGHE he wrote
"There is no such thing in history as a primitive monot~eism; but there is a permanent singleness in the thought
Of deity which man forever departs from, through loyalty to
the variety of deity's manifestations ... (324- 25.)
t~ined any notion of a primordial monotheism;
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The negative moments in this dialectic appear, first,
in the discrimination between the living and spiritual from
the merely material aspects of Nature, which marks the transition from animism to (poly)spiritism.

1

The emergence of

the genuinely religious frame of mind begins in the discovery of the personal nature of the .. powers .. in or behind Nature, and the eventual segregation of the sacred and profane
realms of experience. The second negative moment concerns
the discernment of the divine character of the spirit tvorld
-- the transcendent dimension of the gods, in contrast to
the lesser natures of other numinous entities such as ghosts,
demons, kings and heroes.

2

(At this point, presumably, the

god[s] as well as other "supernatural" entities would be
positively perceived as .. Thou[s].'') The third moment negates
the plural aspect of theism in the discovery of the absolute
nature of God: the many Thou's coalesce into the One. 3
".Hth "the discovery of the Absolute," religion passed
historically from a personal to an impersonal conception of
God, who was no longer merely an other Thou, but the allpresent and inexpressible ground of being in which all differences were reconciled.

4

This disc~very, which Hocking

1

cf.

MGHE 317.

2

cf.

1-fGHE 319.

3

cf.

HGHE 325f.

4

cf.

HGHE 323; GL Dec. 10 I 1938; and "HA" 433.
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called "the most important cultural achievement of antiquity,"l marks the first stage in the evolution of mysticism.
The negative aspect of this discovery is expressed in the

__ __ __

;;....--' neti , " "nada , nada , " of the mystics East and West:
"neti
God is not this, not that particular entity, but somehow implicated in the Whole. Pantheism is one historical manifestation of this insight; monism is its philosophical counterpart.2 But a further development took the dialectic forward
a step: the belief in the possibility of realizing union
with the Absolute by a life of moral discipline, i.e.,
11

right living." In renunciation and meditation, the

11

nega-

tive path 11 of the mystic, in which the motif is both personal and impersonal ("That art Thou"), the spirit is prepared
for a transforming union with the Absolute. Even mystical
withdrawal into contemplative union was, however, surpassed
in the final stage of religious development, the mystic's
return to the World of plurality and action. Mysticism gives
3
rise to prophecy as its logical and natural culmination.
Individual religious development does not reproduce
the whole gamut of the historical phases with anything like
microcosmic exactitude, although the animistic and polyspiritistic attitudes of the infant are similar to the early
1

GL Dec. 10, 1938; "HA" 433.

2

cf.

3

cf

MGHE 326.

• GL Dec • 1 0 ,

19 3 8 ; '' HA" 4 3 3 - 3 4 •
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stages of religious evolution in many respects, as Hocking
observed and has been more systematically studied by Piaget
and others.

1

Hocking clearly indicated, however, that indi-

vidual development in terms of religious awareness involves
a progressive explicitation of the latent dimension of Godawareness in nuclear experience, that is, the emergence in
consciousness of events in Nature and Society, the expression of I-Thou relatedness in worship,

and the culmination

of both in the heightened awareness of God's presence in
mystical experience with its actively prophetic consequences.
Both the social and individual history of religious
development are thus rooted in and productive of social experience. Hocking occupied dozens of pages in his magnum
opus illustrating how the religious perception of Nature as
the habitat or medium of God's presence is radically social,
concluding that
Social experience, then, becomes religious experience
only when it is at the same time an experience of Nature
power. And nature experience likevlise is religious only
when Nature becomes an object of social apprehension.
Soiritism and Animism are at bottom the same.2
Nature, as we have seen, is known as a shared world
- - I know Nature as already known by Him (or Them), which
1

cf. Piaget, op. cit. and below, p. 168, n. 2. Cf.
The Origins and gistory of Consciousness
(Pr~nceton: Princeton University Press, 1969 ed.).

als~ Erich Neumann,

2

HGHE 232 - 33. Cf. "Is the Group Spirit Equivalent

to God for All Practical Purposes?" Journal of Religion, 1

(Sept. 1921), pp. 489, 495f.; hereafter referred to as "IGSEG."
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,

accounts for its very knowability.~ The child, similarly,
iS born into a social world, that is, into a system of structures already organized into meanings which he must largely
assimilate by an active process of "construction. 112 All
knowledge is thus social knowledge, for all experience is
social experience and knowledge is the natural term of all
.

exper~ence.

3

Nature and Society together thus constitute in both
historical and individual genesis a shared field of possible
action in which one is always dealing with God whether he
knows it or not.

4

A possible and sometimes actual mistake

consequent on the "dim awareness 11 of God's omnipresence consists in concluding that Nature and/or Society are God rather than media of God's self-communication. It is therefore
not surprising that one function of religion has been to
relativize both Nature and the State,

5

an achievement made

possible by the recognition of God as the Absolute -- "r,v-hatever else he may be.

11

6

1

cf. MGHE 239 - 40: "At the source of all religion,
so far as our analysis can discover, we find an experience
Of God as Other Knower of our World, already in close relation to self, and also in some natural bond with our social
and physical experience. Such is the report of the elementary religious consciousness ••.• "
2

cf. Jean Piaget, The Construction of Beality in the
op. cit., and Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann,
The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday and Co., 1966).

.
~h~ld,

3
5

cf. MGHE 282, 64, 67£.
cf. "INR" 378.

4

cf. LRWF 278, "MS" 189.

6MGHE 206.
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Overall, then, the structure cf religious experience
is both historically and individually social in origin, development and consequences. The nuclear foundation of all
experience, the I-It-Thou relation, is explicitated in both
dimensions as the awareness of God's presence in the events
of Nature and Society, reaching in mysticism levels of increasing explicitness and intensity, culminating in the direct and immediate experience of God described as mystical
union or communion. The outcome of this dialectical process
of~plicitation

is also social, and it is at the stage of.

mystical experience that the transition from contemplative
union to active, prophetic engagement in the world is most
effectively realized and where it must be sought. Hence, it
will be necessary to turn to an investigation of mysticism
as the fullest development of nuclear experience in order
to complete the analysis of the social structure of religious experience.

IV.

CONCLUSION: T!E EE.J..NING AND V.liLUE OF RELIGIOUS

EXP:SRIE~TCE

For Hocking, as was noted before, meaning is found in
the dynamic relation of the parts to the whole -- of the partial aspects and elements of experience to the whole frame
of experience; of the universal to the particular; of the
general to the specific. Meaning is dynamic in so far as it
"descends 11 from the whole to the parts, from the real to the
"less real," in a dialectical alternation with its inductive
"ascent" from the partial to the holistic. The dynamism of
meaning is also a function of its temporal structure; the
dialectic of experience is a cumulative induction, a process.
Hence meaning is discoverable in function; what something is
will be most clearly understood in view of what it does -1

its overall purpose, development and effects. So too with
religion.
In terms of its most immediate purpose with respect
to its character as a bond between men and God, religion exercises a moral function, indeed an "ascetical" one: freeing
men from "worldly" preoccupations by withdrawing their attention temporarily ("detaching" them) from that world, but
without thereby totally disengaging them from society, where
they have a necessary place and destiny:
If men are to live freely in a world of uncertain fortune it is necessary that their affections be in a meas1

See above, p.22, n. 1. Cf. also MGHE 409, n. 1.
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ure detached from the world of objects, and from the necessity of success in the world, and yet they must continue to act there and with absolute power. They must be
detached without losing attachment: it will not suffice
that they are assured of really being identical with
Brahm, if they must realize this identity by retreat
from affairs.l
How religion thus functions, and the variety of passible meanings it consequently possesses, can be seen in respect to both the individual person and the social group,
whether dynamically or statically considered: integration
and growth.
As mentioned before, for Hocking, the overall human
function of religion is unification or integration -- the
unifying process of individual persons, both at a given moment (integration) and over time (individuation), as well as
the social unification of men currently (cohesion} and in
history (progress}. Both processes are reciprocally related
by a dialectic of alternation -- each person arising out of
the social matrix, achieving individuality (or failing to)
by seeking independence from society and then contributing
to the development of society by free and creative social
involvement.
1. Individual Integrity a.nd Development
Several instances of individual integration as a func1
"HCCBFR" 282. This, Hocking's principle of ascetic~sm, is found in works from all periods of his life. Cf.
e.g., MGHE 105, 493f.; HNR 353; TP 182, 187, 268, 270, 274;
RM 58; "HGI.H" 462; CHC 123; NIHE 126ff., 129, 131, 154.
.
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tion of religion

have been cited already.

1

Keligion tends

to effect a unifying transformation of the instincts, sexuality, aggression and ambition; also of the will and conscience, stripping the person of artificialities in order to
liberate the simple and sincere "real self," the whole man.

2

It enables the individual to overcome evil and sin as fragmenting forces by including them as partial aspects of a
3
greater whole, that is, by "transmuting" them.
Religion affects a greater harmony between the Self
and the world of Nature, begetting objectivity of mind and
thereby creating the conditions necessary for the emergence
4
of science. Religion endows the individual with a greater
sense of self-worth and an assurance of the realism of his
5
hope. It is his anticipation of attainment. Religion thus
promotes wholeness.

6

1 see above, pp. 132, 138ff.
2

cf. HNR 367; ewe 92; MS 429; l-1GHE 436- 38.

3 c£. "HCCBFR" 281; MGHE 87f.;"WV" 88£. • TP 19; "INRu
584. Cf. also Michael Galligan, God and Evil (New York:
Paulist Press, 1976), pp. 36f., 55- 57; and David Toolan,
S.J., Evil and the Hystic's Way.!£ God (Dissertation, Southern Methodist University, 1975).
4

ef. MS 429, SIG 113, TIMF 145 - 46, etc.

5 c£. "DCSNR" 39 and "HCCBFR" 277.
6 c£. Bernard Heland, Faith and Culture (London: Allen
and Unwin, Ltd., 1955), p. 166: "\jholeness as the ultimate
condition of the spiritual life is generally associated with
a monistic metaphysics. In Absolute Idealism, for example,
religion and wholeness came to have identical meaning. Whole-
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With respect to the individual's relation to society,
he is provided by religion with a measure of detachment from

social norms and thereby independence in thought and action,
primarily by a breaking down of socially conditioned habits
of behavior.

1

By withdrawing a person from society tempora-

rily, religion thus catalyzes the process of individuation,
which as a temporal period of growth prepares the person for
a return to society more creative and free.

2

And by the on-

going dialectic of withdrawal and return, that is, of excursion and reflection, continued growth is achieved. From a
social point of view, then, religion is society's way of rejuvenating its inner resources by enhancing the experience

of its members. (This is not to say, however, that this is
the main purpose of religion on the individual level, which
is, rather, closer union with God. It is to say that closer
union with God has important social consequences

~vhich

are

inseparable from the nature of religion as a social phenomenon.)
ness in this sense is aluays in danger o£ obscuring the individual, a.s Josiah Royce \vell knew, and as Hilliam Ernest
Hocking has clearly indicated in stating his principle of
alternation.~~

1

2

cf. HNR 378; "DCSNR" 43; "INR" 568- 71, etc.
cf. MGHE 25, 462££.
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2.

social Cohension and Progress
Turning then to the social effects of religion, the

pattern of integration and growth is parallel: for Hocking,
religion tends to increase social cohesion and to promote
social progress, if it does not always in fact succeed.
First, and most importantly, religion in its most characteristic activity tends to achieve an historical union of wills,
that is, of human persons.

1

Thus religion tends to produce
'I
2
the unification of history itself. Religion further promotes a contemporaneous

11

meeting of minds": it brings men

together, perpetually reaffirming "that original human solidarity which underlies political and all other social grouping."3

Religion promotes an "impersonal interest in· man-

kind which political life

increasingly demands, and yet in4
creasingly tends to break down, 11
thereby maintaining the
conditions necessary for the continuation of justice and
law. Horeover, "worship sensitizes the individual conscience,
and confirms that 'better reason' which law embodies or

1 cf. "HCCBFR" 270: ~~ ••• one of the functions of religion is to join the minds of worshippers in the present time
with the minds of worshippers in all past and all future time.
~orship is imperfect unless when I worship I am joining the
race in worship." Cf. HGHE 522, "DCSNR" 35.
2

cf.

1-~GHE

515ff.; GL Dec. 10, 1938; "HA" 433.

\rs 426

-

4

- 28.

r-rs 427

27; cf. "INR 11 576.
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'
ought to emooay, 1 tnus
contr1Dut1ng to c1v1 1 'narmony, re'

•

II

'1

'

'

'

ligion•s conservative influence. It also reduces aggressive2
ness on the social level as well as on that of individuals.
More positively, religion has borne both the sciences and
the arts.

3

Religion, by enhancing the individuality of so-

ciety's members, assures the on-going and humane renewal of
the social enterprise itself and is also thus
.
d
so 1 1tu
e. .. 4

tion o f

~the

redemp-

Religion promotes the survival of the

state by relativizing it, thus preventing or at least oppos5
ing political totalitarianism.
In terms of social development, religion .. promotes
change in the direction we call progress."

6

alluded to the prophetic aspect of worship:

Here, Hocking
11

Every critic of

the existing order is at heart a revolutionary; but worship
is the radical and deliberate cult of revolution."

7

Religion

is also progressive; it promotes the growth of civilization
by eliciting the condition for the appearance of the State
1

MS 429.

2

3
4

MGHE 13 - 14; "IUR" 568; TIMF 145 - 46, etc.

MGHE 404; LRWF 27; CWC 73, etc.

5

6

Cf • " INR" 57 5 f •

"DCSNR 11 43.
Ms 430.

7

Ibid. Cf. MGHE 364.
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as a "circuit of wills'': morale, the willingness to co-operate in forming an international human family.

1

Religion

here functions as a cultural universal, present more or less
2
effectively in particular religions as a "world faith." But
as a particularizing agency, religion also preserves national and regional differences, supporting the co-existence of
~

world religions, not their amalgamation or abolition.Hocking's evaluation of religion was obviously positive and optimistic. In this, he was at odds with many influential philosophers who held that religions as particular
had, if anything, exercized a retrograde influence on civilization (the Marxist critique and Dewey's). He likewise differed from those of his more conservative co-religionists
for whom society and religion were antagonistic, not antithetical or collaborative agencies (Barth, Kraemer, et al.).
A final assessment of the value of religion for society is

not, of course, available. But Hocking's case for religion
as the fuller development of human experience, based upon an
analysis of religion as a collective (universal) phenomenon,
a culturally particular entity, as well as an individual experience, has proved to be sufficiently seaworthy to have
weathered various storms of controversy. 4
1

cf. MS 430;

2
3
4

C~C 153.

cf. Lm·IF, passim; "RF" 366.
cf.

c~c 150 - 54.

cf. the articles by Van Dusen,

~ieman, Horton,
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It would be tempting to fault Hocking as being overlY sanguine in his endorsement of religion except for two
facts. First, he was 'tvell aware of the historical failings
of organized religion despite a tendency to underestimate
them. 1 Second, he was articulating a descriptive theory of
religion based on its general manifestations; he was searching for the meaning of its purpose, process and effects, not
attempting to assess every respect and detail of religious
history, much less to exonerate it. In concluding that in
general religion proved to be a positive and constructive
agency in the making and remaking of Self and Society, I believe that Hocking established a convincing case. But he also fully realized that an analysis of religion in its ordinary manifestations, culminating in the religious institution, was incomplete on both the individual and social levels of experience.
~e

have already noted that to the extent that mankind,

individually and collectively, wills to preserve its religious insights, values and achievements against the encroachments of time, it resorts to institutions -- systematic ways
of acting, thinking and valuing which are given corporate
permanence in the form of customs, traditions, scriptures,
monuments, etc. From these embodiments, the sagging reliK~aemer,

Slater and Radhakrishnan in PRC~C as well as the
Cl.tations in the works of ~·fach cited above.
1

Cf. HGHE 11, 459; "MS" 190 - 92; LRHF, passim.
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gious spirit can and should be able to draw new energy, being brought again by their mediation into the ambience of
the Holy. 1 But the very qualities which insure their permanence also doom institutions to a diminishing capacity to
renew religious feeling, to mediate the Holy to new generations. And thus mankind collectively and individually must
sometimes revitalize the source of the institutions themselves -- by the personal rediscovery in experience of the
meaning of the original insights, values and achievements
which are worth handing on to the coming generations.
In the sphere of specifically religious institutions,
those who purport to have, and who demonstrably have had,
the original insights, appreciation of value and ability to
achieve lasting works are, for Hocking, the mystics:
Religion is kept alive by the presence in the world of
those who have known what religion is, and who interpret
it to us; and of these interpreters we have to say, as
the old Greek saying had it -- many are the thyrsusbearers, but few are the mystics.2
Everyman may be a mystic at heart, but as in art and science,
so too in religion, genius is infrequent. But genius there
has been.
As the explicitation of the nuclear dialogue of the
Self with God mediated by Nature and Society, religion thus
looks back on the varieties of ordinary experience and ahead
1

2

cf.

HGHE 519 -

"RF" 345.

24; LR';lF 48 -

49.
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to its own further explicitation in the mystical dimension
of experience. There the social origin and goal of religion, as well as the immediate awareness of the presence of
God, receive their highest and fullest expression and must
find their ultimate evaluation. There too the deficiencies
of religion can be expected to find their supplement.

CHAPTER III
THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF MYSTICISM
INTRODUCTION
Mysticism was not a mere variety of religious experience for Hocking, but rather its culmination as the full development of worship. For worship, the chief act of religion,
embodies the conscious recognition of the bond between men
and God expressed as an I-Thou communication. As the epitome
of this consciousness, mysticism makes salient the principal
features not only of religious experience, but also those of
experience as such in its essential structure and deepest
meaning. For as we have seen, religious experience is the
manifest development of the nuclear structure of all experience.
Consequently, in its explicit form, mysticism provided
Hocking with an empirical testing-ground for his formulation
of the meaning and value of religion, as i·t had for James.
Hocking's particular genius lay in recognizing that in order
to produce valid ''fruits for life"

which always means

life shared with others --, authentic religious experience
and,

~

fortiori, mysticism must originate in a form of so-

cial experience (intersubjectivity). as well as eventuate in
constructive social action.
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As the essence of religious experience and as such
the ground of all experience, the mystical dimension of experience was constituted for Hocking by a direct and immediate encounter with God which is nevertheless mediated in its
explicit form by natural and social factors. Thus in the investigation of mysticism, we again and definitively encounter Hocking's two-fold philosophical agenda: to account for
intersubjective experience as well as for the awareness of
God as a direct factor in experience.

By investigating mysticism as practiced, Hocking undertook to determine whether or not his positive appraisal
was in fact borne out in experience. The importance of his
study lay in the fact that by the logic of his own dialectic
the final validity of his case for the social meaning and
structure of human experience depended upon the conclusion
of this examination.
In this chapter I shall argue that as articulated by
Hocking mystical experience must be considered an intrinsically social phenomenon, that is, in its origin, development
and consequences. Further, mysticism constitutes practical
evidence for the awareness of God immediately and directly
present in human experience. I shall also argue that Hocking correctly concluded that as an extension as well as the
inner meaning of religious experience, mysticism cannot be
considered essentially extraordinary or exceptional, but
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must differ from ordinary experience in degree and incidence
rather than in kind. Nor can mysticism be reckoned an esoteric, elitest form of religious indulgence, but must be
judged to represent a dimension of experience access2ble to
everyman.
An important corollary of the preceding theses is
that religious experience is not only fundamentally mystical, but, conversely, mystical experience is fundamentally
religious -- an encounter with God (excepting those experiences which are illusory, pathological or, in James' words,
diabolical 1 ). ·rhe basic distinction between types of mystical experience is, then, between ••true" and "false" mysticism, not that between "religious" and "non-religious" mysticism.2 This equation of religion and mysticism raises a
difficulty for an empirical theory of religion in so far as
there are those who claim to have mystical experiences which
are not theistic. 3 Hocking's solution to this problem rested
on his theory of interpretation as well as on his view of
1 James, op. cit., p. 326. For a contemporary reiteration, cf. William Johnston, S.J., Silent Husic, op. cit., pp.
lOOff. Cf. also MGHE xxviii for Hocking s distinction between various types of mysticism.
2

cf. MGHE xxviii.

3 cf. the excerpt from Arthur Koestler's The Invisible
Writing (pp. 232 - 36) and the editor's comment-rp. 27) in
Walter Stace, The Teaching of the Mystics, op. cit. Cf. also
Alister Kee, The Way of Transcendence (Harmondsworth, England:
Penguin Books, 1971) and Julian Huxley, Religion without Revelation (New York: New American Library, 1958), pp. l38ff.
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implicit experience: without a minimally adequate concept
of God, an experience of God will hardly be interpreted
1
theistically.
Interpretation, accordingly, is a necessary
element in all explicitly religious experience. Conversely,
one can have an immediate and direct experience of God without recognizing it as such. Indeed, for Hocking God is always present in the pre-conscious "depths" of experience,
that is, implicitly.
The dynamic transition from nuclear experience to developed mysticism {i.e., God-consciousness) is, I believe,
what Hocking meant by

11

the dialectic of experience."

2

This

process of making explicit the implicit presence of God in
nuclear experience is systematically cultivated by the mystic, who in this differs from the ordinary religious devotee content with the undeveloped consciousness of God's presence or its spontaneous occurrences, or who is unable to
develop them further. Begun in acts of physical, mental and
moral discipline which the mystic deliberately undertakes,
this interpretive effort aims at conscious union with God.
As the apex of mysticism, however, contemplative union involves an element of human passivity which allows for the
free action of grace. Hocking was no Pelagian. Moreover, he
1

see below, pp. 313ff.For a similar position, cf. w.
Donald Hudson, Wittaenstein and Religious Belief, op. cit.,
pp. l80ff.

2

cf.

MGHE 538.
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respected the value of spontaneous or undeveloped experiences of mystical encounter as distinct from the deliberate
cultivation of mystical states, especially with regard to
the "very ordinary experience" of everyman, himself included ..
In elaborating the meaning and structure of mystical
experience, Hocking faced two major obstacles. Each had not
only the accumulated force of two centuries of anti-mystical
sentiment, but also vocal and articulate representatives at
hand in Hendrik Kraemer and others. The first, the "protestant" objection, held as we have seen that mysticism is radically anti-social, a privatized form of pseudo-religion
based upon a flight from the real world to the untroubled
recesses of "inner experience." Against this position, Hocking contended that all authentic human experience, including
mystical experience, is not only radically intersubjective
but also inevitably social in expression. The second objection maintained that mystical experience is essentially extraordinary, differing from ordinary experience in kind rather than degree and characteristic of a few, elite souls
called to a life of religious perfection denied to the majority of mankind. Opposing this "catholic" objection, Hocking
claimed that God was a direct and immediate factor in all
human experience and, as a consequence, that

au

human per-

sons were at least latent mystics.
Hocking met the first position by incorporating it
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into his dialectic of experience, showing that social withdrawal was but a preliminary, negative phase of the mystic's
fuller involvement in society. He met the second objection
by acknowledging that while religious genius was rare, the
accomplishments of the saints presupposed a foundation common to all men. If not everyone in fact reached the heights
of mystical development, all were nevertheless capable of
reaching as high as they desired and sincerely strove for.
In effect, Hocking not only enlarged the scope of mysticism
temporally, he extended it socially. In thus democratizing
mysticism, as I shall argue in the concluding chapter, Hocking not only reclaimed the venerable tradition of classical
Christianity, but concurred- with and even anticipated the contributions of later exponents of mysticism.
From a philosophical viewpoint, it can be concluded,
then, that mystical experience entered Hocking's philosophical thought not as an illustration as Rouner asserts,

1

but

as the instance upon which the validity for his case for the
social dimension and theistic basis of experience rested.
Hocking's insistence upon the philosophical importance of
mysticism was the expression of a life-long study of both.
In Types of Philosophy, he devoted four chapters to mysticism as the seventh and final type of philosophy, the synthesis of the most important features of the others. The
1

Rouner, WHE 243. See above, p. 8.
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mystic is definitely a member of the academy, indeed a special if reticent one: "the mystic, in the history of philosophy, is the initiate, one who has attained a direct vision
of reality, a vision which he is unable to describe."

1

How-

ever, as we shall see, the mystic-philosopher is not without interpreters. He is especially fortunate to have had in
Hocking an interpreter who was a philosopher-mystic.
1 TP 255.

I. HOCKING'S CONCEPT OF J.1YSTICAL EXPERIENCE
As

developed over a lifetime of reflective analysis,

for Hocking mystical experience consisted of a direct and
immediate apprehension of the presence of God mediated by
one's own psychic objects, Nature and Society. In other
words, it was an explicit awareness of God as the Field
grounding the elements' of what Hocking called "nuclear experience" -- the structural relatedness of "I," "It" and
"Thou." Mysticism, the practice of the presence of God, is
thus the cultivation of mystical experience, a practical development of this field-awareness in relation to the realities of everyday life.
Hocking held that mystical experience had two phases
first, a primordial, constant but subliminal experience
of God's presence underlying our nuclear experience of Self,
Nature and Society, and, second, the explicitation of that
presence in moments of feeling-charged insight, whether as
spontaneous occurrences or in the form of deliberate shifts
of attention from the objects of daily experience to their
ground in the World as a whole, conceived of as a medium of
the divine presence. These moments range in explicitness
from a simple awareness of the underlying unity of the world
to a more or less continual and intense consciousness of
Union with God.
Hocking also held that developed mysticism as the
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cultivated practice of such explicit consciousness always
tends to find expression in action. Hence, structurally,
mysticism was also a temporally dynamic social process which
alternates between the inward pole of God-consciousness and
the outward pole of prophetic activity. For Hocking, mysticism was thus essentially dialectical, manifesting itself
processively in action and reflection according to the fundamental principle he called the "law of alternation." The
prophet is the mystic in action; the mystic is the prophet
in reflection and worship.
Overall, Hocking's understanding of mystical experience was achieved by a long process of progressive articulation. The fundamental concepts of his earliest writings remained influential throughout his life-long exposition of
the meaning of mysticism. But these, like his concepts of
experience and religion, underwent development, widening
from a predominantly psychological concept to include a more
social dimension and ultimately finding metaphysical expression. In his later years, I believe that Hocking came to
identify mystical experience with religious experience in
its highest realization as the explicit manifestation of the
systematic interrelationship between Fact, Field and Destiny.
Hocking's .. final" conception of religion coincided with his
developed concept of mysticism.
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Fundamental Conceptions of Mysticism
From the beginning Hocking approached mysticism not
as "the 'speculative mysticism' of the textbooks," but as "a
practice of union with God, together with the theory of that
1
practice." He did not deny the theoretical dimension of mysticism, but

let its metaphysics come as a resultant, an in2
ference, a presupposition." Mysticism was more than an ex11

perience, it was a practical art:
the fine art, almost the lost art, of worship. Historically, the mystics are those who have carried the common
art of worship to the degree of virtuosoship, they are
those who have won eminent experimental knowledge of the
way to God. And their technique, which is the refinement
of worship, often the exaggeration of worship, is at the
same time the essence of all worship.3
Here in a stroke Hocking not only severed his ties from what
Royce called "speculative mysticism,"

4

but established his

own case for mysticism as the pragmatic extension of religious experience in the form of developed worship.
Worship, as Hocking came to view it, essentially
1
2

MGHE XXYiii.

"MM" 39. He added, importantly, "There is a minimum
of theory without which mysticism cannot develop even as an
experience, -- perhaps this: that God is one, and that it
is possible to be one with him. Beyond this minimum, it is
a community of experience that unites the mystics rather
than any community of explicit doctrine." Cf. MGHE 352.
3
Ibid.
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amounts to an effort to "attain union with God in a mystical
experience, other than in thoughtful attention to the mys1
teries of self-consciousness and existence •••• " And thus,
2
"mysticism and worship do stand or fall together. •• The connection between worship and mysticism as the practice of the
presence of God is a function of immediacy; in worship, God
is recognized and addressed in the vocative case. He is
"there" as personally present. our response is no less personal, that is to say, intersubjective:
we recognize here an other-than-theoretical relation to
our object, a relation which surmounts objectivity without destroying it, and which is seen quite simply in
that transition in consciousness from "he't to "thou•• and
from "thou" to "we. 11 3
Mysticism brings to clearer manifestation that which
all

worshi~

intends in a less "transparent" manner. The agent

of transition is the whole-idea, the working concept which,
as that which we think the Whole with, constitutes the "equipment" which shifts
1

attention from the particular objects of

MGHE 356.

2

Ibid. Cf. 352: "the agreement of the mystics lies
wholly in the fact that, prior to doctrine, and wholly coextensive with religion, the practice of union with God [is]
a special act of worship. 11
3
.
MGHE 343 - 44. In "MM." he had written, "The mystic
ls ~e who, finishing his philosophy, or more frequently, antic1pating its conclusion, breaks through the film of objectivity involved in the theoretical relation and adopts towards his God the vocative case. In that new relation lies
all.that is distinctive of mysticism." (p. 41.) Note the alluslon to consubjectivity in the transition from "thou" to
"we. " Cf. also MGHE 279 - 80.
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experience to their ground. By means of it, worship directs
our concern to the whole of things; it "places" life in the
context of ultimacy. Thus "whatever recovers the worth of
living

~

recovering the natural vigor of the whole-idea is

~orship, or a part of worship."! But mysticism makes salient
~hat

in worship is found only as a general tendency. It also

leaps beyond the Whole to its ground:
Having been using the word mystic in a somewhat loose
and generalized fashion, I now return to the mystic in
our special sense, the man whose particular dissociation
is between the whole of the system of things temporal on
one side, and on the other the heart of the eternal,
which he hones to make empirically present to his consciousness.2
The "wholeness" of mystical experience rebounds to
both the mystic and his society as a promise and lure of ultimate integrity. It is in this sense that Hocking was able
at a later date to identify mysticism with his original conception of religion as an anticipation of attainment:
To discern that one is in presence of a goal, though not
the final goal, is a remedy for despair; and such'anticipation of attainment," which I take to be the essence
of religion, is an achievement which the practical mystic reports and undertakes to make available.3
1

MGHE 419.

2

"MM" 52. It should be noted here that Hocking distinguishes God, "the heart of the eternal" from the Whole.
Mystical experience is a passage from the Whole to God as
the field of_experience. Cf. also 54 and MGHE 477ff.
3

"SSP" 399 - 400. Cf. MS 424: "In proportion as worShip is successful, the will is elevated and transformed as
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summarily, mystical experience as the manifestation
of the relationship between the Self and God as the Ground
of experience mediated by natural and social objects represents the further development of worship as the chief and
characteristic act of religion. Moreover, as the extension
of religious experience, i t is the further explicitation of
the nuclear structure of all experience, the I-It-Thou triad
with its ground in the divine presence as the Field of experience.1 The mystic's perception of the "Thou" present
within himself as well as in the midst of the world as the
Ground of both constitutes the essence of his experience:

•

The nuclear Thou-art (whose encounter is the theme of
the mystics of all ages, and whose dialogue with the
self has been described with such discerning power by
Martin Buber) is never experienced merely as a co-subject, but as a creative will sustaining my own being
(hence caring for my existence), an activity inviting a
response, a launch as of "animal faith," a summons to
by every vision of surpassing worth: it achieves not a finished perfection but a contact with perfection, a 'union
with God' in which the quality of attainment lies at an infinite distance." It is because the ultimate goal still lies
ahead that the mystic becomes the prophet: "The mystic insight demands embodiment: the concentration and energizing
of the will must be made good in action." (Ibid.) Cf. also
MGHE 439: .. the meaning of the mystic experience is prophetic.
It anticipates an attainment still to be won; it can be held
only by preceding to that winning."
1

For nuclear experience as the fundamental structure
of mysticism, Cf. MGHE xiii; "RF" 364; TP 309; LR~TF 9lff.;
"LRT" 17 - 18· "OSSM" 257· SIG 114• .. FD II" 340- 41·1 C1V'C
31f., 72, 99 .: 100, 103; MIHE 199.: 200; "FFD" 545 - 46;
uHA"- 432, 441, 450. Cf. also "Forward," Charles Hartshorne,
~ea1ity ~~Social Process {New York: Hafner Pub. co.,
1971 ed.), p. 15 and Experiment in Education, op. cit., p.l63.
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find in experience directives that indicate Hthis way
lies your fulfillment, your task, your destiny.»l
Consequently, mysticism is to be understood as an integral aspect of human experience, rather than an exceptional and possibly dispensable option, much less a tangential
oddity. It must be seen as heightening and thus presupposing
a prior if less clearly defined awareness of God's presence
in Nature, Self and Society.

2

The dialectical process by

which the nuclear awareness of God's presence is raised to
direct and immediate consciousness is therefore a function
of mediation. 3 God reveals or communicates himself through
the World. Religion interprets this communication: worship
provides the appropriate response. Mysticism is the epitome
of both.
More specifically, both spontaneous and cultivated instances of mystical experience involve some element of Self1

MGHE xiii. This passage from the 1963 edition also
reflects Hocking's later notion of mysticism. Cf. also xxii,
.. MGHE" 65, GL Mar. 18, 1938, "MS" 190, MIHE 241 and SMN 218.
2
cf. "MS" 189: "The characteristic assertion of mysticism in all its forms is that there is a vitally important
and non-conceptual experience of God available to men who
meet its conditions. The simplest and most usual expression
of this thesis is that all men at all times are directly
dealing with God, whether they know i t or not."
3

cf. "MS" 190: "The principle of the mystical consciousness is the transparency of intermediaries. Vital awareness
deals with what intermediaries represent. And if the Real is
God, it is with God that we have to do from moment to moment
of daily living. For each action the world concentrates it~elf into a point of resistance and support: and that point
1s a Thou, not an It ...
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-

awareness

such as finitude, immortality, worth, goodness

o r depth; of Nature -- such as beauty, goodness, power and

order; or of Society -- such as love, duty, sacrifice and
compassion. 1 It is not so much that things or even persons
as such reveal God to us but that in our experience of them
we become aware of another dimension indicating something
(or Someone) within yet beyond those things, events and persons not only grounding our relations with them but also
calling and responding to us through them. In this way, God
"becomes .. present not only as the Other (He) but as Thou:
through the intermediary agencies of common experience which
are discovered to be "transparent .. by a shift in awareness
from the part to the Whole.
As noted previously, this transition from the part to
the Whole, and the further transition from the Whole to God,
is one of the more controversial aspects of Hocking's metaphysics of experience. As one of his critics objected, '1 We
2
never face the Whole that Hocking is concerned with." Hocking would agree that in thinking the Whole, we are unable to
form an adequate concept of it.

11

0ur thought,

11

he maintained,

1 Hocking provided several examples of such mediation,
some from his own experience, such as Nature, Time and Space,
Self, Other Selves, Love and Duty. Cf. MGHE 272 - 73, 297,
429 - 35; C~JC 73, 93, 99, 138, 183; MIHE 96- 97, 216; "FFD"
546 - 47.
2

Y. H. Krikorian, "Hocking and the Dilemmas of Hodernity," Journal of Philosophy, 55, 7 (Mar. 27, 1958), p. 274.
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"iS never, in point of time, adequate to its total object."

1

we are nevertheless aware of it.
Here Hocking had in mind the consciousness of the context of objects as experienced, a psychological fact long
subject to study by Gestalt psychologists and investigated
by philosophers such as Husserl, Herleau-Ponty and Dewey.

we

2

are not "faced" by this Whole, as if it were something

apart from us, but are rather placed in it. It is, simply,
the

~iorld

as total context of experience: "In thus nuclear

experience there are always three factors, an I, a Thou and
a common subject matter, let us say an It. Taken in its totality, this It is simply the world in which the I must work
out its life.••

3

The Whole is not simply "given" in experience -- i t
must be discovered and

~

be discovered by a shift in at-

tention from the objects of our consciousness to the "object"
of consciousness in general, that is, the inclusive World,
reality. Thus while there can be no concept fully adequate
to the Whole as such, our awareness of the holistic quality
l"SSP 11 397.
2

cf. Edmund Husser!, Logical Investigations, J.N.
Findlay, trans. {New York: Humanities Press, 1970), II, pp.
463 - 489; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ~ Phenomenology of Perception, Colin Smith, trans. (London: Routledge and KeganPaul, 1962), passim, and The Structure of Behavior, Alden
Fisher, trans. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), passim; and
John Dewey, op. cit., p. 18.
3
MGHE xii.
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of experience (and of reality) is actively cognitive -- our
"Whole-idea" is what we think the

~·lhole

with. As such, it

depends upon an experience of the Whole, however marginal in
consciousness, just as the God-idea depends upon an experience of God but is not a concept of God.

1

Further, God is not equivalent to the Whole: to assert which would entail pantheism. On the other hand, God is
never found as an object among other objects.

2

Nevertheless,

the Whole can be a medium of God's revelation to the Self
just as can any particular object. For the Whole mediates
God's presence as the Field of the Whole, the "frame of the
universal." 3 In short, God is related to the universe of our
experience just as he is to discrete objects in our experience-- both transcendentally and immanently, that is, not
contained by our experience although present within it.
The inductive movement of consciousness from the part
to the Whole has its correlative in the deducti ..Te movement
from the Whole to the part, as noted before. God is mediated
1
2

cf. MGHE 129ff., 408 - 12.
cf. MGHE 321 I

323; "MGHE" 62.

3 "Whole" in this sense need not be taken to connote
more than "intact , " "entire , " or "full , " as in "of a piece ,
sound," indicating unity or integrity. (Cf. OED 3768- 69.)
It need not refer to "totality" in the sense of "all-encompassing" or "the totality, .. meaning that there can be nothing outside it, thus requiring God to be contained within
the Whole, which is exactly what Hocking does not want to
say. Cf. in this regard, Levinas, op. cit., passim.
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in Hocking's view by both the Whole and the part. But the
whole and its parts are mutually entailed; every experience
of God mediated by a particular object is virtually an experience of the Whole, that is, implicitly given with it.
Not surprisingly, the equivalence of the part with the Whole
is a fundamental element in the mystics• theory of reality,
their metaphysics.
It must be noted here that some ambiguity exists in
Hocking's treatment of the Whole. Long an item in the philosophical lexicon of Idealism, "the" Whole connotes an aspect
of the Absolute -- primarily its unity. As such, it is ostensibly an ontological category. As frequently used by Hocking,
and certainly as used by the Gestalt psychologists, Dewey and
more recent scientific exponents of mysticism,

1

the \lhole is

a csvchological category, a percept by which the unity of
the experienced world becomes heightened.

2

Our real knowledge of the world, that is, of Reality

1
cf. Deikman, art. cit.; Roland Fischer, "A Cartography of the Ecstatic and Med1tative States," Science, 174
(26 Nov. 1971), pp. 897- 904.
2

Fischer, art. cit., p. 902, thus comments: "During
the 'I'-state of daily routine, the outside world is experienced as separate from oneself, and this may be a reflection
of the greater freedom (that is, separateness or independence)
of cortical interpretation from subcortical activity. With
increasing ergotropic and trophotropic arousal, however,
~his separateness gradually disappears, apparently because
1n the 'Self'-state of ecstasy and samadhi, cortical and subcortical activity are indistinguishably integrated. This unity is reflected in the experience of Oneness with everything 1
a Oneness with the universe that is oneself." Cf. p. 901.
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in its most inclusive aspect, is surely founded on an experience of the Whole in this sense-- the fact that things
"hang together ... Despite black holes in space, quarks and
positrons, all known phenomena conform in essential respects
to our mathematics, even in those cases in which mathematical development preceded these discoveries, as is clear in
the confirmation of non-Euclidean geometries used by Einstein in elaborating his theories of relativity.
Thus, attending to the Whole means the disengagement
or de-investment (Deikman) of attention in the manifold,
discrete objects of daily concern and becoming aware of reality as the total environment, that-which-is. This is the
state, for instance, of the Zen Master as described by Deikman and others. It is the object of a true perception, not
merely a concept or an inference. It has, moreover, ontological as well as psychological implications for the mystic,
who feels and knows that he is in contact with the deeper
wellsprings of being, not merely beings.
Hocking, I suggest, concerned himself more with the
empirical aspect of the Whole, the

11

Whole-idea" or percept

which we think the Whole with, rather than with the Whole as
a concept, the "Idea of the Hhole." Nevertheless, in the
psychological sense of the term, it can be held against Krikorian that we indeed "face" the Whole Hocking is concerned
with, but not with reflexive adequacy.
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2 • Reconceptions of Mysticism: Realism and Action

Between 1920 and 1940, a period which began with a
shift in Hocking's interests toward social issues and activity and ended with the series of prestigious lectures in
America and abroad, Hocking's understanding of mysticism
likewise)expanded to include a greater social dimension. He
studied the incidence of mysticism in non-Christian religions, often at first hand, assessing its function and value
in society. He similarly investigated history, appraising
the first manifestations of mysticism in society. He also
ventured beyond the psychological theory derived from mystical experience and began to expound the mystics' teachings
about the nature of the world.
His fundamental concept of mysticism as the practice
of union with God was carried over into this period of development. He elaborated upon the basic notion, however,
characteristically describing the mystical experience as an
awareness of the presence of the "Real," which is typically
revealed in terms of an all-pervading unity:
For the realist eye the values of experience run
down and he [can] only restore them by reverting to the
One. With recovered simplicity he might then recur to
the particular tasks [of lifeJ, and with new efficiency.
Life was an alternation, whose denouement was a grasp of
reality in its fullness.
This infinite task [is] sustained by the mystic's
certainty that the Real, in its immediacy, was present
throughout the entire adventure. It was only the mystic
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realist who could realize the infinite as an operative
factor in the finite, and live the life of reason in
presence of the irrational and obdurate facts.l
By "Real," Hocking fundamentally meant that which ex-

ists independently of the human mind.

2

As seen above, Hock-

ing further identified the Real in its ultimate expression
with God. By employing the less obviously religious term,
. he was able to avoid the need for theological distinctions
based upon religious differences. As he would in later accounts, he was also reaffirming his fundamental contention
that the mystic perception was a common and universal endowment:
The mystic is indeed definable as the self aware of a
unity in objective being, and of his own unitedness with
that unity. But he is not an uncommon person. He is ~
ery ~ who uses the definite article in referring to
"the world"; for he implies thereby that the real world
is one and identical, and, as such, an immediate deliverance of experience for all alike. My heresy here, if it
is one, is that I -- interpreting every man -- hold ·~he
Real" to be always present in experience, the ultimate
subject of predication, even while it is, in its full
character and description, endlessly sought.3
1 GL Har. 18, 1938. Cf. "MGHE" 65 and "ABN" 93: "The
history of religion in the West is not wholly alien to the
search for realization, though it has been inclined to regard such seekers as a separate and somewhat eccentric
group, the 'mystics,' for whom worship is an experience of
participation in the ultimate real. 11 Cf. also "HA" 433, 437
- 38 and GL Dec. 10, 1938.
2

Cf. MGHE 150, 161, 198, 269n. 1, 303, 308 - 10, 436,
489, 502, 562, 568, 571. It was, of course, much more as well.
3

"RPK" 280. Note Hocking's virtual identification of
himself as a mystic in this passage.
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Perceived as the Real and as the source of the unity
of the World, God represents the "object" of mystical experience, whether explicitly identified as "God" or not. Jl.s such,
God is ingredient in every perception of reality, prior to
distinctions between theism and atheism and among competing
religious traditions as to "what 11 God is.
During this "middle 11 period, Hocking further sharpened his case against the adequacy of any conceptual knowledge of God, finding in that denial the heart of the mystic's epistemology and his meditative discipline:
the mystic believes, as the agnostic does not, that the
quality of the Real, though not describable, can be ~
perienced in a sort of direct knowledge which is far
more satisfactory than the remoter knowledge of concepts,
just as acquaintance with a person is more satisfactory
knowledge than the best description.!
Mere intuition, however, does not give

positive knowledge

of what, but rather, that the One is. Horeover, mystical experience is not merely intuitive knowledge

2£:

There is, so to speak, another stage of intuition, in
which the sense of other-ness drops away and the knower
realizes that he is identical with the inner being of
his object. At least, such is the view of ••• mysticism,
which teaches the absolute unity of reality. If reality
is o.ne, \ve can only knO\v it truly when we merge t.vith it;
that is, when knowledge in the objective sense of knowing something Q2! myself ceases.2
1

TP 262 - 63. For a further description of the analogy
between mystical experience and intimacy, see below, pp. 234££.
2

TP 254 - 55.
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Nysticism thus surpasses mere intuition in so far as "intuition, which perceives the whole unique being of its living
object with sympathetic intelligence, may still hold the object as different from the one who knows it."

1

Hysticism

characteristically teaches the unity of subject and object,

2

and this theory of knowledge leads to a theory of being. Although an epistemological dualist, holding to the identityin-difference of the knower and the known, the mystic is an
ontological monist:
The mystic is persuaded that the Real can be whole and
entire in the minutest being, just as the salt-quality
can be complete in every smallest drop of sea-water, or
as one who is injured, however slightly, may truthfully
say "I am hurt," -- I, the whole Self, am identified
with the part that is injured.3
The many thus participate in the One by a kind of
metaphysical synechdoche, recalling the hermetical principle
of antiquity, All is One. And hence arises the problem of
the predication of attributes, which Hocking attempted to resolve by distinguishing between essence and existence.
~

4

But

God is has less immediate importance to the mystic than
1

TP 254.

2

Cf. TP 255: "Realism separates object and knower;
idealism holds that all objects belong to some knower; mysticism holds that the objects and the knowers belong to each
other, -- they are the same reality, they are one ...
3

TP 260.

Se~elow,

4 cf. MGHE 142 - 43.

p. 272.
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that God is; existence precedes essence in the priorities of
;.;;.---

mystical experience.

1

This mystical existentialism is both

theologically and pragmatically motivated. Faced with the inadequacy of the theistic concept of what God is and the atheistic denial that God is, "The mystic has something beyond
nature to keep thinking about, to gain approximate or sym.
by.~~
bolic concep t ~ons
o f , and to l;ve
•

2

The main thrust of Hocking's writings on mysticism
during this period concerned the mystic's prophetic activity,
his "return to the world." New to his exegesis of the mystic's
practical career was attention to the ethical content, the
mystic's "code of action for the world • ., He summarized:

11

the

principle of all mystical codes of ethics may be stated in
this simple form: Be what you are. That is, be in action
what you are in reality."
1

2

3

Cf. TP 261.
TP 262.

3
TP 273. ne added, emphasizing the more-than-theoretical intention of the maxim, 11 This masterful attitude toward
types of conduct which have the name of virtue fits the mystic to be a moral originator, a reformer of laws and customs.
He has so often filled this role that it would be interesting
to enquire whether any great reform had occurred in history
without some mystic at the bottom of it. 11 Many significant
ethical ramifications of Hocking's writings on mysticism
could be profitably explored but extend beyond the limits of
this inquiry. As Alford Professor at Harvard, Hocking was
professionally concerned with social ethics. Several of his
major and minor works deal explicitly with that subject, especially its foundations, such as Morale and Its Enemies,
Human Nature and Its Remaking, ~ and the State, The Lasting
Elements 2f Individualism and Strength of Men and Nations. I
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The principal achievement of the mystic's ethical
code concerns the formation of conscience which, in one instance Hocking clearly identified with mystical experience
itself:
In [Socrates] conscience appeared as an unanalzed sense
of wrongness warning him away from certain courses of
action which he was inclined to adopt. These actions
were incongruous with ~ inner standard of whose nature he was hardly aware. 'rhat inner standard, we may
suppose, is si~ply the persistent mystical sense of unity
with the Real; and conscience is the intuitive recognition that a proposed course of action is, or is not, consistent with that unity.l
Consequently, as Hocking assessed the function and value of
mysticism, the "negative path" of mystical discipline "would
be understood as the process of renewing the sensitivity of
conscience ... 2
In his comparative study of religion, Hocking similarly addressed the active phase of the mystic's career in terms
of the development of religions. Referring to the work as
concluding chapter 11 of his magnum opus

11

11

Which remained un-

published, .. he noted that he had been
attempting to present a realistic mysticism, one which
turns its back on circumstance and the world's concerns
believe that a strong connection exists between Hocking's
ethics and his mystical vision, but this, too, lies beyond
the scope of the present study to explore.
1

2

TP 272.

Ibid.

a
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onlY to find the Real, and thereby to renew energy and
grit for the particular task, and to regain certitude
in action, that detailed action whose integral sum is
history.l
stated in its simplest terms, Hocking's contention
was still that "Some notion of God lies in the line of development of any mysticism; and mysticism is the common coin of
all great

religions.~ 2 The social dimension of mysticism re-

mained a function of the principle of alternation, but its
ramifications were now seen to lie primarily in two directions -- the mystic's need for the community and tne community's reciprocal need for the mystic. 3 Here Hocking brought
into conjunction the individualistic perspective of his earlier writings with the social consciousness of his "middle"
period.
Having found concrete corroboration in his Asian investigations for the mystic's necessary return to the world
in order to complete his development, Hocking concentrated
on the mystic's motive in a somewhat different light than he
had before: "There are signs that the mystic feels at times
that salvation cannot be complete in solitude -- as if the
sin and lostness of other men penetrated one's own security." 4
1

2

3

4

LR'ilF 7.
LR';oiF 190.

cf. LRWF 41 - 51. See below, pp. 256, 26lff.
LRHF 41. Cf.

40.
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The mystic's essential solidarity thus provides the incentive to work for the salvation of all:
unquestionably, the religious impulse in its more powerful representatives lifts personality into a region
where the walls·of moral isolation between man and man
grow thin. And where such a sense of community in sinfulness exists, it must lend a deeper gravity to the
disposition to spread righteousness.!
As noted before, the mystic's return to the world is
also motivated by a sense of destiny, the factor of "cosmic
demand": "the total worldf there, expects something of me,
2
and my effort becomes a response •••• " Destiny would figure
pre-eminently in Hocking's later writings, in which he
brought his concept of

mysti~ism

into conjunction with his

more metaphysical interpretation of the concept of experience. Less explicitly developed, the notion of Destiny here
figured in Hocking's concluding evaluation of the development of world religions into a loose "world faith" organized
upon the fact of everyman's access to God in the World and
in his own psychic depths. As he looked ahead, he again saw
the function of mysticism as one of unification in the emergent structure of history:
If men are to keep their hearts, they must have some way
of seeing the non-futility of the futile! They have to
1 LRWF 43.
2LRWF 26. See above, pp. 153ff.
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be assured that there is another reckoning in which what
they have done and what they are has its effect, is
known, comes to the centre. They need to know that what
they have done to the least and in the least corner of
the unsurveyable swirl of world-happening, they have done
to the highest. [ ••• ] History must have a peculiar structure in order to realize such a condition •••• The Whole
alive in every conscious part; the One somehow present in
the interstices of happening, aware like some all sensitive Karma-principle of every intent, every purpose there
flashing into being, and linking it somewhere with its
due effect.l
Such certitude, based on experience of the One-in-every-part, the Real, is the mystic's contribution to society.

2

To be sure, every man must experience the Real for himself to
acquire such assurance. But for Hocking the intimate presence
of God within each person was the condition for just that possibility. Confirmation of that presence and its

cons~quences

must be sought and, for Hocking, could be found, not only in
the rapport bet>veen mystics themselves and their appeal to
those attentive to them, but also in the facts of history.
In his Gifford Lectures, Hocking retraced his outline
of history, noting with regard to the "discovery of the Absolute"' in the mystical phase of Indian religion that it was
the demands of social existence which led to the passage beyond mystical withdrawal: "The spell of this absolute quiescence is broken (1) by the necessities of daily living, which
it cannot differentially aid; and (2) by the attempts of the
1

2

LRWF 266 - 67.
Cf. GL Mar. 18, 1938, cited above, pp. 199 - 200.
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discoverers to expound and promote it."

1

Here we encounter the principle of alternation applied
not only to the experience of individuals but to the lives
of whole peoples. The theoretical articulation of the Absolute is corrected by adverting in experience to the needs of
further experience. The limitations of the Absolute are initially empirical, not speculative -- its value for life is
restricted and must therefore be overcome in the name of
better meeting the world. The mysticism of contemplative absorption thus passed into the no less mystical activity of
prophetic work and teachir.g.
The mystic, in transcending the limitations of mystical experience by a dialectic of contemplative absorption
and prophetic action more fully realizes himself and, in so
doing,brings to fuller realization the values of religion in
society and history. For Hocking the perfection of mysticism
did not consist in abandoning it for a life of action, but
in the dynamic rhythm of alternating phases of withdrawal
and return in which mystical awareness expresses itself as
prophetic action in turn demanding meditative reflection and
and evaluation.
1 "BA" 434.·He continued, "They can only pass beyond
silence into speech and action by a descent which appears to
involve a .!!2!2 sequitur if not outright inconsistency. It was
necessary that history find its Absolute. It was also necessary that it pass beyond ll•"
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3 • Final Conceptions
The major development in Hocking's final reflections
on mysticism concern, I believe, its experiential

e~bodiment

of the elements of Fact, Field and Destiny. In this, the two
strands of thought

cente~ing

about the ultimate meaning and

structure of experience and religion are synthesized in a
final conceptualization of the meaning and structure of mysticism, particularly with regard to its social dimension. In
arriving at this confluence of concepts, Hocking also brought
into sharper focus the essential theses, as I see them, of
his case for mysticism as both a direct and immediate experience of God and a fundamentally social phenomenon.
In The Coming World Civilization, Hocking continued
the line of development inaugurated in Living Religions and
~

World Faith. A possible world community must have a common

factual basis in shared experience which can provide men
with sufficient assurance and incentive in order for them
even to attempt bridging the chasms dividing person from person and nation from nation. This common factor is the presence of God in individual, corporate and historical experience.1 The mystic represents the future citizen of the coming world civilization as an embodied "anticipation of attainment.

11

He is the prophet of a world brotherhood united

not yet along political lines, but in spirit.
1

For

'

11

Corporate mysticism," see especially ''MS" 194.
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In so far as the mystic represents all men, then all
must be mystics, at least potentially. Further, as Hocking
had proposed before, mystical experience is thus a common
element in human existence and history itself:
the "mystic" here is simply that "any man" in any religion who opens the door of his self-built enclosure, and
sees the world, perhaps for the first time, in his own
experience, as not his alone but God's world, and therewith every man's world, as held in God's care, the ego's
personal entity included.l
And hence, mystical experience cannot be isolated, extraordinary or bizarre:
Such seeing is not a
not unnatural; it is
natural and true. It
wakening of the mind
eyes to beauty •••• 2

rare and privileged event; it is
a passing from the unnatural to the
is present in some degree in every
to love, ·and every opening of the

Ordinary experience, interpreted by religion raised
exponentially by the mystic's acquired and native sensitivities, is the medium of the mystical encounter with God.
Again, Hocking singled out the mystic's discipline,
1 cwc 100 - 101. Cf. "Rl?K" 280, cited above, p. 200.
2
cwc 101. Later, he clarified this point: "what I mean
by 'the true mystic' is simply the person who in the course
of his own experience ~as in sene moment become aware of the
nature of things as supreme good." "Such vision may come wholly outside the lines of formal religion •••• Or it may come in
the way of meditative discipline •••• Or still more simply and
widely in the waking of the mind to love and the opening of
the eyes to beauty, when these. experiences are, as they may
be, entrance gates to the nature of Being." (CWC 138 -39.)
tlere Hocking is largely restating his principle of the transparency of intermediaries with an eye to his reconception of
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the practice of union with God, rather than any shared doctrinal tenets as the basis of a possible world faith which
alone could ground a humane world civilization.

1

But he per-

ceived an even deeper foundation than their practices for
the mystics • concurrence:

~~~ihatever

their departures from

one another in practice and theory, there is a tendency for
the mystics in various traditions -- selectively -- to under2
stand one another... Further, the long history of mysticism
indicated to Hocking that "The several universal religions
.
.
3
~ already fused together, .§..£ to speak, at the .!.£E."
AnCJ.
accordingly, "Theprimary identity involved in recognition
of mystic by mystic is the essence of the religious world
view, the perception of Being as beatitude -- God is, and
God is One."

4

Such a vision is neither specialized nor re-

served to a few: "With this final and universal truth, whatever is implied in it, and that is much, is already implicitly
the possession of every believer within his own faith." 5
mystical experience as a heightened contact with the Real,
that is, God as Being itself.
1
ef. ewe 140 - 41. ef. above, p. 190 n. 2, 193 n. 2.
2
eHC 141. Cf. Evelyn Underhill, quoting Claude de St.Hartin, "All mystics ••• speak the same language and come from
the same country." (Mysticism [New York: World Publishing Co.,
1955 ed.],, p. xiii.)
3 cwc 149.
4

Ibid.

5 rbid. Cf. also p. 142.
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The common faith of the future, as anticipated in the
religion of the mystic, would find its natural expression in
action, the work of love and justice governed by the rhythmic
excursions and withdrawals of the Law of Alternation. But the

I

I

mystic-prophet is not simply regulated by the alternation of
contemplation and action. He is driven to manifest his vision
of the unity of all-in-one in concrete deeds whereby his ultimate attainment is anticipated in actual experience and
also to reflect on

h~s

deeds. Accordingly,

1

To "love one s neighbor 11 would be to deal with him, not
blindly but with responsible provocation, on the basis
of his favorable possibilities ~ creatively discerned
£Y you, including therein that not actual but potential
divinity which your deed may elicit. Then one understands
that startling statement, 11 Inasmuch as ye have done it
unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done
it unto me." Since the finite self already participates
to some extent in the infinite life, the true mystic
finds his deity not alone at the end of the negative path,
as the Absolute-that-is-not-the-finite, but also there
on the highway,
Where move in strange democracy
The million masks of God.l
The mystical path, essentially a practical way of living, not only comes to realization in action, it finds therein its ultimate verification. Hocking concluded, returning to
the theme of the unification of history as he had in his two
major works on religion:
these ministerings of man to man are not merely items of
creature comfort bestowed on passing needs; they are acts
1

cwc

184. Cf. MIHE 232.
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of transforming this human history into the pattern of a
divine community through changing the relational schemes
of its units.l

--

Such a vision is less an assessment of the historical
structure and present meaning of religion than a sanguine
estimation of its potential and ideal function in a somewhat
optimum future. Nevertheless, Hocking's prediction was based
upon a critical study of the actual tendencies at work in
world religions. History itself will prove his prediction
right or wrong with respect to the eventuation of a world
faith, even a pluralistic one. But as with his l959 forecast
of the Soviet-American d~tente (as he called the coming postcold war thaw) in Strength of Men and Nations, recent events,
including the ecumenical movement and the attention of the
Second Vatican Council of the Catholic Church to

11

non-Chris-

tian religions, .. have seemingly borne out his expectations.
Hocking•s emphasis on the role of action in a maturing
world faith has been similarly echoed in the pastoral concern of international religious organizations as well as the
1 cwc 184. A. R. Luther•s otherwise excellent discussion of mysticism in Existence ~ Dialectical Tension (op.
cit., pp. 55- 60, 108ff.) is marred by his failure to consider the mystic 1 s motive in returning to the world. Consequently, the rhythm of alternation appears to be a mechanical oscillation in which the mystic is not so much guided
from within as regulated by the pressure of external forces.
As a voluntary activity, the mystic•s return is imperated by
both love and duty -- a passion to save souls and to remedy
the lack of integrity in the social fabric by fostering communication, justice and well-being.
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Vatican Council. His historical principle, moreover, has a
qrea t er ring of truth after almost two decades of sluggish,
top-level efforts to affect fuller religious and political
co-operation. ',rhe pattern of history can only be modified
-=·

overall by pervasive change in the relationships among individuals as expressed in, not engineered by, changes in the
social systems and structures. Ecumenical agreements among
denominational leaders and professional diplomats remain ineffectual if repugnant to their constituents -- a lesson unlearned despite efforts to unite Eastern and Western Christianity since the thirteenth century.
As the prophet of religious community and world harmony, the mystic does not

~

fact remain content with the im-

mediate certainty of life's ultimate meaning in the consciousness of God's immediate presence. In The Meaning of Immortali~

in Human Experience, Hocking argued again that mystical

assurance, which is neither lasting nor directly communicable,
is confirmed only in action: "immediate certainty is not
enough. If living were so much its

O\vn

always available and

sufficient apology there would be no reason for a program of
action and change."

1

The mystic, then, is often by necessity

(or, in more experiential terms, by Destiny 2 ) a man or woman 3

~liHE~ 160.
2

cf. iv1IHE

161.

3 c:onsider, e.g., Catherine of Siena, Joan of Arc,
·reresa of Avila, Catherine of Genoa, Dorothy Day and others.
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of action, characteristically a tough-minded realist:
He commonly finds himself, in practical affairs, a strenuously effective individual, like some Savonarola or
Eckhart or Loyola. Sometimes he condescends to this
"realism" with an uneasy sense of duplicity, as if he
ought to be an alien in this world of fact. More often
he perceives that the art of life must unite, in some
fashion, its realistic with its mystical phases, and
seeks some further understanding of this union. As a matter of practical program, we all tend to alternate between the two.l
The mystic is not wholly comfortable with the World
as it is. His vision unflinchingly encompasses Fact, but extends also to possibility, to what can be and should be.
Further, the mystic feels a call to realize that possibility
in personal action. Thus, as an element in the pattern of
full mystical development, the

c~aracteristic

return to the

world of the true mystic manifests the necessary aspect of
action as the completion of that process. Again, the mystic
experiences this "call to action" not as an externally imposed task, but as an inner compulsion corresponding to a
summons from beyond which is so closely integrated with both
his self-understanding and the exigencies of the situation
that he can only refer to it as his "destiny," his proper
vocation in history. Importantly, Hocking also reminds us in
this passage that the dialectical structure of the mystic's
life of action and reflection is rooted in the pattern of al-

1

MIHE 160.
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ternation characteristic of all experience worthy of the
·
qual~· f ~er

"human."

In a passage dating from 1957, Hocking amplified his
growing

u~derstanding

of the importance of the sense of des-

tinY and with it a measured reticence in the life of the mystic. Here, I suggest, he brought his mature concept of ex-

perience into alignment with his final formulation of the
meaning and structure of mysticism. He had already identified
destiny as an interpretative schema employed by the mystic
to account for the impetus to historically appropriate action.1Anticipating "Fact, Field and Destiny," he contined,
Many people have a feeling, perhaps a superstition, that
they have a specific function to fulfill, \Thich has been
assigned to them in the deeper councils of the world.
They do not know what the function is. 3ut they are in
search of it, kept from a sense of meaninglessness by a
conviction that it exists.2
This intimation of purpose in life is part of the nuclear awareness which makes all of us at least latent mystics, as noted before: "Let us designate such persons as the
mystics. They are at a disadvantage in giving an account of
it." 3 The mystic's reticence thus results from a non-articulate sense of destiny. Nevertheless, he is rarely content
merely to acknowledge the feeling, finding in it, rather, an
1 cf. HIHE 161.
2
MIHE 96; cf. "FFD" 546ff., quoted above, pp. 99f.
3
MIHE 96 - 97.
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imperative to act and thereby possibly to understand:
the mystic has to find and decipher his own secret instructions. These strange souls demand that human action
shall bear a stamp of cosmic appointment, and if they do
not perceive that stamp in the actual present task, they
are willing to continue its lead through a long pilgrimage, persistently expecting the day of recognition: "This
is the thing for which I was born."l
The mystical life is a quest for meaning as

purpose

less as understood than as achieved in action. It

in life

is this prophetic element of a pragmatic destiny only dimly
understood which found further expression in Hocking's last
metaphysical statement, "Fact, Field and Destiny." In this
important article, the strands of his religious and metaphysical doctrine were brought together in a surprising concatenation -- surprising in so far as the words mystic and mysticism found no place in it. Nevertheless, the mystical element
tacitly dominates and guides the entire essay thematically.

2

Hocking's "last word" on destiny and mysticism was
contained, however, in a posthumous article. In it he reiterated several themes he had developed as early as 1912, rounding off his career with a return to the beginning. In discussing the value and achievement of true individuality, he ad1
2

MIHE 97.

cf. "FFD" pp. 545 - 47, discussed above, pp. 99ff.
The mystical_content Of the article and its connection with
the Gifford Lectures are discussed further in the Appendix,
pp. 381 - 86.
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ver t

ed to society's inability to nourish the uniqueness of

rson despite the necessity that it be done:.
the Pe
Individuality is born at that moment -- and only at that
moment -- when the soul in its loneliness sees its life
in society -- necessarily under a system of rules -- ~
subjec~ !£ ~ goal-seeking beyond these rules.
This goal is commonly the unspoken treasure of religion, conveyed to the seeker as a privately won vision.
The individual is the potential prophet. His experience
may be called mystical, not in the sense of a subliminal
blur, but in the sense of a directive, seeking embodiment, including the corrective function of the Socratic
familiar spirit.l
Religion and its mystical aspect still functioned for
him as an anticipation of final attainment, guided, as he

•

added, by a sensitized conscience. Mysticism likewise preceded prophetic action for him as the condition for true individuality, the ability to make a difference, a contribution to human history no one else could add.
4. Summary and Conclusion
From his earliest to his last writings, Hocking consistently maintained that the essential element in mystical
experience is a direct and immediate apprehension of God
culminating in its fullest expression in an experience of
union with God through a free act of grace.

2

Such experi-

ences admit of a range of explicitness, from a somewhat difl"ABN" 93.
2

cf. HGHE xxviii, TP 257, "MS" 190.
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fuse awareness of an aspect of the perceived world, such as
itS underlying unity, total goodness or absolute beauty, to
an intensely focused consciousness of God's pres.ence, includ1
ing a consubjective sense of oneness. But all such experiences are various modes of God's constant presence mediated
either opaquely or transparently through the Self, Nature or
2
the demands and delights of social existence. Thus all experience is at least radically if subliminally mystical, latent in everyman's "dim a\vareness" of the divine Thou grounding all intersubjective as well as objective experience.

3

De-

veloped mysticism ensues when the latent mysticism of nuclear
experience is raised to consciousness, especially in those
persons peculiarly sensitive by nature, nurture or grace to
the meaning of these experiences. No one, however, is barred
by temperament or intelligence from the ranks of the mystics;
fundamentally, all are mystics for all are directly dealing
with God whether they know it consciously or not in every
authentic experience of Self, the World and other selves. 4
Further, mystical experience may be particular, corporate or
historical~

1
c:ve 101 I

depending on the level of its manifestation in

cf. "1-i.H" 56, "WDP.S" 42, TP 314, ewe 138 - 39: TP 314,
139 o

2ef. "MS" 194. Cf. also 190, 11 MGHE" 65, ewe 99, "HA"
433- 34: MGHE 430, xiii, 343ff. and..,MGHE 11 65.
3ef. "MGHE" 65,
4

ef. TP 314,

11

11

HA" 433 - 34.

MS 11 189, CTtle 101.

2ZO

human

.

exper~ence.

1

In view of the preceding analysis of Hocking's treatment of mystical experience, I propose the following overall
definition of that experience: The Self directly and immediately meeting God, both subliminally in nuclear experience
and consciously as explicitly mediated by Nature and s-ociety.

By meeting, I here mean an active as well as receptive encounter, a "dialogue" conditioned by a shared field of experience -- in this case, God himself.
Having followed the genetic development of Hocking's
conceptions and reconceptions of mystical experience, we can
now turn to a structural analysis of mysticism as he understood it.

l C f • "MS" 19 4 •

!I. THE ELENENTS AJ:ID STRUCTURE OF HYSTICAL EXPERIENCE

Hocking's philosophy of mystical experience was not
systematic. Yet by thematically compiling and comparing relevant texts from his many writings on the subject, the outline of a system can be disclosed. For mysticism as Hocking
came to view it was not a miscellaneous congeries of unconnected events, but a developmental process regulated by discernable principles or laws similar to those fundamental to
all human behavior. Further, he detected a variety of constant factors in mysticism, both in its historical manifestations and in individual experience. Accordingly, by more
systematically articulating these principles, elements and
structures as found in Hocking's more descriptive and exploratory presentations, the coherence of his doctrine can
be more readily assessed and the cogency of his fundamental
theses can be more easily evaluated.
In the following section, I shall present, first, a
phenomenology of mystical experience, that is, a profile of
its essential characteristics as found in Hocking's writings. 1
Second~

I shall articulate the fundamental elements, struc-

ture and functions of mysticism and the principle which regulates them according to his account. Third, I shall investigate to a limited extent his treatment of the theoreti1 sy "phenomenology" I mean simply a descriptive analysis of the manifest features of an experience.
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cal content of mystical experience, its objective aspect.
Finally, I shall consider briefly the role of interpretation
in the process of structuring mystical experience.
1 • The Essential Characteristics of Mystical Experience
In his effort to define the meaning of mysticism descriptively, Hocking sought to determine the essential characteristics of mystical experience, drawing on personal reports as well as the work of James and other researchers.
While little inclined to reflect on methodology, in his earliest article on mysticism he nevertheless made a noteworthy
distinction between the psychological characteristics of mystical experience and its objective or metaphysical content:
What I want to point out is that these words, unitary,
immediate, ineffable, which at all events apply to the
mystic's experience, are precisely the words which the
metaphysician applies to the mystic's doctrine. And I
suggest that the misinterpretation of mysticism here in
question is due to the fact that what is ~ psychological
report (and a true one) is taken as a metaphysical state~ {and a false one).l-For Hocking, although neither the subjective nor objective aspect of mystical experience exist separately, each
should be distinguished logically and described separately.
Consequently, although the initial description of mystical
experience will refer in some sense to both psychological
and ontological aspects, these aspects must not be confused
1 "HM" 43. Here, Hocking had Royce in mind. Cf. MGHE 352.
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or reduced to each other.

1

The phenomenological unity of

mystical experience thus not only precedes but also warrants

I
li

the division into its psychological and ontological-theolo-

li

gical components.
For Hocking, mystical experience, like the religious

·II
'1.1

'II
,Iii
Iii

experience of which it is the extension, reveals in sharper
relief the essential characteristics of all experience, as
we might expect. Nevertheless, it manifests certain specific
qualities which differentiate it (not in kind but in degree)
from experience in general and ordinary religious experience in particular.
As we have just seen, while mystical experience is
associated with unity, immediacy and especially ineffability,
these attributes are shared to some extent by all experience:
Probably all experience in its immediate quality is incommunicable; but the arts of communication draw infinite material from the region nearer and nearer the
heart of this immediacy. Immediacy and idea are not disparate stuff, they are different stages of the same
stuff, the same meaning and the individuals historically
most active and fertile in this ideal exploitation of
immediacy are none but the poets and mystics themselves.2
1 An epistemological realist,- Hocking maintained the
irreducibility of subject and object while no less strenuously maintaining their inseparability. Cf. TP 255, cited
above, p. 202 n. 2.
2 ••MM" 44. By the same token, mystical experiences are
thus not "purely'' or qabsolutely" immediate, for through an
intrinsic relationship to ideas, the mystical state "is never so complete as to be wholly without fringes ••• , some
awareness of the empirical self remains." ("MM" 46.) For
Unity, cf. "MM" 43, 52, 56: ~1GHE 404, 419, 522; MS 427; "HA"

I

2Z4

Although common to all experience, the quality of ineffabilitY had, however, given the word mystical its significance.

1

'!'he mystic is one who is "mum," who cannot or will not speak
out. 2 From a psychological perspective, Hocking would later
refer to this character of mystical experience as the mystic's "reticence."

3

Faced with the paradox of the alleged ineffability of
the mystics' experience as well as their notorious volubility
in describing them, Hocking's insistence on distinguishing
433. James treats of unity in The Varieties of Religious Experience, op. cit., 46 and 115. For immediacy, cf. "MM" 43;
MGHE 410, 474; "RF" 365; ewe 99; MIHE 157; "ABN" 96. For ineffability, cf. "MH" 43, NGHE 348, 353, 363; "FFD" 545 and
James, op. cit., 292.
1 ef. MGBE 348: "It is this difficulty of communication, this separation from the mass of people in thought and
habit, this embarrassment of speech, which has embodied itself in the word mysticism." The alienation from ordinary
people experienced by the mystic is a consequence not of a
fundamental difference in the kind of experience had, but in
the intensity. The mystic is rendered speechless by his experience; he is also driven to seclude himself, temporarily,
from his fellow citizens. But all experience difficulty in
describing experience, just as all must occasionally withdraw from societal transactions in order to renew their energies for work. The mystic merely extenuates these aspects
of common experience.
2

ef. TP 255. The etymological origin of the word is
the Greek verb muein, which means "to close" or "to shut. 11
3

ef. especially LRWF 69 - 71. Hocking eventually acknowledged that reality itself is also ineffable; i t cannot
be adequately described. ef. TP 255ff.
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the characteristics of subjective experiencing from the object(s) experienced would later permit him to save both the
~alidity

of the mystics' descriptions as well as his own com-

mitment to rational inquiry without either compromising the
intimate mysteriousness of the mystical encounter or indulging in cryptic and premature metaphysical analysis. He wrote,
"there is nothing in the mystic experience not expressible
1
in idea, except the experiencing itself." In one respect,
Hocking was thus truly a rationalist, if he also acknowledged
the ultimate incomprehensibility of the act of experiencing
in its moment. Mystical experience might be, as a consequence, inexhaustible (like all experience), but it remained
subject to rational investigation and descriptive interpretation.2
For Hocking as for James, then, there was present in
3
mystical experience a distinctively noetic character. This
Hocking sometimes described as "immediate insight," "realization," or, ultimately, "revelation," that is of some truth
4
about the world. Mystical experience, like all experience,
is in some sense cognitive. It eventuates in ideas about the
1!<1GHE 451.
2

For a contemporary discussion of the "mysteriousness"
Of mystical experience and its susceptibility to rational inquiry, cf. Fritz Staal, op. cit., pp. 13ff., 163££.
3
cf. MGHE 361 - 62, 428; TP 255£.; LRWF 166; "MS" 192.
Cf. also James, op. cit., pp. 293ff.
4

c£.

MGHE 362, 428.
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nature of reality, out of which the mystic elaborates a
world-view or metaphysic, a feature of mysticism which Hocking only gradually came to appreciate, owing, perhaps,to his
rejection of Royce's "speculative mysticism." Less conceptual than aesthetical and practical, however, the noetic element in mystical experience is typically manifested in certainty and praise of God and in creative activity.

1

That is,

rather than elaborating a scheme of abstract concepts, the
mystic expresses his insight in song and poetry.

2

Neverthe-

less, even this intuitive and immediate grasp of reality can
be rendered conceptually intelligible by interpretation.
With respect to certainty, Hocking (like James) found
the mystics' assurance to be largely incommunicable; each
must experience it for himself.

3

As such, the mystic's ex-

perience is not subject to fundamental doubt. However, the
mystic's certitude in existential and pragmatic rather than
theoretical. He is certain
more accurately,

!h!1

~,

rather than

~

God is --

he is in immediate contact with God.

Further, mystical certitude was for Hocking neither derived
4
nor circums~antial, but immediate.

1 cf. MGHE 460.
2
cf. MGHE 452.
3
4

cf. James, op. cit., pp. 311, 323ff.

Cf. "MM" 52; MGHE 296, 449£.; LRWF 7, 220: "MS" 192;
MIHE 156; "ABN" 95. See above, pp. 108ff.
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A creative or novel element in mystical experience is
found both as a quality and a function.

'~at

is new to the

mystic is not only the ever-original awareness of God, ure~elationu

in the

~ustomary

sense, but the perceived charac-

ter of the World as well, to which he is awakened by the
breakdown of habitual modes of perception, thought and action.1 This sense of

11

newness,

11

of being at the origin of

things, becomes manifest in the mystic's subsequent behavior
as freedom.

2

Alternation is reflected in mystical experience in
two respects: the active and passive phases of the experience as well as its character as continuous despite a fundamental discontinuity. Passivity was a quality of mystical experience emphasized by James.

3

For Hocking passivity occurred

developmentally as the culmination of active efforts to
1 c£. especially MGHE Chapter 31, pp. 462 - 84. Cf.
also uMM" 54; MGHE xxviii, 424, 460~ TP 271; "MS" l92ff.
2

c£. MGHE 457: "Of this new knowledge, we have here
to say that it comes to the mystic in the course of his return to the world, unsought by him. He has known God from
the standpoint of the world~ now he begins to know his world
from the standpoint of his new experience of God. As after
every new experience the familiar experiences to which one
returns are lit up with unfamiliar light, shining out strange
and reborn: so as the mystic resumes his occupation with the
many things, he finds that 'all things have become new,' and
this novelty he will learn how to distil into the stock of
human wisdom at large."
3

Cf. James, op. cit., p. 293.
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achieve union with God:
Various as the ways are which mystics in different ages
have used in approaching their god, their resemblances
run deep. In all of them there are efforts of the mind
fairly described in the medieval terms, purgation and
meditation. And in all of them these active efforts are
brought to a close by a voluntary passivity.!
This voluntary passivity is of course a form of activity and
thus never "pure" in itself, for the mystic actively attempts
2
to become passive. Ultimately, voluntary passivity is transformed into involuntary passivity ''when God accepts and lifts
to himself the prepared soul. Its history [i.e~, that of the
'negative path'] is that of an activity of self-suppression
which must itself be suppressed." 3
If Hocking avoided Pelagianism by stressing the necessity of passive perfection by God's grace, he avoided Quietism by an equal if not greater stress on the active phases
of the

my~tic's

preparation and his return to the world for

the completion of his own and society's development.

4

The

active and passive moments of mystical development thus constitute a dialectic of withdrawal, transformation and return.
1 MGHE. 371 - 72. Elsewhere he remarked, 11 the attempt
at worship, in so far as it depends upon the mystic's own
active efforts, is impossible." (MGHE 381.)

2

c£.

MGHE 383 - 86.

3MGHE 386. Cf. also "MS •• 190.
4 cf. Hocking's critique of M. Guyon, MGHE 425ff. A
failure to see passivity as a penultimate rather than ultimate stage of mysticism mars Furse's otherwise excellent
study of mysticism as a pattern of behavior (op. cit.).

,
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The mystical dialectic is also manifest in the alternation of continuity and discontinuity, especially in the
transience of mystical experience. By discontinuity I mean
the mystic's disconnection from social ties, values and even
physical presence, the withdrawal from the social world into
solitude.

1

This break in experience is but a more deliberate

explicitation of the natural tension

an~

relaxation of human

pursuits, however:
For the mystic, strictly speaki~g, is the man whose disconnection is made between the whole system of things
and ideas temporal on one side and the heart of the
eternal on the other; whereas the subdued "mysticism" of
our ordinary life merely flits from one body of ideas to
another within that world system.2
The transiency of mystical experience similarly amplifies the in-built disconnection in the structure of ordinary
human experience, the temporal limitation of sustained activity of any kind.

3

All experience has its endings: "if union

with God were the whole

sto~J

of mystical experience, there

could be no reason why that moment should pass. The mystic
himself knows very well that his vision cannot last, so long
as he remains a human being.u

4

Alternation signifies the

overcoming of this limitation by successive, reciprocally
1

cf. "MM" 54; MGHE 40lf.; ewe l40f.

2

MGHE 401.

3
4

b

Cf. James, op. cit., p. 293.
MGHE 390.
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reinforcing phases of activity and withdrawal which permit
intermittent progress rather than eventual and final termination. Religiously, this alternation is experienced as the
dialectic of worship and work.

1

Discontinuity on one level of experience allows for a
deeper continuity on another, however. This is most dramatically reflected in the mystic's return to the social world
and action.

2

For the mystic withdrew from a world whose es-

sential and manifold impress upon him was carried into his
temporary retreat. Not least in this regard is the stock of
ideas and values which the mystic rethinks and clarifies and
which perdure through his active and passive purgations. In
this respect, mysticism can be described as society's way of
renewing its most valuable spiritual resources while modifying and correcting them in the experience of its most sensitive members. The spiritual history of humankind, while allowing for revelational novelty, is thus basically continuous just as is religious experience in the personal history
of each man and woman: "Whatever religion adds to human
wealth is not poured in, as an extraneous gift: it comes in
1

ef. MGHE 426: "The whole of human experience falls
into two phases, work and worship; the domain of duty and
the domain of love, respectively."
2

.

e£ "MM" 49 , 52 , 56·, MGHE 392 , 478f., 483, 511, 514;
MS 424; TP 189ff., 270f.; LRWF 43, 46, 51; 11 HA 11 434, 437;
"MS" 192; ewe 139, 182ff.; MIHE 159.
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continuity with what that individual has known before."
Thus mystical experience is characteristically a

1
~

cial phenomenon, despite its interlude of solitary transfor____.
~ation

in which the mystic is but better prepared for his
2
creative role in the social world. Religion is not mgrely

what man does with his solitariness, but in both its lesser
and greater realization "the redemption of solitude." For it
returns the individual to his world more an individual and
more a social being than when he left it.

3

Further, this mystical interlude of solitary "soulmaking" is not the prerogative of some spiritual elite; in
its essential structures and functions, mysticism is both £Qm~

and ordinary. Hocking clearly insisted that mystical ex-

perience was not limited to those who by temperament or situation were somehow superior to the rest of mankind. Despite
the fact that such experience admits of degrees of intensity,
"The mystic is simply the person who does consciously and
with the whole man that which we are all doing spontaneously
and in fragmentary fashion in every moment of our effective
4
living." As such a universal factor in all experience,
1

MGHE 478.

2

cf.

LRw"'F 43f., 49;

3

cf.

MGHE 414, 522.

4

11

MS" 191: "ABN" 93.

MGHE 404. Cf. 361: " ••• note well that while the mystic of genius is a natural product, the mystic impulse is not
a matter of special temperament. For there are mystics in all
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~hether

latent or manifest, the mystical dimension is neither

extraordinary, unusual or esoteric.
~elop

1

The great mystics de-

to full explicitness what we all experience in at

least rudimentary form.
Finally, whether in a pervasively indistinct form or
in a sharply focused realization, mystical experience for
Hocking was essentially theistic. It is the consciousness of
God's presence, recognized as such or not.

2

While not wholly original, Hocking's elaboration of
the characteristics of mystical experience, ·thus abstracted
and somewhat systematized, is nevertheless unusual in its
scope and richness. For Hocking, however, not even fourteen
major characteristics adequately distinguished mystical from
other forms of experience without taking into consideration
the mystic's psychology, especially the factor of motivation.
Similarly, the theoretical content of the mystics' reports
of experience serve to differentiate mysticism from other regions of experience, if -- once more-- not entirely. The mystic will find his interpretation of reality in surprising
congruence with the reports not only of poets but of scientists.4
temperaments. This incentive is deep enough in human nature
to take various forms according to the disposition of the
mind." Cf. also 422.
2 cf. ,._MM" 41, 55; HGHE xxviii, 352, 356, 448; MS 424.
3

4

C.f •

n

MM.. 50 •

In this respect, cf. LeShan, op. cit. and Fritjof

3
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The practical and theoretical elements of mysticism
consequently provide a framework in which to sketch the fundamental structure of mystical experience as revealed in a
preliminary fashion by the phenomenological description of
its essential characteristics.
2. The Fundamental Structure o£ Mystical Experience
The basic structure of mystical experience, as Hocking stated in the 1962 preface to his magnum

~'

is the

triadic rela.tion of the Self to God through the natural and
social World. The dialectical transition from the implicit
awareness of nuclear experience to an explicit consciousness
of a personal relationship with God is accomplished on the
mystic's ••negative path" through a progressive clarification
of imtermediaries. These media of God's self-disclosure are
manifold. They can be grouped generally in the categories of
Self, Nature and Society, as we have seen. Specifically,
these include certain experiences of time, of one's own individuality and, pre-eminently, the love of other selves
which, beyond the more "ordinary" channels of derived know1 e d ge o f

Go d , us h er us

.

~nto

h'~s very presence. 1

The mystical experience itself may be of low intensity, analogous, as James had also observed, "with our occaCapra,

!h!

~of Physics (Boulder: Shambala Pub., 1975).

1
MGHE 429 - 31.

Fl""_,, ,,
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sional experiences
111

~f

realizing more or letts suddenly the

eaning of words, sayings, points of view, which may have

been familiar and empty possessions for a long time .. "

1

Hocking also noted that "the commoner mystical experiences
begin, I believe, with the concrete occasion, only suggest~---

ing or foreshadowing the universal meanings which they have."
Knowledge of ourselves may strike with a keen stab of recognition and significance. But it is primarily with respect to
the often sudden discovery of the individuality of another
person that we are provided with the mystical paradigm par
excellence: "at times we are granted something like a mystic
vision: it seems to us that we have come into the presence
of the individual and have seen the miracle as such. ••

3

Love

penetrates beyond the individual's vision, beyond his interests in the outer world, to what Hocking had before called
his "substance."

4 Such love is one key to the meaning of mys-

tical experience inasmuch as it is "a revelation like that
of the mystic, full of significance. For in finding the in5
dividual, one has indeed found the individual's idea."

1 MGH·E 428
; c f .. J ames, op.
2
MGHE 428 - 29.
3

't
c~

., p. 294 •

MGHE 432.

4 cf. '"M!r1" 55 and MGHE 409 for Hocking's descriptive
analysis of personal knowledge.
5

MGHE 433. Hocking added, "This is the central fact
of all mysticism: namely, that the discovery of the individual is always a discovery of truth, of a powerfully syn-

2
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P..n "idea" in the sense that Hocking here employed the

term is far more than a mental image of someone loved. Although he did not amplify the point, it can safely be surmised that by

~

he meant the cognitive-and-emotional aware-

ness not merely that the beloved is, but what -- or, rather,

-

who -- the beloved is, the essential character constituting
individual personal identity; one's essence.
Such analogues point to the meaning of mystical experience: "For what is the mystic experience but finding the

idea of the whole, as love finds the idea of a person?"

1

Hocking added, however, that "These other experiences are
not only analogous to the mystic insight; they are, as ·we
h ave sa1' d ,

' t 11 2 r."7 h e th er 1n
'
'
par t s 2£- !_·
exper1ences
of

t empora 1

existence, self-consciousness or the perception of another's
individuality in love, it is nevertheless God who is encountered also, however dimly perceived. For "wherever the individual is recovered, there is in some degree also a vision
of God. God is the One of all these plural loves and pleasures; and it is the love of God which naturally includes
and places all the rest." 3 Thus, "What the mystic knows is,
~hetic idea, and yet not by way of effortful thinking. That
1nterest in another soul which we call love is not an interest in his idea as a matter of theory: it is an interest in
~ as an individual substance, a being which knows and is
more than its knowledge ...

1

2
3

Ibid.
MGHE 434, emphasis added.

MGHE 434 - 35.
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first of all, that which he intends to know, namely God: and
in so far as he is a mystic pure and simple he knows nothing
else th an God."l
Such knowledge is , however, not generally -- if ever-a matter of "pure" mysticism, for by virtue of the integral
structure of nuclear experience, the World is necessarily
present as the background of our awareness of God, and, it
may be added, that of our Self as well:
We must remember that in these experiences, to which we
give the name of mystic simply because in them the individual finds himself consciously at one with the whole
of things, the world is not absent: it is with one's
world-knowledge that one now knows his world-unity or
God. The system of ideas is in no sense abandoned, but
rather in the liveliest use, though not thought of.2
Hence it is that developed mysticism heightens the
awareness and explicitates the ffieaning of that dialectical
triad which constitutes nuclear experience. From the viewpoint of the dynamic process of temporal existence, the
meaning of mysticism derives from the drive toward the World
as the field of the mystic's love-in-action, now felt as an
imperative: "the meaning of the mystic experience is prophetic. It

~nticipates

an attainment still to be won; it

ca~ be held only by proceeding to that winning." 3 And the
1

MGHE 448.

2

MGHE.

450n. Cf. "MM .. 46 and MGHE 296.

3MGHE_ 439.
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mystic returns to the World "not less a lover of men, but
rather a lover in more intense and human fashion, because
it is only the true worshipper who can find the world genuinely lovable."

1

The mystic also returns creative. By means of the personal re-integration made possible by the purifying and reconstructive efforts of the "nagative path," the mystic contributes a creative impulse to society which is similarly

re~integrative. 2 And as the mystic experienced the dissolution of habitual modes of ideas and conduct, as well as an
opening to novelty in his relations with God, other persons
and the World itself, so also he becomes a critic of society's "habits" -- its customs and institutions. He returns a.
reformer. 3
In this highly condensed summary, we can conclude that
for Hocking the fundamental elements of mystical experience
are the Self, the World and the personal Other together with
God as their

~ield

of reference or Ground. The relations

lMGHE 439 - 40.
2

cf. MGHE 440ff.

3 cf. ~1GHE 484. Cf. also 511: "The prophet is but the
mystic in control of the forces of history, declaring their
necessary outcome: the mystic. in action is the prophet. In
the prophet the cognitive certainty of the mystic becomes
historic and particular; and this is the necessary destiny
of that certainty: mystic experience must complete itself
in the prophetic consciousness." Cf. also TP 273.
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among these elements are various, but chief among them is
their binding unity, love. Taken together, the three elements, their Ground and the manifold of dynamic and static
relations among them constitute the structure of mystical
~

experience.

r

As an extension of nuclear experience, mystical ex-

I

perience is temporally dynamic, an historical process whose
characteristic operations can be described in terms of certain constants. Furthermore, regulated by a dialectical principle or "law 11 of alternation, the active and receptive
phases of mystical development serve to facilitate the explicitation in consciousness of God's presence as the Ground
or Field of experience as well as the unifying Goal of history. The characteristic function of mysticism is thus to
make salient the divine Field of experience, differentiating
it as an implicit dimension of all experience from other
forms of experience by intensification rather than segregation.
Conceived in terms of a temporal dialectic, mysticism
can also be seen to possess an intrinsic social dimension,
its major cadence being reiterated in the lesser, repeated
alternations of activity and repose which result from and
continue it. Both the greater and lesser manifestations of
the principle of alternation are dialectical, that is, reciprocally progressive; the difference lies mainly in the
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frequency of the latter in contrast_to the more probably
single occurrence of the former.
The emergent pattern of individual and social mystical
development is modified, however, by the exigencies of particular human psychologies, natural and social situations and
the historical nature of the encounter with God. While these
exigencies will be manifest in varieties of mystical experiences, nevertheless constancies can be found in these varieties. In order to discover and elucidate these common factors,
Hocking investigated mysticism both in its historical manifestations as well as in particular instances in the lives of
mystics East and West.
The .. deep structures" of mysticism, especially in its
developmental phases, concern us next. The common theoretical
aspects of the mystics' experience, both their psychology
and their cosmology, will warrant briefer attention, in so
far as the fundamental structures of mysticism are primarily
of the practical order. Still, the theoretical concurrences
are important philosophically and bear upon practice, as
Hocking gradually came to realize. For such conceptual ramifications of mystical experience inevitably guide further
experience by becoming schemas for the interpretation of experience, especially as preserved in formal traditfons. The
social dimension of mysticism is found not only in the world
of action, but in patterns of thinking and behavior dialecti-
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callY intertwined with action.
3 • The Dynamics of Mystical Experience
Hocking treated of mysticism both in its individual
manifestations and as an historical phase in the development
of religion in a variety of cultures, especially with regard
to the mystical teachings of outstanding representatives
which were institutionalized into traditions, schools and
literature. Individual and ••historical" mysticism are, of
course, interrelated ... Particularized" mysticism appears in
the lives of individuals generally within a mystical tradition of one of the world's great religions, although not ne1
cessarily so. Further, while distinct phenomena, individual
and "social'' mysticism were at least structurally homologous
for Hocking. As the withdrawal from the social world in individual mystical development finds completion in the mystic's
return to society, so, too, mysticism historically passed beyond the stage of unworldly absorption with the Absolute into
an active, prophetic stage. The pattern in both forms of mysticism is so remarkably similar in this respect that i t is
no distortion of Hocking's thought to say that individuals
continuously and approximately recapitulate in their own de1

some of the great modern mystics such as Therese of
Lisieux, a Carmelite, and Rufus Jones, a Quaker, thus either
gravitated toward existing mystical communities or developed
within them.
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~elopment

the pattern of the historical emergence of mysti-

cism, thereby perpetuating and also modifying it in the
course of subsequent history.
·

l.·

Eistorical Mv_sticism
Mysticism appeared historically, as we have seen, as

a response within the major religious traditions to the perception of God as

11

the Absolute, .. that is, the discovery of

the supreme sovereignty of "the One." 1 Individual mystical
experience undoubtedly preceded the emergence of socially
recognizable mysticism in so far as any person was aware of
the personal nature of the god he discovered in his experiences of his own existence as a Self or, more likely, in experiences of Nature, social obligations and love -- a living
presence attentive to him and whom he could address as "Thou. 11
Thus, animism and even polytheistic religion were a prelude
to mysticism. But the development of what we now recognize
as mysticism was dependent upon the appearance of personalistic monotheism and the possibility that the "dim awareness"
of the presence of God could be raised to explicit consciousness by "everyman," an ability at least in part socially conditioned by the availability of interpretative schemata and
the sanction of the community.

2 The actual shift from poly-

1

cf.

GL Dec. 10, 1938; ••HA" 433- 37.

2

cf.

LRWF 45 - 51, "HA." 433.
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theism to monotheism and the attendant belief in the possi~ilitY

of achieving union with the One was a widespread phe-

nomenon dictated by the structures and dynamics of human consciousness itself:
such changes were bound to occur, through the constancy
of the need for integration in the human spirit; and
they everywhere took the direction of bringing unity out
of plurality.
The logic is much the same everywhere: the many
gods cannot be independent; and a subordinate or dependent god cannot be the supreme Reality.l ·
Hocking pointed to India as the locus of breakthrough
with regard to the development of true mysticism:
It was in accord with the genius of India that this logic
[was] pursued relentlessly to its conclusion in the doctrine that the Real is absolute unity, whereas such unity
rejects description: the One, as inexpressible, culminates for our thought in Mysticism. What we may describe
as the discovery of the Absolute marks, I believe~ the
most important cultural achievement of antiquity.~
The realization that God is One, together with the belief that i t is possible to be one with him, constitutes the
historical condition for the explicit manifestation of mysti3
cal religion, both in theory and in practice. But the full
development of mysticism awaited the "passage beyond the Absolute":

l"HA" 433.
2
3

Ibid. Cf. GL Dec. 10, 1938. Cf. also MGHE 329.

c£. ewe 149, ".t-1M" 39 and "MS" 189.

243
the moment of discovery is never final: it marks a dividing line between two struggles: first the prior struggle
out of Polytheism; second, the subsequent struggle beyond the absolute poise of the mystic to a recovered relevance !£ effective living, a more concrete realism.rWith respect to the general thrust of religious consciousness, therefore, "the Mystical -- shall we say watershed -with its relative absence of leadership for the masses of
mankind must foretell a further stage of historical advance."
Hocking instantiated his contention by pointing to
the impact of movements begun by the fifteenth century Chinese sage, Wang Yang Ming, by the Buddha and by Jesus. Even
Greek and Roman religion had refused to sacrifice the historical particular despite an overriding concern for eternal
truth and beauty. 3 Nevertheless, the critical event in the
ancient phase of religious history was the encounter between
the realism of Rome and the Realism of Jesus in which the
4
Jewish revolter lost his life, and apparently his cause."
11

But the execution of Jesus concealed a victory which rested
upon the identification of the universal and the particular,
the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the temporal in
one, unique historical event: "the realism of Rome in full
power is absorbed in the Realism of the prophetic conscious1 "HA 11 434; this passage has no correlative in the
Herald text.
2

•• HA., 4 34 -

3 "HAn 435
•

35 •

2
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ness of the C rue~. f'~e d • ,.l
Beyond the quiescent contemplation of the Absolute,
even beyond union with it, there lies the completion of the
process of religious development in active involvement in
the World. Thus the greatest examples of religious genius
are found promoting reform, attending to the needs of the
poor, the diseased, the ignorant, the dispossessed and forgotten of every kind. The social legacy of mysticism is
found not only in a magnificent body of literary remains and
religious orders, but in schools, orphanages, hospitals,
charitable agencies, social reform, peace and brotherhood.
And thus for Hocking the mystical propheticism of
Christianity historically represented an advance over the
mystical absolutism of India by dint of the pragmatic criterion of "better meeting the world. 11 The adequacy of this
comparison of world religions is, of course, open to serious
objection. The reforming efforts of Hindu and Buddhist saints
is well known -- a point which, if anything, reinforces Hocking's major contention concerning the active phase of religious development. But in his defense, it can be said, I believe, that the corporate commitment to social betterment
institutionalized in Christianity has in Asian religions never passed far beyond the stage of individual efforts or a
general commitment to compassionate solicitude such as is
l"HA" 437.
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found in Buddhism. In terms of concrete achievements, ChristianitY may not rank higher than Buddhism philanthropically.
aut with respect to an explicit tendency in the religious
ethiC toward improving the general lot of mankind, no religion has proved as conscientious

or, perhaps, as meddle-

some -- as Christianity. Writing as a Christian, Hocking may
have betrayed some bias; as an historian, he was generally
on secure ground.

1

ii. Individual Mystical Development
In particular instances, the transition from the latent mysticism of nuclear experience to explicit mysticism
repeats the pattern characteristic of the historical evolution of mysticism. The discovery of the Absolute in multiform experiences of Self, Nature and Society comes to ex1 In so far as the role of Jesus Christ is even and
perhaps especially that of the historical mediator between
God and mankind as God-made-man, the "human face of God"
(LRliF 228; "What Is a Lost Soul?" Chicago Theological Seminary Register, 23-[March, 1933], p. 10), Christianity is,
for Hocking, the natural culmination of religious development, the ~final" religion. There is, however, no developed
Christology in Hocking's philosophy, and it is consequently
difficult to assess his conception of the role of Christ
further with regard to mystical theory. But as an historical
fact, rather than an element of belief, the Christian religion is of course subject to philosophical scrutiny, and in
so far as it might be shown to best satisfy criteria for effective living religiously, could be considered "final .. in
a purely philosophical context. That, however, lies beyond
the scope of this study to examine. (Cf. HNR, Part VII;
"HCCBFR!' passim: LRWF 229 - 62; ewe 108ff. For commentaries
on Hocking's "reconception" of Christianity, cf. Rouner,
WHE. 256 - 86 and Andrew Reck, Recent American Philosophy
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1964], pp. 64ff.)
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prass awareness through worship and its enlargement by mystical ascesis, eventuating in greater social participation.
Wide vari a·tions are, of course, possible (and indeed actual,
as Hocking well knew} in the ways and means by which the
mystical potential of "everyman" is realized. But the overall pattern or structure of development appeared to be relatively constant in East and

~vest

over various temporal

. d s. 1
perJ.o
The temporal structure of mystical experience takes
the form of a dialectical pattern of three stages: withdrawal from the world or "conversion," transformation or re-unification and, ultimately, action or return to the world. In
his magnum opus, Hocking also adverted to the classic characterization of the stages of development
illuminative and unitive "ways,

11

the purgative,

but without elaboration.

2

What is important is not their designations but the fact

•

that it is possible to discern certain distinctive phases of
development in the mystic's career. Hocking himself proposed
the following description, which also correlates well with
the stages of the mystical life as described by St. Teresa
of Avila. First, the "overall moral character of the process in the ideal of the 'pure heart' which is recognized
as the condition of finding God in worship."
1

cf.

3

Second, the

"MM. .. 39, MGHE 352.

2

c£. MGHE 373. Note the lack of reference to action
in the classical description, which terminates with union.
3
MGHE 387.

24 7

••simplification of consciousness," usually attained by a proc:ess o f mental discipline and prayer.

1

Third, the "repudia-

tion of effort," in which, as we have seen, God can freely
2
qive himself to the mystic prepared to receive him.
Whether called purgation, illumination and union or
(with St. Teresa) the Prayer of Quiet, the Prayer of Simplicity and the Prayer of Union, the more significant stages of
development in the mystic's life were not embodied for Hocking in discrete periods but in the dialectical interplay of
various depths of experience distinguished by a tension of
opposition but also united by a central thrust toward expansion and creativity. Further, a major

difference between

Hocking and the classical description concerns the phase of
activity, the return to the world.

~~ile

evident in the lives

of the mystics, this stage of development received no explicit reference in their descriptions. Whatever the reason for
this, the omission is not only striking but serious:
This, at any rate, is what has impressed me in mysticism:
That the turning away from the world in the negative path
of worship (together with the mystic experience itself
which marks the limit of the upswing) and the turning
back again constitute a normal rhythm or alternation
which has many analogies, and a vital function in the human mind capable of psychological expression.3
1
2

3

rbid. Cf. also 438.

r·.OJ."d •

Cf. 385ff •

MGHE 392.
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These alternating currents of world-love and Godare not merely antithetical. They are reciprocal:
We may say that beyond the limits of the mystic experience itself, the love of God takes on the form of human
ambition; that these motives are, so to speak, allotronic forms of the same. They alternate with each other,
as the hour glass is turned, -- each one in turn becoming the life of the other. With the idea of God, one
loves- the world; and then with the idea of the world,
one loves God again, -- and the two loves, or ambitions,
are of one substance, though they involve alternations
in the history of the empirical will.l
Thus it becomes necessary to correct the traditional
designation of the stages of mystical development to the extent that beyond the purgative, illuminative and unitive
phases, or, rather, framing them, are the dialectical movements away from the world and back to

i~.

The negative as-

pect of mysticism finds its positive meaning not only in the
transforming union with God, but dynamically in the return
to the work-a-day world where the social meaning and value
of mysticism becomes manifest. Thus both the "three ages"of
the mystical life as classical conceived and the "Prayers"
of st. Teresa belong to the second phase of mystical development as articulated in terms of Hocking's widened view of
the process. Likewise, Hocking's three-fold description cf
the purification of heart, simlification of consciousness
and repudiation of effort similarly refer to the "inner"
stages of mystical development, the "negative path." Conse1 MGHE 424.
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que nt

ly

five distinct moments can be discerned overall:
, -

~ithdrawal

from the world, purgation, illumination, union

and return to the world.

1

(1) Practical Mysticism
In his earliest writings, Hocking adverted to the dual
aspect of mystical experience, its practice and the theory
2
of that practice. This was extended in his later career to
specific statements about the nature of reality as experienced as well as the nature of the experience in its subjective aspect. 3 Thus disengaging the objective from the subjective aspects of the theory of mystical experience was a major
development in his thought, one which took Hocking closer
respectively to James and Royce in spirit if far beyond them
in content.

Hocking's "theoretical" mysticism was never merely
speculative, however. The empirical origins of the mystic's
metaphysics as well as his psychology always exercized a
critical function in his approach to mysticism. The true mystic was an empiricist; his practice

preceded~eory.

Conse-

quently, Hocking's attention to the practical aspect of mysFor a conteQpora~y discussion of this problem which
concludes with a similar expansion of the stages of mystical
development, cf. Kenneth l'lapnick, "Mysticism and Schizophrenia,11 The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 1, 2 (Fall,
1969, pp. 49 - 66.
1

2

c£.

MGHE xxviii.

3

ct.

TP Z.60 I

"MS." 187.
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ticism preceded and always outweighed his interest in the
theoretical aspect. The unanimity of the mystics themselves,
he consistently maintained, pertained primarily to elements
of discipline rather than to theories.about reality or even
God, if perhaps less so than Hocking believed at the initial
stages o f

1
.
.
hi
. s compara t 1ve
stu d y o f mys t•1c1sm.

This discipline or pattern of life, as Hocking ab,

stracted it from a variety of cases, involves a movement of
withdrawal and return to the world, as we have seen, between
which occurs a period of development he called "the negative
path." This "path" includes the purgative and at least parts
of the illuminative and unitive "ways."
This first phase of the mystic's development once he
has withdrawn from the world of ordinary life to pursue a
greater intimacy with God, is negative in so far as it consists mainly of voluntary efforts to detach oneself from the
2
customary habits of thought and action of the world. It is
characterized by two cardinal elements to which we shall
turn briefly: renunciation and meditation.
The mystic characteristically withdraws from society
not so much in terms of physical relocation as by a more or
less voluntary renunciation of socially conditioned ideas,
norms, values and behavior, including notions of "what
1

c£.

u.HM" 39, MGHE 352.

2

cf.

MGHE 386.

11

God
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iS· By "more or less voluntary," I mean that the budding mystic may only dimly perceive the need for and nature of the
disengagement from conventional attitudes and only reluctant-

lY undertake surrendering them. But the process of dishabituation will occur despite initial resistance, for attaining
the desired purgation of desires, habits and preferences entails some "unlearning" of habitual modes of social participation.1 A reflexive awareness of the process by which this
occurs is not necessary for the acquisition of detachment,
however.
Thus the mystic is gradually "mortified" in body,
mind and spirit -- reduced, that is, to the state of feeling
utter dependence on God alone. This is accomplished by actively and passively stripping oneself of all worldly attachments, not because they are evil, but because they are not
God. 2 But the path of negation occupies only half of the
mystic's method of purification and advancement. All turning
away is also a turning towards; all detachment is for the
sake of reattachment:
the active part of worship still remains a path of negation. For the god whom the mystic seeks is in fact something other than any given natural object of pursuit;
and since we are always better aware of what our absolute is not than of what i t is, the note of negation
1

cf.

MGHE 372 - 73, HNR 27.

2

cf.

MGHE xxix.
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must remain predominant. But meanwhile, worship has its
positive side also; the mystic has always in some way
recognized the fact that passion can be cast out only
by some greater passion.l
Here is the positive foundation of Hocking's doctrine
of asceticism, which has its analogue in "mundane" experience in the discipline, critical effort and hardships entailed in artistic and scientific method.

2

Without the posi-

tive upswing of affirmation, the mystic's path would end in
mere nihilism, which is of no value to the person or society.
Negation is necessary but neither sufficient nor final. As
we shall see, the mystic, like the scientist and the artist,
acquires by his negative discipline a ne\'1 and powerful appreciation of the common world, finding therein whole realms
of meaning and value unnoticed before and yet unfathomed.
Considering the role meditation plays in mystial experience, the mystic's attitude toward the world could hardly be totally negative. Even the

pu~ative

phases of his

path has its positive aspect. Hocking briefly but pointedly
asserted that
1
2

MGHE 376.

Like the mystic, the artist and the scientist must
undergo rigorous training, learning to perceive the elements
of the common world differently, effectively ''stripping"
themselves of socially conditioned modes of perception, attitudes and behavior which exercize a kind of divine but
dulling power over social existence. For a contemporary examination of the role of "unlearning" habitual modes of behavior, cf. Arthur Deikman, "Deautomatization and the Mystic
Experience," Psychiatry, 29 (1966), 324- 38.
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Pleasure, recreation, friendship, the companionship of
men and women, beauty -- all these recall the outgoings
of ambition and moral effort, and reunite a man with his
natural appreciation. Something in common these all have
with the quest of the mystic, and with the mystic experience itself. ll.nd worship is the whole which includes

~

.!!!.·1

Purgation, which encompasses the efforts traditionally
referred to as "renunciation," "mortification" and "detachment," concerns both "outer" and "inner" experience, that is,
both the body and the mind.

By no means enamored of an anti-

corporeal spirituality, Hocking clearly saw the underlying
function performed by the obviously negative bodily restraints
characteristically undertaken by those entering upon the mystical way:
in all acts of the will, the body plays its part: and i t
is the physical side of all mental acts, whether one sets
himself about thinking, or enjoying, or praying, which
is most directly controllable. In proportion as the inner
process is subtle and evanescent, the physical preliminaries must be extensive.2
The body, for the mystic, is the symbol of the sou1. 3
The greater stress in the mystic's effort to prepare
himself for the encounter with God is more likely to be
placed on mental discipline than on physical control, how-

1 MGHE 418·
I

2

Cf •

422 •

MGHE. 372.

3For a similar treatment of the body as a metaphor
of "subtle and evanescent .. process, in this instance social
relations, cf. Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols (Harmondsworth,
England: Penguin Books, 1973 ed.)
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ever. Indeed, the concentration on the body is a means to
greater command over the spirit and mind. This "inner" discipline is traditionally referred to as meditation.
In turning away from the world, the mystic has always
needed something to turn toward; in all his purgation
there has been an element of "meditation." He has done
what he can to find his own positive ultimate will, to
make real to himself what i t is that he most deeply
cares for. He has tried to remind himself of his absolute good.l
The positive achievement of learning to direct the mind's attention

by acts of restraint is "a condition of powerfully

directed attention. Such as the term 'contemplation' suggests."

2

By training the mind to withdraw from the multitude
of objects of attention ordinarily preoccupying consciousness, the mystic learns how to advert to the whole of reality, and in that shift of attention to become aware of the
infinite field of reference mediated by that Whole. The mystical "vision" achieved by the art of meditation is a form
1 MGHE.376; cf. 378- 79, RM 4Sf., LR'W.F 227, CWC 138f.
2
MGHE 371. Hocking also noted the connection between
the contemplative dimension of meditation and the stage of
involuntary passivity which marks the mystic's final period
of development: "'Contemplation,' as used by the medieval
mystic, implies that the effort of 'meditation,' in which
one holds the object before the mind by force of will, gives
way to a state in which the object attracts and holds attention without further conscious effort." {Ibid.) This description of contemplation can serve as a working definition
of the term for present purposes.
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of

intuiti~e

knowledge which attains to the Whole by with-

drawing attention from the "parts" -- that is, particular
objects of concern. It is thus an induction leading to a
contemplative experience of God by means of the God-idea.

1

This "working concept" of God, the pre-reflexive awareness
of God present within us and in the World, is, like the
whole-idea, beyond our ability to articulate conceptually.
For all ordinary concepts are, as expressible, particular,
limited and therefore inadequate to represent either God or
the Whole. In this sense, Krikorian was right in his observation that

11

cerned with."

We never face the Whole that Hocking is con-

2 And thus the mystic remains certain but un-

able directly to convince anyone who has not

11

Seen .. what he

bas seen, as James had observed.
Yet in his quest for meaning, the mystic not only attempts to reach further clarity in his ••conception" of God,
he also persists in trying to share his vision. His "accounts with reality" are never closed. His openness to experience is thus assured by his awareness of the inadequacy
of all concepts and all expressions. His method, his "prayer
of union," tends to approximate to a wholly non-effortful
receptivity to God in which his concepts {which he must
think with if he is to think at all) must play the most minimal role. While no stranger to theological reflection, his
1 c£. MGHE 129££.
2 K 'k
.
.
r~ or~an,
art. c1t.,
p. 274 •

I''
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o\tln \'lay is one of

II

•
1 H'J.S openness to experience
unknowJ.ng."

is likewise an openness to God's grace.

2

Paradoxically, the fact that the mystic has a "true"
concept of God or the Whole determines his inability to articulate it. Thus the problem of verification arises, the
real thrust of Krikorian's objection. Simply speaking, it
would seem that Krikorian is right, as James had admitted:
immediate verification by "objective" or· external criteria
is ruled out by the mystic's inability or refusal to articulate his vision. The mystic, of course, is less interested
in verification than in experience, and of his experience
he is certain. He is not concerned to convince others that
his concept is accurate, but to persuade them to join him in
his vision, to follow his way, that is, to experience it for
themselves. The mystic needs the community to confirm his ex1

The Dionysian strand of "unknowing" (agnosia) so
marked in Hocking's treatment of mysticism had its origins
in the remote ages of Christian antiquity, perhaps as derived
from Philo. It was strongly influenced by Nee-platonic
thought from the third to the sixth centuries, finding expression as early as the writings of Clement of Alexandria
(fl. 200) as well as those of Sts. Basil, Gregory Nazianzen
and Athanasius among the Greek Fathers and Augustine in the
West. Reaching a peak of development in the Mystical Theo~ of the Pseudo-Areopagite, the "way of unknowing" passed
into the medieval period with the translation of this work
into Latin by Erigena in the ninth century. On the PseudoDionysius, cf. MGHE 355 and 395, n. 2; on Plotinus, cf. MGHE
329 and 395; on Bonaventure and High of St. Victor, cf. MGHE
371 and 379, n. 1.
2

cf. "MS" 190. While mentioned here and implicit in
other places, there is no developed concept of grace in
Hocking's thought.

I~' I
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perience, primarily by following his example, not by verify.

ing his doctr1ne.

1

Thus mysticism entails immediate, personal experience;
it is not found in books. In so far as it is knowledge, it
is knowledge of, not knowledge about. It is also democratic;
each must see for himself, and consensus indicates "truth."
2
whatever else he is, the mystic is a radical empiricist.
The highest stage of the mystical

11

ascent 11 and the

culmination of the negative path is reached in the conscious
experience of union with the divine presence. The mystic has
raised to its highest level of awareness the ordinary nuclear
experience of God's presence and now, surrendering his own
efforts to become one with God, he can be "graced" with a
special mode of that presence not exigent upon any effort of
his own. But the mystic has not reached the end of his path
with the transition to the positive experience of God's presence.
The voluntary and involuntary passivity of the unitive
phase of the mystic's spiritual transformation gives way to
renewed social activity -- both voluntary and, in the sense
of an irresistible inner compulsion, involuntary. Manifesting the dialectical influence of the principle of alternation, the mystic returns to the world. This stage of mysti1

2

see below, pp. 263ff.

cf.

LRWF 40, 44 - 46;

ewe

182.
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cal life, often overlooked by the mystics themselves in describing their development, is nevertheless an integral part
of the structure of mysticism viewed from a social perspective. Hocking's signal accomplishment in the study of mysticism lies, I believe, in his exposition of the fact and meaning of this phase of the mystic's career. For the concluding
social phases of mystical experience not only complete the
dynamic process of individual development but accounts for
I

the mystic s role in society, apart from which mysticism appears to be merely an episode of religious alienation. Above
all, Hocking's analysis revealed that mysticism is in its
deepest structure a social process, finding in society both
meaning and value beyond that which it has for the individual. Further, this social dimension of mysticism contains the
clues which helped him resolve some of the perplexities mysticism had caused many of its thoughtful critics.
Hocking did not discover the reciprocal relationship
between action and contemplation, which found expression
even in the writings of Aristotle and has antecedents in the
1
work-rest dialectic of the Jewish Sabbath. This dual element of spirituality was a fundamental principle of medieval
and later theologians, not only Thomas Aquinas, but through2
out the West. Hocking, however, in realizing that there1

cf. Nichomachean Ethics, Book X, Ch. 8, 1178 b 33 1179 a 33. Cf. also Harvey Cox, Turning~ (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1977), pp. 68- 70.
2
For Aquinas• teaching, cf. his Summa Theologiae,
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lationship between action and contemplation was dialectical
and that the character of activity following upon the contemplative development of the mystic was significantly different from that which preceded it, contributed a valuable
and original insight to our understanding of the spiritual
life. Further, Hocking was able to express this insight
structurally and to use it to integrate the active phase

•

of mystical development into an overarching description of
the mystical life without subordinating it to the contemplative phase as a perhaps necessary but regrettable interruption. This he was able to do by showing that the dialectic
of active involvement in the world and contemplative refleJtion were the mystical expression of the principle of alternation which regulated all human operations. 1
II-II, Q. 188, a. 6 and Q. 182 1 a. 1 ad 5 and ibid., a. 3.
1

The significance of action has been approached from
an historical viewpoint with regard to Ignatian mysticism by
Joseph de Guibert, S.J. in The Jesuits: Their Spiritual E££trine and Practice (William J. Young, s.J., trans. and George
E. Ganss, S.J., ed. [Chicago: The Institute of Jesuit Sources
and Loyola University Press, 1964]). While recognizing the
necessary connection between love and action in the mystical
life (p. 58), De Guibert does not develop these connection
theoretically nor does he explain its genesis in terms of
psychological motivation. He denies, further, that Ignatius•
mysticism was one of union and transformation (pp. 178- 79)
despite the evident experiences Ignatius enjoyed of God's
presence (pp. 32, 45, 55, 59) and his personal spiritual
transformation (p. 28). This might be taken to imply that in
Ignatian mysticism the contemplative aspect is subordinate
to action rather than a complementary phase of development
despite the clear affirmation that Ignatius was "a contemplative even in the midst of action" (p. 45, citing Jeronimo
Nadal). However, following de Guibert himself, the life of
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For Hocking the mystical interplay of action and contemplation provided the dynamism of the spiritual life of
the individual as well as that of society, both of which
move forward in time and advance in "maturity .. as a boat advances by tacking -- sailing obliquely in a zig-zag pattern
rather than sailing directly into the wind. The initial contribution of mysticism to society is thus a function of reflection: re-evaluating, re-thinking and re-organizing with
respect to the structures, values, ideas, institutions and
goals of state and church. But only in action can such reflection find its value for life and thereby its meaning. In
applying his reconceptions in the World, the mystic becomes
the prophet: critic, gadfly, truthsayer, reformer.

1

His task

can be described as a struggle to overcome evil in the world,
Ignatius can be seen to provide a paradigm of the stages of
mystical development as outlined by Hocking: with~awal from
the social world (pp. 24- 27); a period of renunciation and
purgation, the "negative path" on which the mystic undergoes
a complete personal transformation (pp. 28, 66- 67, 72- 73);
meditative and contemplative exercize of the mind and will,
culminating in experiences of the direct and immediate presence of God (pp. 32, 45, 55, 59££.); and a return to the
world and a life of heroic service (pp. 32- 33, 58, 73, 177
- 78). Ignatius • mysticism \'las neither "nuptial" ( p. 55) nor
Dionysian {p. 59), but it nevertheless conforms to the classical pattern of Western tradition, particularly with regard
to its expression in action. (Cf. MGHE 361, quoted below, p.
). For a more recent study of Ignatius' mystical development, cf. Harvey D. Egan, S.J., The Spiritual Exercizes and
~ Ignatian Mystical Horizon (St. Louis: The Institute of
Jesuit Sources, 1976).
1

ct.

MGHE 473; TP 131 - 32, 271; .HIHE 160 etc.
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but this is only the negative aspect of the mystic's positive
contribution. He will be found at the bottom of reforms, agitating for greater justice and more charity, a spokesman for
the poor and oppressed, an originator of new movements for
co-operation and peaceful co-existence (as Hocking was in
his own life). In all of this, the motive of the mystic's return and the on-going source of his rekindled efforts is an
imperative sense of duty and especially of love.

1

Hocking was careful to point out that the alternation
between action and contemplation which governs the mystic's
development and subsequent career is not a natural cycle, although analogous to one. Its period is regulated by voluntary
and historical factors as well as by the inner dialectic of
the mystic's development as a member of society:

\

whatever the psychological phenomena associated with mysticism may be, the thread upon which they are hung is -as I must insist -- the mystic's intention; and if that
intention is at all fairly conceived as an intention to
worship, it involves an occupation of attention which in
the nature of the case must alternate with attention to
other affairs. I am driven, therefore, in the search for
a psychology of mysticism, to look for further analogies
among those normal alternations such as sleeping and waking, work and recreation, competition and co-operation,
the hungers [for beauty, society, solitude, etc.] and
satisfactions already referred to, conception and gestation, etc .. 2

1 cf. MGHE 424, 507; CWC 183.
2
"MM 11 SO. He continued, "Every detail of physical operation shows this method of action. Attention is a rapidly
alternating current, perpetually withdrawn from its object
and instantaneously replaced: but in the instant of withdraw-
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For Hocking, therefore, the alternation that obtained
in the reciprocity of action and contemplation was not a mere
biological rhythm manifested psychologically, but rather a
harmony of active and receptive phases of experience that
characterized many vital functions. It was a method of maximizing the available energy of a system. More than that, it
was a description of the nature of cognitive experience from
a philosophical perspective: "at the bottom of the psychological alternation there lies an epistemological principle,
which

de~erves to be called the Principle of Alternation." 1

The actual alternations of attention Hocking was concerned
with fallinto t'vo categories, that between the part and the
whole which defines the structure of the knowing process,
and that between activity and receptivity which characterizes
the structure of experience. In short, the principle of alternation is the regulative aspect of the dialectical character of experience in all its modes.
In his later writings, the social dimension of mysticism remained a function of the principle of alternation, as
we have observed above,

2

the mystic's need for the community

al, having recovered a better poise and a steadier termination, having wiped away the film of relativity with which
self and object had begun to infect each other." Thus the
mystic "only does consciously and totally that which we all
are continuously doing in the minuter movement of psychical
life, that which we all resort to in fragmentary and instinctive manner." ("M~1" 55.)
l,.MH" 55.
2

See above, pp. 205ff.
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and the community's reciprocal need for the mystic.

1

First, the mystic discovers that he has a need for
the community "'vith ali_ its particular marks in order to
2
complete his religious selfhood." This need is primarily or
at least initially satisfied by the mystic's gathering about
himself a band of disciples. "It is not that the mystic confirms in his disciples what he is already sure of; it is
rather the negative side of this -- if he had no capacity to
persuade, he would have to suspect himself." 3 Consequently,
verification represents confirmation by the community through
its representatives gathered around the mystic. This is but
a partial satisfaction, however. A greater need lies in the
continuity of experience, which is also a social exigency:
the mystic is a bearer in his own person of the questioning out of which he was born. When he joins his community in worship, he joins in its questioning -- for worship when it is alive contains a new grouping of the
soul, not a wearing deeper of old ruts. And if he finds
an answer, he must bring it back into the context of the
questioning to which the answer belongs. He must vest
his insight in that particular historical campaign.4
The third and deepest need pertains to the decline of
individual religious feeling and to the character of ritual.

,

·cf. LRWF 40 - 43, cited above, pp. 205ff.
2
LRNF 43.
3LR1'1F 45.
4

LRWF 46.
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For feeling runs down in religion as elsewhere: "Religious
feeling, underlying all others, is in the same case: it, too,
runs down; savedness does not last: the passion for righteousness needs to be renewed."l
The religious need of the mystic for the community
is therefore to renew his religious feeling, his awareness
of value and meaning. Such a renewal takes place normally in
the ritual of worship: "As feeling, religion takes the shape,
for the community, of ritual."

2

Thus the mystic not only re-

ceives his original stock of ideas and values from his cornrnunity, he also replenishes religious feeling at that store.

3

Fourth, the mystic also needs the community in order
to achieve the prophetic potential of his experience, "the
prolongation of his deed" in history:
The spread of righteousness is a task which cannot be limited by the reach of an individual either in space or in
time. So far as his "work" deserves to continue, it can
continue beyond his personal scope only if there is a
community to continue it.4
1 LRWF 48 - 49. Hocking explained, "If we say that feeling is our cognizance of value, or that feeling is the report
of consciousness that value is present, it becomes a truism
that without feeling life is valueless. But feeling, the most
important element of experience, is also the most intangible.
It cannot be conveyed from mind to mind in its own character:
its expression necessarily is in another medium •••• Further,
feeling is evanescent." For him, feeling was also "a natural
response to the meaning found in an actual situation." (p. 49.)
2

LR~1.F 46. Cf. also 49.

3

LR~lF 49.

4

LRWF 51.
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Not only does the mystic need the community for the
completion of his development; the community also needs the
mystic, as Hocking had first proposed in his magnum opus.
Hocking consistently maintained and positively expressed this
relationship as the mystic's value to society: his renewal of
society's values and meanings in the crucible of personal recreation. In his later work, Hocking's point of view widened
from the nature of the mystic's contribution alone to include
the limits and deficiencies of society: "While the mystic is
building up his own inner group, as a sort of leaven within
the wider secular community, this wider community relies on
such work as his for certain qualities which it cannot produce for itself."l
The principal social need is for continuing morale:
"The community depends for its indispensable morale upon the
mystic and his findings."

2

Religion and its inner power to

revitalize-- the mystic's experience of God, provides the
basis for sustained social co-operation. S 0 ciety in turn can
be expected to favor "that mode of religion which is most
nearly in harmony with its own moral direction." 3 For this
reason, of course, the danger of co-optation is great -- perhaps more so than Hocking was willing to recognize in 1936,
1
2

Ibid.
rbid.

3LRWF 53. Imd hence, "The community must cultivate its
mystics." (LRWF 52.)
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despite the worsening

situ~tion

in Europe. (Oddly enough, he

all but ignored the mystical-prophetic function of critical
dissent at that time.)
Convinced that society depended upon the mystic for
its ess:ential vlell-being and development, Hocking • s original
rejoinder to those who pitted prophetic social action against
mysticism was to assert their fundamental connection, indeed
their identity. For him prophecy was the extension of mystical awareness in action: "The mystic in historic action is
termed the prophet: in a study of the prophet we may span the
final term of religion's work in the world."l Prophecy is
thus not merely a mode of social interaction, but the ripe
fruit of a mystical encounter with God rooted deep in the
meaning and structure of human experience.

2

Consequently, prophecy should not be limited to a type
of knowledge such as precognition. The transition from aware·ness to active social intervention is inevitable, given the
prophet's mystical impulse toward communicating what he has
experienced despite its ineffable character, as well as toward leaving behind a permanent contribution to the world's
1 MGHE 484. Cf. 511: "The prophet is but the mystic in
control of the forces of hi~tory, declaring their necessary
outcome: the mystic in action is the prophet. In the prophet,
the cognitive certainty of the mystic becomes historic and
particular; and this is the necessary destiny of that certainty: mystic experience must complete itself in the prophetic consciousness."
2

cf.

MGHE 503, 511.
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worth, as he feels he has been charged to do by a mysterious
destiny:
Prophetic power is the final evidence to each individual
that he is right and real; it is his assurance of salvation; it is his share of divinity; it is his anticipation
of attainment. Hence it is that the greater mystics have
been great founders, great agitators, and have if not a
heavenly immortality yet unquestionably a mundane immortality. There are no deeds more permanent than those of
Buddha, of Mohammed, of Jesus. ~nd innumerable lesser
deeds of equal validity have completed the substance of
these mighty frames. The deeds of the mystics constitute
the hard parts of history; the rest has its day and
passes.l
So it is that in the accounts and orders and sects
left behLnd by the great mystics, the supreme values of society, refined and renewed by the personal transformation of
the mystic \vho embodies them, are readjusted to their institutional form and thus rendered more accessible to those less
prone or able to endure the stresses of the nagative path,
but who share the same nuclear experience and the same fundamental values. Prophecy is to that extent conservative. Perhaps even more importantly, new values are also discovered,
clarified and expressed by means of the mystical adventure,
and thereby the race moves slowly and raggedly but definitely
forward toward the unification of history in a common spir2
. '
Ad
·
·
1' tua 1 v1s1on.
n to t h at extent, prop h ecy 1s
progress1ve.

1 MGHE 512. Cf. 518 and MIHE 160, quoted above, p. 215.
2
For further discussion, see below, pp. 294ff.
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Hocking's belief in the unanimity of the mystics East
and

regarding the practical elements of mysticism may

~·Jest

strike the reader armed with a half-century more of studies
in comparative religion as somewhat naive. And yet, as these
very studies have shown, despite real divergence, there is
wide-ranging agreement on many major issues, including the
necessity of social and physical renunciation, meditation,
the suppression of conceptual thought, and some form of social action -- elements which Hocking recognized as being
virtually universal. 1 In this respect, agreement lies less
in the details of practice than in the more general patterns
and underlying structures of behavior. Hocking saw clearly
that despite the universal character of mysticism as a function of nuclear experience, because of the historico-cultural particularities of peoples and nations, mysticism would
be as variegated as were the religious traditions cut of
2
which it emerged and into which it flowed.
As noted in the introduction, within Christianity itself, there is widespread disagreement as welL as agreement
1

cf. in this respect the works cited by Deikman, Furse,
Johnston, Happold, Scharfstein, Smart, Staal, Stace and
'iiapnick. Cf. also Hilliarn Johnston, ~ Still Point (New
York: Fordham University Press~ 1970); Claude Geffr' and
Gustavo Gutierrez, eds., ~ .Hystical and Political Dirnen~ of the Christian Faith (New York: Herder and Herder,
1974 TConcilium, Vol. 96J); Margaret Smith, The Way 2f the
Mystics (London: Sheldon Press, 1976); and Harold Coward
and Terence Penelhum, eds., Mystics and Scholars (Waterloo,
Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1977).

2

ef.

MGHE 407,

ewe

141 - 42, 180.
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regarding the status of mystical experience and mysticism
as a way of life. Given such a range of opinion, it is perhaps safe to say that while differing in particulars, a majority of Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox theologians have
traditionally considered mysticism to be in some way consonant with essential Christian beliefs and practices. Possibly
the most common points of agreement include the belief that
in mystical experience God comes into close personal contact
with the human spirit not as the result of human effort
alone, but as a free gift of grace which the mystic has been
disposed to receive by voluntary efforts as well
voluntary

a~

by in-

or "passive" purifications. Protestant \iri ters

such as Harkness are wont to

stress~

the notion of communion

with God rather than union, especially in the sense of ontological absorption. Further, greater emphasis is placed upon
the sovereign role of grace and the inadequacy of human efforts to attain such communion. But in either case, the awareness of God's immediate presence is held to be a transitory
state. characterized by intense love for God and human persons, but ineffable as regards conceptual expression. Such a
state is also held to be experienced after a progressive development of the spiritual life and presupposes a high degree of moral refinement.
Reports of Catholic and Protestant mystical experiences are similarly comparable and in many respects similar,
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particularly with regard to a persistence of individual personality during the state of ecstatic union.

1

But it is im-

portant to observe that contemporary thought, much like Hocking in his own development, has come to discover that the
fundamental areas of agreement among the mystics are not limited to practical issues, but extend to significant areas of
belief. Comparative mysticism also has a theoretical side.
(2) Theoretical Mysticism
While adverting to the mystic:'s

11

theory of reality"

in his earlier writings, almost seventeen years elapsed before Hocking undertook, almost hesitantly, the articulation
of a mystical metaphysics based on his analysis of important
Eastern and' Western sources. Even then he subordinated theory
to practice, consistently with his original view.

2

Three

principles and their corollaries represent the major element~

of the mystics• metaphysics of the person and the real-

ity encountered in mystical experience:
I. That Reality is One, an absolute unity;
II. That it is possible to reach an intuitive knowledge
of or union with this absolute One by an effort
which is primarily moral rather than theoretical;
1 cf. Georgia Harkness, Mysticism, !i2, Neaning and
Message (Nashville: Abingdon, 1973), p. 58. Ct. also Rudolf
Otto, Mysticism East and ~, Bertha L. Bracey and Richenda
c. Payne, trans. (New Yor}c: The Macmillan. Co., 1970) and the
works cited by Fremantle and Rappold. See below, p. 377.
2

cf. MGHE xxviii.
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III. That all oppositions are reconciled in the One;
the extremes coincide.l
In arriving at these principles, the statements in
"The Meaning of Mysticism" can be taken as Hocking's point
of departure: "that God is One, and that it is possible to
be one with him."

2

Implicit in this "minimum of theory" is

1 The original statement of the theoretical content of

the mystics' teaching is found in Types of Philosophy, from
which I have taken the three major principles and several
corollaries (by which I mean subsidiary principles which can
be subsumed under one of the major principles). Other corollaries are taken from later writings.
2 "MM 11 40. Note the brief ramification in ewe: "God is
and God is One." (p. 149; cf. also "MM" 39.) It should be
noted in respect to the ontological character of these propositions that, consistently with Hocking's idealistic outlook, "God" is taken to be equivalent to "Being" and "the
Real" in the sense of Ultimate Reality, that is, in so far
as his reality is absolutely independent. (Without the capital, "reality" seems to refer to the factual world existing
more or less independently of the human mind.) Hence the assertions "God is One" and "Reality is One" are broadly equivalent although distinguishable by the context, namely the
religious frame of reference. (ef. 11 MS" 187.) For Hocking
God was always "the heart of Fact." (C~ie 198.) Further, whatever else God was, he was "the Absolute." ( ef. 14GHE 206.)
The persistent influence of idealistic language here
evident is not unproductive of some fogginess, betraying the
fact, as many of his critics pointed out in their reviews of
his magnum opus in particular, that Hocking was insufficiently cured of Absolute Idealism. Hocking was no pantheist, but
in equating "God" with "Reality,n he could be mistaken for
one. In his defense i t can be said that if God can be called
"real" as he can be called "good," he can also be called
"Reality Itself" as he can be called "Goodness Itself" -here following the medieval via eminentiae as employed, for
example, by Thomas Aquinas. (ef. Summa Theologiae I, Q. 13,
aa. 1 - 12.) On the basis of the identity of essence and existence in God, God "possesses" attributes substantially
which are "accidental perfections" in creatures. Thus, while
men are good, just and loving, God is Goodness Itself, Justice Itself. Although sanctioned by tradition and represent-
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an ontology, an epistemology and an ethics which, although
limited by the mystic's circumscribed interests, are nevertheless both weighty and extensive.
The force of the first principle is that "No pluralism
can be a final metaphysic."

1

The underlying problematic here

is the tension between the One and the Many. The

mystic is

not blind to the reality of the Many; he merely asserts that
beyond all plurality is a fundamental unity which is in some
sense divine.

2

Several corollaries flow from this ontologi-

cal axiom. First, that all of Being is present in each of its
instances. Thus the part can stand for the whole: "In the
world of minds, the part can include the whole, and is continually engaged in doing so, however partial a member i t
may be of any whole to which it belongs. 113 A kind of "metaphysical synechdoche," this ancient principle has its moral
implications: "In so far as ye did it to the least of these
my brethren, ye did it unto me."

4

The second corollary is that Reality (i.e., God) is
ing a further development of the apophatic theology of the
Greek Fathers, such employment of language does not result
in greater clarity regarding "what 11 God is, as Thomas well
knew. (Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, Q. 13, a. 2. Hocking referred indirectly to. the via eminentiae in TP 261.)
l"FFD" 525; cf. TP 256.

2 cf. TE 256, "MS" 188, "FFD" 525, "RPK" 280.
3
MS 368; cf. TP 260.
4

Matt. 25:40, cited in CWC 184. See above, pp. 202ff.
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thus inescapably present to all, although we are generally
only "dimly aware" of that presence.

1

Third, Reality is identical with the human Self. In
its strong form, as in Vedanta, this refers both to the Absolute and to the universe. In its softer form, such as that
proposed by Hocking, this is taken to mean that "the Universe
[i.e., the World] is a self," and "the world is kindred to"
the Self of the mystic.

2

Fourth, Reality is ineffable (indescribable). This applies both to the One and to the nequally indescribable essence of the human self •••• "

3

I am led to suggest here that

the ineffability of mystical experience is the product of
the indescribability of both the subjective experiencing and
the objective reality experienced, which are equally and perhaps infinitely mysterious. The "reticence" of the mystic is,
in other words, traceable to the inexpressible immediacy of
experiencing but also to his immediate and therefore ineffable awareness of Fact, the certainty of which outstrips
his conceptual ability adequately to conceive or to express
as meaning.
1

2
3

4

4

Hence, the mystic chooses not to say anything

cf. nr4GHE" 65, MIHE 156.
GL Mar. 18, 1938; Cf. TP 257, CHC 138.
TJ? 257; cf.

"MS" 187.

cf. "MM" 44, quoted above, p. 223.
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or else to utter paradoxes.

1

As a consequence, fifth, all concepts of the One are
inadequate and "all the predicates or descriptives which we
.
app 1 y t o ~' t are some h ow ~n
nee d or...

.
correct~on

•••• 11

2

Finally, "in so far as the One eludes definitive characterization, the sphere of the clearly definable remains
plural and open toward future experience."

3

As the first principle is largely ontological, the

second is mainly psychological, or, more accurately, epistemological. It also stems from "The Meaning of Mysticism":
"it is possible to be one with him [God]" and vitally important to be so. 4 But whether conceived of as "an intuitive
knowledge of, or union with,

thi~

absolute One," this one-

ness is the result of an effort primarily if not wholly moral.5 Inasmuch as it asserts the radical inadequacy of all
conceptual knowledge of God, mysticism is thus voluntaristic
and cognitively agnostic, renouncing the attempt to fathom
God intellectually in order to find union with him in love,
surrender and obedient service.
1
2
3

cf. LRWF 69 - 71, MGHE 234, TP 315, "SSP" 397.
TP 257; cf. "MS" 187.
"SSP" 397.

411 .HM" 39. Cf.

5

11

MS" 189.

TP 257, 264; cf. LRWF 280, "MS" 180.
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Conceptual knowledge is not simply abandoned by the
mystic (as is all too clear from their writings)_ It is radically subordinated to action, which for Hocking as for those
other students of mysticism, James and Bergson, is a function
of the will. But as we have seen, the inadequacy of conceptual knowledge does not mean that the mystic does not know
God. For he has another way of knowing, an intuitive grasp
of the existential fact of God's presence.

1

Mysticism as a

way of knowing transcends mere intuitionism, however. But as
such it is a consequence of loving union in which the awareness of differentiation between the lover and the beloved is
lost in a sense of corporate identity. The cognitive "object 11
of

~ystical

~. 2

knowledge is neither I

nor He nor even Thou, but

God is known from within.
Several corollaries may also be added to the second

mystical axiom. First, obstacles to the realization of a
union with God more profound than that of conceptual knowledge or the "dimly felt" nuclear experience can be overcome
to an extent by the "right discipline 113 of the body, mind and
4
spirit, mainly by renunciation and meditation.
1

Cf. above, pp. 20lff.

2

see above, pp. 201, 257. For consubjective experience, see above, pp. 49, 58f., 74f., 149 and 190.
3
4

"MS 11 188.
cf. "HS 11 189 - 90.
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Second, however, all voluntary activity and even voluntary passivity -- the paradoxical renunciation of all effort, the voluntary sacrifice of the will -- are insufficient to attain to perfect union with God. Such union is a
free gift of grace requiring involuntary passivity, the absolute surrender of Self, else God would not remain free.

1

Yet, third, in so far as freedom is a function of actual willing, i.e., the voluntary realization of personal
possibilities, then because conscious union with God is a deliberate development of the theistic ground of nuclear experience, such union must be freely willed if it is to be
human experience at all.

2

~

Theologically, Hocking thus asser-

ted the paradoxical necessity of both free will and free
grace for salvation.

3

1 cf. MGHE 380 - 86, "MS" 190.
2 cf. SBF 173: "Freedom can grow great only as hope
can find its possible good an object of genuine belief. Hence
the life of freedom depends intimately on the validity of
the mystic's worship."
3 rn addressing this traditional theological paradox.,
Hocking simply pointed out "that there comes a stage of effort in which effort must be set aside in favor of a purely
receptive attitude." The mystic "must render himself passive
and wait in hope that.God will vouchsafe to reveal himself."
( "!-15'' 190.) Involuntary passivity, as we have seen, represents
a stage of development in which the mystic does not even try
to receive the gift of grace, being simply content to receive.
Freedom and grace are not antagonistic principles; in the
dialectical unfolding of the mystical life, they are, rather,
antithetical: equally necessary but equally incomplete. Their
ultimate reconciliation occurs in the experience of union,
the mystic's freely willed but purely receptive acceptance
of God's self-communication. By locating grace and freedom
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·rhe third major principle represents the dialectical
tension preserving the real difference of the One from the
many, subject from object, infinite from finite, whole from
part-- while paradoxically maintaining their basic unity.
The philosophical articulation of this principle is as old
as the Hermetical writings and the speculations of Ananagoras. To the Greeks it was enantiodromia. To the late medieval Platonists such as Nicolas of Cusa, it was the coinci1
dentia oppositorum.
The principle of reconciliation tempers the mystic's
metaphysical monism; all things do not constitute a unity of
uniform identity, a "block universe," but one in which related elements are balanced in an equilibrium of dynamic tension. The many may well be aspects of the One, but they are
real aspect. The Self

thus both is and is not the Universe,

the part both is and is not the Whole. Hocking's own position was that the One and the many are equally rea1. 2 Thus

within a dialectic, Hocking did not resolve the classical
dilemmas of theological speculation about God's freedom and
human responsibility. He nevertheless made a significant
contribution by thus illuminating the non-contradictory
character of apparently exclusive principles when related
dynamically rather than sta.tically.
1 cf. ewe 180. Cf. also Armand 1-laurer I "Nicolas of
Cusa," The Zncyclopedia E.! Philosophy,, ed. cit., 6, pp.
496b - 498b; F.C. Happold, Mysticism: A Study and ~ Antho12gy (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970 ed.), pp. 333- 341.
2For Hocking, however, the One was ontologically
prior to the many: "The One we believe in must be a One
which needs and is able to produce the many." (TP 276.) On-

278

he and most Western mystics with him escape the dilemma of
pantheism versus atomism by postulating a form of participation in which many particulars share a common or universal
character. The mystic remains a realist to the extent that
he must deal pragmatically with the world of discrete facts
in which he exists. 1 To the extent that the mystic upholds
the felt unity of the world, he remains an idealist.

2

In mys-

tical experience, the partial perspectives of both realist
and idealist are reconciled not in terms of conceptual harmony but in terms of experience itself.
In our experience, things do fit together; natural
law describes all known phenomena. So much so, I might add,
that Einstein's dream of a unified field theory describing
all possible physical-energy transactions in the universe is
not far from a realized possibility nor from the mystic's
vision. Yet this is no block universe. The parts are real
parts and their "fit" is not always perfect. There are loose
tological dependence; however, does not render the many less
real than the One. Conversely, Reality is constituted oy the
reciprocity of the One and the many; apart from each other,
neither is real: "The Real cannot be either the absolute One
of the mystic or the absolute Many revealed by realistic analysis." (Ibid.)

1 c£. TE 274 - 75.
2 cf. TP 276. Hocking qualifies the monism of the first
metaphysical principle by means of a realistic criterion:
the social dimension of mysticism, the return to the world,
contains in its call to action an intrinsic corrective for
the idealistic phase of mystical metaphysics. I am convinced
that Hocking's own "objective idealism" was tempered by such
a dialectic.

strings and left-overs as well as novelty, development and
loss which cannot be left out of account in any adequate interpretation of experience. But here, I think, Hocking's commitment to rationalism and idealism may have betrayed him
into too tight a scheme of things, even granting his •ttentative pluralism."
Certain elements of experience do not fit together
well. Absurdity is also a fact of life, at least on the human, macrocosmic level.

1

Further, we do not grasp how cer-

tain elements of experience fit into somelarger context, even
though they might well do so. To be sure, Hocking's tentative
plur~lism

could be taken to represent a confession that the

underlying unity of the world is not only

inaccess~ble

to us

in its nether depths, but that it may well be evolving. That
is, the dynamic aspect of being, becoming, necessitates a
modified monism as well as a modified pluralism.
The mystic, on this reading, is one who has been enabled to experience the deep unity of all things as parts of
a developing Whole. Process is, in that sense, absolute, even
though there may well be a foreseeable term. Unity is thus
as much a promise as a fact, or even more so. The mystic's
vision of the Real is thus prophetic: it is a virtual unity,
the actualization of which is the goal which leads him to
spend himself bringing history to full expression as the King1

For a religious and mystical interpretation of this
point, cf. Raymond Nogar, The Lord of the Absurd (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1966).------------

280

dom of Heaven.
The mystic's metaphysical allegiance remains to unity
rather than to pluralism because his experience has been one
of unity. His pluralism remains tentative not as a capitulation to mystery, but as an obstacle to be overcome. He is
not attempting to create a block universe, however, but a
community of love and justice.

Es I read Hocking, the tension between the One and the
many is thus resolved in terns of the second theoretical axiom. The real but as yet non-evident unity of all can be
brought to mind, first, by a conscious shift of attention
from the part(s) to the Whole, a shift which can occur spontaneously but is more commonly, perhaps primarily, voluntary
and thus moral. The mystic's metaphysics is in this sense
voluntaristic: the will is the human principle of unity.
Second, the concrete and manifest unity of human society and
the world of nature can be realized within history by action.
Unification is a process as well as a task and a vision: it
is achieved in time as well as seen in the depths of being
opened in the moment of mystical revelation. Importantly,
action, like attention, is also a function of the will. Ultimate integrity on both the individual and social planes of
experience is a matter not primarily of cognition but of love.
Several corollaries likewise pertain to the principle
of reconciliation. First, that space and time, for instance,
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exist both as all-pervasive yet independently plural fields
1
united by a Self as a "field of fields."
Second, that all
religions possess. a fundamental and universal character but
are nevertheless historically and culturally particular;
they are united "at the top" while rooted in the irreducibly
plural soil of human differences.

2

Similarly, religious ex-

perience is fundamentally universal; it is no less discretely particular in the lives of individual persons.
The third corollary is that the individual and the
community are co-equally important and mutually implicated
in all experience. 3 God and the World, fourth, are also intimately associated but not identical. God is neither Nature
nor Society; yet God is in the World, which thus becomes a
medium of his presence. Finally, as distinct, God and the
S'elf are ••Thou" to each other. Yet as united, God and the
Self constitute an inclusive and unitive "We."

4

"iihile not all these interpretations of reality might
be found in any particular mystical work, they represent the
theoretical foundation of the mystic's reflections on his experience. But whether or not these principles accurately encompass the mystical worldview even as articulated by Hocking,
1 ef. "FFD" 541 - 42; MIHE..
2

xvi.

ef. ewe 141 - 42, 149; "HS" 190 - 91.

3 ef. LRWF 44ff., 49, 52.
4

XV -

cf. MGHE 344, "MS" 194.
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the fact remains that interpretation is structurally integral

,

to mystical experience and thus warrants further attention.-

4. Interpretation and Mystical Experience
By abstracting, organizing and presenting even a
sketch of a coherent metaphysics based upon the experiences
of the mystics, Hocking was clearly engaged in hermeneutics.
In calling attention in his magnum opus to the distinction
between the mystic's description of his experience as a psychological account and his metaphysical statements about the
nature of reality, he was similarly engaging in critical interpretation.2 While not prone to methodological discussions
for the most part, 3 Hocking felt strongly enough about the
need and place of interpretation with regard to mystical experience to devote explicit attention to it in several works.
Significantly, he urged in his magnum

~

that the mystics'

own interpretation, their "account," should be given sympa.thetic attention prior to any effort to re-interpret their
experience. He thus not only raised the issue of the place of
interpretation within mystical experience, but he also anti1

cf in this regard LeShan, Stace, Furse, Capra as \·Tell
as the article cited above by Bertrand Russell. While agreeing
neither with each other nor with the mystics themselves in
many respects, these authors testify to the simple fact that
mysticism contains at least the germ of a cosmology.
2

c£. MGHE. 352 - 53 and "MM" 43.

cf. however "Les principles de la m~thode en philosophie religieuse," Revue de l•:i.E!taphysique et de Morale, 29
(Oct.- Dec., 1922), pp. 431- 53.
3
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cipated Smart's distinction between "auto-in·terpretation"
and "hetero-interpretation ... l He wrote,
we shall not do well to impose at first our own language
upon the mystics. We must give ourselves over for the
time to their guidance, to their modes of expression,
and even -- so far as we can -- to their sentiments; realizing that they are laboring with conceptions not wholly literalized, and that we shali be able in due course
to win our own freedom and our own interpretation.2
Meaning and truth have their democratic aspects:

3

the

mystic will atempt to communicate his vision in order to corroborate, judge and evaluate it pragmatically. Should it
care to do so, society must therefore be able to interpret
it in turn. But the mystic himself is as much in need of interpretative skills in order to understand his own experiences as well as to (or rather, in order to) make them accessible to his community. For the meaning of his experience
may well be concealed in symbols, physical events or even
viaceral promptings that require patient efforts to understand.- In any event, all such experiences of God's presence
1 cf. Ninian Smart, .. Interpretation and Hystical Experience," loc. cit., pp. 78ff.
2
MGHE: 369. E-lsewhere he noted "~e must allow the mystic the first word in reporting, and also in interpreting,
his experience. But while he dwells upon its unique, superlative, indescribable aspects, psychology helps our understanding of that experience by finding what is ~ unique
about it, what analogies it has in more commonplace experiences, undertaking thereby both to describe and to explain
it." (MGHE 389.)
3 cf. "MS" 192.
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and purpose are mediated in some way and thus require interpretation.
Hocking was well aware that the relationship between
experience and interpretation was fraught with problems on
the level of both individual and social experience. For example, the alleged ineffability of mystical experience and
the subsequent hesitance of the mystic to endorse any positive predicates of the One

(d~spite

a propensity nevertheless

to do so) create an initial philosophical problem of classical proportions. 1 On the other hand, if the mystic's account
of his own experience and his hesitant description of what
he has encountered are extrinsic structures imposed upon his
2
experience, as Dewey proposed,
and thus lacks an intrinsic
connection with the experience itself, this would suggest a
radical discontinuity between experience and interpretation
which precludes any valid objective reference. Interpretation
on this understanding would represent merely what one recent
scholar of mysticism calls "superstructures" -- "considerations" which are "laid over" experience from outside

being

generated by belief-systems adhered to for a variety of nonrelated motives. 3 Such superstructures can easily be disengaged and discarded as excess baggage, especially those con1 cf. MGHE 142 - 43, "MS" 191. See above, pp. 277ff.
2
3

cf. Dewey, op. cit., pp. 35 - 38.
cf. Fritz Staal, op. cit., pp. 16lff.
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taining any metaphysical assertions, as Bertrand Russell re1
commended in his 1917 essay. Mystical experience would thus
be reduced to a description of various inner states of consciousness which can be described but have no necessary "external relations" with reality outside the mystic's own mind.
In this respect, Hocking came down unhesitatingly if
cautiously on the side of a mystical realism in which interpretation was part of experience and as a consequence objective references were not merely superimposed upon reports of
subjective _or "inner" events. For him mystical experience
was, after all, an extension of religious experience, both
of which have their roots in ordinary experience -- not only
in the F.ield grounding all experience, but in the concrete
events of history and in the particular development of individual persons. Such experience is integral, not riven into
separate realms which operate independently as "subjective"
states of consciousness and "objective" reality.

2

ence is intentional. It is experience of something

Experi~

some-

one met together in a common field of reference. Nevertheless,
as we have seen, Hocking distinguished interpretation from
experience.
As

diffe~ent,

interpretation and experience are relat-

ed as dialectical moments in a whole-part process which pro-

,-cf.

Ci t •

I

Russell, art. cit., p. 16 and Scharfstein, op.
PP • 3 I 16 9 •
2
Cf. TP 255, quoted above, p. 201.
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duces understanding or insight. But for Hocking, interpretation was not a separate kind of mental activity co-ordinate
with intuition and reason, as he felt that Royce was proposing, but an intermediate stage between them:
In his last series of Gifford Lectures, Professor Royce
defined "interpretation" as a method of knowledge taking
its place beside perception and conception (or, let us
say, beside intuition and reason) as a third type. This
is a suggestion of large promise: and its bearing upon
mystical knowledge will be immediately evident if we regard interpretation rather as a mode of transition between intuition and reason than as a co-ordinate form of
apprehension. Intuitions are not positions of stable
equilibrium: they must submit to interpretation. In being interpreted, they become conceptual systems, and subject to all the mortality to which rational defenses of
religion have alwys been exposed. But the destructive
criticism of any interpretation does not (on this understanding) do away with the cognitive side of religion,
as the critics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries too hastily assumed. It leaves standing two things:
the original intuition, which is irrefutable, and the
interpreting process, which is infinite. The mystic, on
this understanding, will not resign his certitude, from
which an entire world has taken courage: nor will. he, to
retain his certitude, evade the ordinary canons of judging truth.l
As a form of cognitive activity intermediate between
intuition and reason, interpretation for Hocking shared in
the characteristics of both to some degree. 2 -That_is, interpretation was not simply inferential, unless divorced from
the immediacy of direct apprehension. Although a rational activity, interpretation likewise possessed an inner connection
l"INR" 588 - 89. Cf. also 81 and "ORE." 61.
2 cf. "INR" 81 and "ORE,. 61.
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with the process of perception or apprehension, if only in
so far as all experience is mediated and mediation requires
interpretation.

1

Without the element of rational judgment,

however, interpretation shades into intuition.
Such a position was logical and indeed inevitable for
Hocking given his understanding of mediation. For interpretation functions as the subjective correlate of the objective function of mediation in experience. Hence experience
can be described operationally as interpreted mediation.
Needless perhaps to point out, interpretation and mediation
also include dimensions of experience beyond the immediate
subject-object relation. Interpretation is laden with structures funded by past experience: selective

attenti~n,

inter-

est, patterns of perception, biases, etc. Likewise, mediation brings with it a host of external relations, for every
object is situated in a context. Thus every interpretation
bears with it the latent history of an individual in a particular culture and behind every objective mediation lies
not only the intention of the mediating agent, but the full
character of the mediator or medium, including, ultimately,
the world-system as a whole.
1 c£. MGHE xxix, ewe 99. The immediacy of mystical experience does not constitute an exception for, as we have
seen, experiential immediacy precludes the possibility of
meaningful understanding. And thus "The immediacy of any experience must submit to interpretation by what is outside it
and related to it ... (MGHE 354.)
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It seems necessary here to advert to Hocking's distinction between levels or degrees of

''auto-interpretation~

in

that interpretation not only partakes of the immediacy of conscious experience by providing a structure for thought, but
represents as well a reflexive, conceptual scheme for further
cognitive activity: inference. In brief, interpretation is
part of the structure of experience but also distinguishable
from it and susceptible to modifications which do not change
the original intuition. That is to aay, further interpretations may well alter the understanding or meaning of an experience, e.g., a slap on the face, when new information is
acquired, such as the motives of the agent and the effect on
the recipient. The fact of the slap remains unaltered. Misrepresentation, while not inevitable, always remains possible
in experience because of the variable factors in interpretation. But interpretation always remains corrigible by further
interpretation. 1
As any connecting medium between minds may be construed as either transparent or opaque, permitting or obstructing communication, interpretation can likewise be
viewed as either a bridge across

o~

a barricade before the

psychological and metaphysical chasm between minds and be2
tween minds and reality. On one side of this issue stand the
realist and the

~objective

idealist~~';

on the other the skep-

1 c£. MGHE 66 and "INR" 588 - 89.
2 cf. MGHE. 266.
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tic and the subjective idealist, still imprisoned by the
"ego-centric predicament."
F 0 r Hocking the integral function of interpretation
as an element in mystical experience was to render the meaning present in the encounter available for understanding and
communication, both individually and socially. Despite the
fact that extraneous factors can enter into the interpretative process and to some extent always must, distorting or
enriching meaning, there remains a nucleus of "truth" in any
interpretation in which the factual character of the world
is accurately reflected. Thus, in the art of hermeneutics,
the primary condition for the attainment of truth is a moral
one:: the willingness to see what is there, to be "objective,"
to face the facts squarely and to render as honest an account
of them as possible.
The objectivity of mystical experience as a process
and the integral character of interpretation within it thus
become susceptible of "verification" by a comparative study
of mystical reports, not only of the paths proposed but also
1
of the character of the goal attained. Actual widespread
consensus among the mystics of E.ast and I.Yest, including mem1 "The position of mankind toward the whole wonderful
history of mysticism would be vastly improved if attention
were given to the extent to which the reports of the great
mystics corroborate one another and indicate a common nature
in the paths proposed; and it were further shown how deeply
the more extraordinary varieties of mystical experience are
akin to very normal and, indeed, inescapable experiences of
men everywhere." ("HS" 201.)

,

i,II'"
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bers of various traditions, cultures and periods, might not
prove the mystic-realist's case beyond a reasonable doubt,
but it would at least pose a serious problem for the skeptic
and the reductionist. Whence comes the agreement? Why are
the evinced structures of consciousness and the character of
the reality experienced so similarly elaborated?
Summarily, interpretation is a structural element of
the process by which nuclear experience is explicitated in
mysticism. All experience is mediated -- by ideas of Nature,
Self and the social Other. As the subjective correlate of
mediation, interpretation is a meaning-giving process of
thought, corresponding to the objective aspect, the selfrevelation to us by God through the mediation of the World
and the Self. To put it differently, no experience, including mystical experience, is "finished" until it reaches the
level of interpretation (or at least the first level of interpretation, here excluding inference) and is confirmed in
action.
Thus, as Smart proposes, there are many levels of interpretation which are more or less integral to the act of
experiencing as such. These range from the minimal structuring of recognition, which conditions the possibility of having a truly conscious experience at all,

1

to reflection in

1 cf. in this regard Roland Fischer, art. cit., p. 899:
"experience can be said to consist of two processes: the programmed (subcortical) CNS [ Central Nervous System] activity;

I

I
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the sense of immediate inference based on direct presence,
to the abstraction or remotion of conceptual analysis in
which all objective immediacy has been lost or never occurred, e.g., acts of pure fantasy. Only the first level of
interpretation is an intrinsic part of experience, supplying
the relatedness necessary for that mediation without which
only pure immediacy and therefore no conscious experience
would prevail.

s.

Conclusion: The Mystical Dialectic
The dynamic structure of mystical experience in indi-

vidual history is, then, the process by which the fundamental and immediate structure of ali experience is raised to
further consciousness by an interpretative shift of attention away from the details of everyday life toward the Whole
of life. It reveals the presence thereby of God as the Field
of experience mediated by the S-elf, Nature and Society. Fr9m
a social perspective, this dynamic is an intrinsic moment in
a process of withdrawal from and return to social interaction,
both in the lives of individuals and in the history of peeples. The shifts of attention involved in contemplative meditation and the withdrawal from and return to society are
both governed by the principle or "law" of alternation which
describes the dialectical movement by which a system advances
and the symbolic or perceptual-behavioral (cortical) interpretation, or metaprograms, of the CNs· activity."

292

bY reciprocating activity and passivity, that is, by exten- .
sion and reflexion (excursion and reflection).
As a more or less self-regulating system of social interaction, mysticism does not terminate in a burst of activity, but continues the dialectical alternation of action and
contemplation both in the life of the mystic and to a limited extent in the history of religions. Here, however, the
analogy between individuals and religious traditions tends
to be weak; the social history of mystical withdrawal and
prophetic action in Hinduism and Christianity, for example,
is much harder to trace than the ebb and flow of contemplation and action in the life of a mystic such as Gandhi or
Hammarskjold.
There are other problems worth noting in Hocking's
treatment. His portrayal of the historical development of re- ligion, especially the emergence of the prophetic consciousness in Christianity, tended as we have seen to rely heavily
upon large, general strokes of characterization, almost of
caricature. He likewise smoothed over the factual wrinkles
and scrubby details that admittedly and confusingly obscure
the contours of history. Further, his occasional tendency to
exemplify an entire religion historicalLy in terms of a specific characteristic, such as the Absolute-mysticism of India
and the prophetic consciousness of Christianity, represents,
I believe, a regression to an interpretation of religious
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lution unacceptable by more modern standards of evaluation.

1

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the evolution and. character of religions are more complex and various than Hocking
might have suggested, the historian of religion still often
employs a dialectical model which accomodates the tension of
action and contemplation without resorting to a strict typology encompassing the "character" of an entire religion.
Moreover, Hocking's description of types of religious experience have been widely and favorably cited among scholars of
religion in this regard, both in terms of the action-contemplation dialectic as well as of the universal-particular polarity.2

1 cf. for example GL Dec. 10, 1938 and "HA" 433ff. For
an instance of a more complex approach to religions based on
linguistic structures and "logical strands" of doctrinal development, cf. Ninian Smart, Reasons and Faiths, op. cit.
2
cf. Joachim Wach, Types of Religious Experience, op.
cit., pp. 17 - 32; The Comparative Study of Religions,
Joseph M. Kitagawa, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1958), pp. 68, 84. Cf. also the articles by Kitagawa and
Long in ~ History of Religions: Essays 2n ~ Problem of
Understanding, Joseph M. Kitagawa, ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967).

III. THE

FUNCTIOl~

AND VALUE Or, NYSTICAL EXPERIENCE

One of the principal advances of Hocking's approach
to mysticism was placing it and assessing it in its social
context, as James had suggested but had not carried out.

1

Like James, Hocking evaluated the effects of mysticism on
the individual, but he also realized that to the degree
that society is constituted by the interactions and relations of individuals well or ill-equipped to promote the
common welfare, a social dimension of mysticism is not only
entailed but acquires a special significance and importance.
The criterwn Hocking employed in gauging the social
function, value and therefore meaning of mysticism were similar to those of James: whether mysticism actually promoted
2
social well-being. That is, the ability of society's members to live well in a difficult natural and social environment, meeting the challenges and risks of daily life as well
as furthering the highest ideals and goals of the race, such
as the appreciation of human dignity, the worth of life,
beauty, moral excellence, social harmony and co-operation.
1. Individual Functions and Values
The mystic's withdrawal from society, his period of
negation in which social ties are severed and social values
1

c£.

James, op. cit., p. 35.
2
.
Ibid., pp. 308, 326.
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apparently rejected, would invite an equally negative judgment on the worth of mysticism if that were all there were
to the mystical path. However, history shows clearly enough
that, despite exceptions to the contrary,

1

at least the

greater mystics were far from social liabilities. The social
study of mysticism also shows that the mystic's negative
path is completed by a positive turn back to the world.
With regard to the individual, the overall social
function of mysticism requires alternating phases -- both
negative and positive -- to accomplish its purpose: integration, independence, originality and growth. (It is important
to note that Hocking was describing the ideal function of
mysticism based, to be sure, on concrete historical facts as
well as on real tendencies present in all true mysticism. He
was not merely idealizing mysticism in the sense of projecting a utopian situation or indulging in wishful thinking.)
i. Individual Integration
Many positive values of mysticism are embodied in
those »negative" functions grouped under the general category of renunciation,

~hat

is, those of the "nagative path."

As we have seen, the effect of these activities is positive
1

c£. MGHE. 459, where Hocking adverts to the countervalues of mystical enthusiasm. For a detailed study of the
social dysfunctions of some forms of mysticism, cf. Ronald
Knox; Enthusiasm (New York: Galaxy Books, 1961) and Norman
Cohn, The Pursuit of !h! Millenium (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).
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__ detachment aims at re-attachment, disengagement aims at
re-engagement and withdrawal aims at return. But a difference has been made by the specific function of negation.
Hocking generally referred to this function as "breaking
down" or .. through" habitual modes of perception and behavior.

1

Detachment from reliance on a single set of sociallydetermined and sanctioned patterns of perception and behavior enables the individual to acquire greater psychological
independence from society. His viewpoint is to some extent
(if never totally) "decentered, 11 enabling him to recognize
social norms more readily and to evaluate them as well as
the institutions which emobody and perpetuate them. The mystic thus enjoys greater freedom to see, judge and act.

2

This

freedom is reinforced by an assurance of self-worth and hope.
The mystic's vision is clarified with respect to the
facts of experience. By "cleansing the doors of perception,"
he gains and communicates "a recovered sense of proportion,"
a "sense of the whole."

5

He "renews the ever-ebbing values

of the daily task by restoring the amplitude of horizon to
6
the detail of living." He achieves a new awareness of the
values of things.

7

He is more sensitive than before to their

1

cf.

MGHE 364, 570: TP 318, 274:

2

cf.

MGHE 440, SBF 173, TF 274.

ewe

3cf. MGHE 451, SBF 173.
4
5
cwc 140.
TP 274.
6
7
MIHE 163.
Cf. TP 274.

138.

4

3
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individual qualities and their goodness.

1

But he is also more

objective -- he sees things as they are, he

~faces

facts,~

thus contributing to the development of science and art.

2

This occurs in three major areas:"First of all, the power of
plain scientific observations" or objectivity."

3

chief conditions of truth-getting are moral •••• "

For "the

4 This in-

eludes "simplicity and open-mindedness, 11 the "love of the
thing."

5

Second, "the mystic recovers the power to appreci-

ate facts of the qualities 2£ things, achieving a new innocence o f

th e senses.... "

6

Th'~rd , "he acquires or recovers

the power to face the facts of social intercourse, and thus
7
to extend his capacity for friendship." The mystic widens
and deepens the scope of experience itself by the negative
discipiine of renouncing conceptual knowledge as a means
whereby to attain union with the Absolute, restoring feeling
8
and will to their rightful place. He has a renewed appreci1

e£. TP 275, 314;

e~ie.

138.

2

e£. TP. 274, 320. The interrelationships between mysticism, science and art constitute a theme running through
most of Hocking's writings; cf. MGHE 513, "LRT" 43, SIG 113,
"ORE" 63, .. BIC 11 281, ewe 139.
3

4
5
6

7
8

TP 274.

Ibid.
Ibid.
TP 275.

Ibid.
c£. MGHE 451; HNR 410£.; "RF" 365; TP 318; "SSP" 397;
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ation of the positive role the body plays_ in the spiritual
life.
Morally, the negative path sensitizes the mystic's
conscience; he is better able to perceive both justice and
injustice.

1

His ability to face the facts of social inter-

course also increase his capacity for friendship and love.

2

ii. Individual Growth
Growth and development constitute the most positive
phase of the dialectical process of the mystic along his
path toward full individuality. Having endured the systematic disintegration of his artificial self and its world
(i.e., both Weltanschauung and Weltbilt), and successfully
having reintegrated them in the light of his deeper insight
into the religious foundations of social existence, he returns to society a "new man." His creative capacity has been
enlarged as a result of the greater freedom he enjoys with
regard to perception, evaluation and action. His refusal to
declare adequate and therefore closed the stock of concepts
culturally available to describe experience renders him uniquely open to future experience.
"HS" 188; MIHE 127.
1
2
3

cf. TP 272; HS 429.
cf. T.P 275, CHC 101.
cf. "SSP" 397.

3

The prophetic aspect of

299

"realized" mysticism, its directly social relevance, is characterized by innovation, creativity and originality as the
positive aspects of dissent and reform: "The vital function
of mysticism is origination, the creation of novelty."

1

What

the mystic discerns to be lacking in society, the prophet
2
can and will create, if need be.
2. Social Functions and Values
The individual contributions, values and therefore
meanings revealed by the actions of the mystic-prophet accrue
of course to society because he is a social being. But there
are also particular social values which mysticism as such
contributes to society. Hocking did not claim that only mysticism can make these or more individua1ized contributions.
Rather, the mystic realizes in a distinctive manner what
many other members of society also value and strive to effeet.
As in the case of the individual mystic, the social
body is affected in areas which can similarly be divided into
integrity and growth, i.e., social cohesion and progress.
Again, this description is characteristic of the positive
tendencies present in mysticism and actualized more or less
evidently in history. It does not refer as such to specific
l"MM" 54 •
2
Cf. TP 273.
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episodes.
·
l.e

Social Cohesion
By gathering a band of disciples around himself, the

mystic inaugurates a movement potentially capable of reorganizing society completely.

1

For the values expressed by the

mystic are the deepest values, the ideals, of the social
group to which he belongs, purged, however, of customary excresences and raised to a new level of awareness. The mystic
thus "reminds" society of its truest and deepest character.
This "conservative" function of mysticism is expressed negatively as a critique of institutions, laws and customs
society's "habits." The purpose of this critique is construetive: the recapturing of the original purpose of these institutions, laws and customs in the lives of the people they
are meant to serve.

The mystic as prophet brings society

back to its original values by calling for and even instituting

reforms. More positively yet, the mystic increases so-

cial cohesion by providing for society what society cannot
provide for itself: morale, the will to co-operate.
Co-operation is achieved in part by a "meeting of the
minds" on both a civil and a religious plane of social encounter. Historically, mystics have been pre-eminent peacemakers, often at the cost of initial and even lasting con1

cf. MGHE 518ff.
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flict.

1

No less is this the case in the distinctively reli-

gious sphere, where even in originating new movements and
sects, the mystics have not only tended to preach universal
brotherhood but generally have attempted to practice it.
They have sometimes united whole cultures and civilizations
in their embracing outreach, e.g., the Buddha, Jesus, Francis
of Assisi, George Fox, Ramakrishna and Gandhi. The ecumenical impetus of the coming world faith, Hocking proposed,
will also be a mystical contribution, both among Christians
but also between Eastern and Western religions.

2

ii. Progress
Finally, the "liberal," even revolutionary impetus
of the mystic-in-action is realized in the form of social
progress as a function of creative innovation. The mystic
often tends to anticipate the direction of social growth,
acting as both a spur and a guide, creating a way where
there seemed to be none: "the religious will tends to cre3
ate the conditions for its own success."
1

cf. "INR" 573 - 77; MS 426 - 27•, TP 275·, "Foreword , "
Mukerjee, op. cit., p. vii; CWC 141. Catherine of Siena,
Gandhi and Dag Hammarskjold immediately come to mind in
this regard.
2
cf. "MS" 190f.; ewe 141 and LRWF passim. For concrete examples, one need only think of Thomas Merton,
Mother Teresa of Calcutta, Vivekananda, D. s. Suzuki, the
Maharishi Mahesh Yogi and other "missionaries 11 of both East
and West.
3

MGHE 517. Cf. 518: The prophet

"must~ in the
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3. Conclusion
By this evaluation, Hocking obviously identified mysticism and religion functionally in terms of their own social consequences.

1

This is but another way of indicating

that for him mysticism was a fuller expression of the religious impulse, not a distinctively different kind of experience.
As idea, the meaning of mysticism is revealed in the
dynamic structure of nuclear experience as it is explicated
by a social dialectic of individuation:

the mystic's with-

dra.wal, purgation, integration and creative return to the
World

a process wherein God, heretofore hidden as the

Field of all experience and the aboriginal partner in dialogue, becomes manifest as the intimate companion along
life's way-- both that of the individual and of the race.
The personal revelation of God as the "intimate, infallible
associate, present in all experience"

2

and guiding the

course of history but with whom fully conscious union is
possible, is thus the essential meaning of mysticism.
current of history ~ unity ~responding to the unity of
physical universe, £E else he must create it. And what
I want to point out is that it is just such a conscious
unification of history that the religious will spontaneously tends to bring about ... Cf. also 519ff.

~

1

See above, pp. 171- 75.

2
MGHE 224.
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As function, the meaning of mysticism is the achievement of individual and social integrity and development, the
creation of a world community founded on universal peace,
love and justice by means of union with God and its effects,
the "unification of history" among them.

1

Viewed socially,

the specific religious purpose and value of mysticism is the
renewal of the vital spirit in religious and therefore of
all social life. For over time, as we have noted, institutionalized religion tends to lose its vigor, its ability to
relate men to God experientially and meaningfully. Hardened
by custom, law and doctrinal conservatism, it no longer
touches the hearts of ordinary people. Mystical movements,
conversely, are those which precisely claim to relate men
directly to God, that is, in immediate experience. Hence, as
a function of religion, mysticism serves to break through
the encrusted forms stifling the religious impulse by means
of its critique of institutions, its call to personal experience, its recovery of values and its creative development of the historical traditions.
Hocking•s exploration of the meaning and structure
of religion and mysticism supports their functional identification in terms of their progressive realization of ultimate values. In this respect, mysticism is not only continuous with religion but its inner meaning and fullest mani-

1

cf.

MGHE 515 - 24; LRWF 266f.; CWC 184.
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festation. With this conclusion, we turn to the specific
theses which this study is concerned to defend.

IV. THE MEANING AND STRUCTURE OF MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE
According to the preceding analysis of Hocking's writings, the central dialectic of mystical experience is the
transition from the implicit dimension of nuclear experience,
the I-It-Thou relationship with its divine field of reference which undergirds all human experience, to the explicit
dimension of developed mystical consciousness and its expression in prophetic activity. In this dialectical movement,
God becomes consciously present in ever greater intimacy,
even to the limit of felt communion with the human spirit.
The dialectical transition is accomplished during the interval between social withdrawal and return. At that point, the
common experience of worship, whether latent in the waking
of the mind to truth, goodness, beauty and love, or manifest
in prayer and religious ritual, becomes deepened, clarified
and enriched by the discipline of renunciation and meditation. The realization of affective union with God then expresses itself socially in activity. That is, the unitive dimension of mystical experience tends toward diffusion to
others by teaching, example and direct social intervention.
Further, prophetic action and mystical contemplation continue to alternate in the mystic's life in an on-going dialectical process, enabling him to meet new situations creatively while preserving the highest ideals of the past.
305
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This idealized and somewhat abstract schematization
points to the overall character of mystical experience as a
process within a social context. It is, in sum, a self-regulating and open system of transformations by which civil and
religious life is revitalized on both an individual and collective level. From this perspective, it is possible to develop the argument of this dissertation in a series of connected theses b.ased on the foregoing structural and functional analysis and systematic reconstruction of Hocking's teachings.
The whole thrust of Hocking's thought was aimed at
establishing the essential social relevance of mysticism,
which he did, I believe, by showing that (1) developed mysticism is rooted in and the explicitation of the fundamental
intersubjective relation which grounds all experience

~

so-

cial {i.e., nuclear experience), and (2) that mysticism not
only arises in a social situation but incorporates as a
structural element a social dimension in the form of prophetic action.
With regard to the first part of this proposition,
Hocking argued that if experience is ever truly social, it
is always social. That is, experience is intersubjective in
origin as well as social in its effects. The principle underpinning this argument is, as we have noted before, the
classical axiom actus prior~ potentia. 1 Mysticism is that
1

see above, pp.S2£HOcking's statement of this prin-
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manifestation of the religious dimension of primordial intersubjectivity, the I-Thou dialogue with God grounding the possibility of consciousness, which comes to later awareness as
the sense of the presence of God disclosed through the manifold media of Self, Nature and Society. The same reasoning
holds here: if experience is ever mystical, it is always mystical. That is to say, if God is ever found within human experience, it is because in some way he was already there.
Various "degrees" of consciousness of that presence are possible, including a heightened form which human effort alone
can never fully actualize. Thus the possibility of the free
gift of grace is left open. However, the native and radical
capacity for union with God is disclosed by this token as a
characteristic of the human person as such; grace, as the
ancient theology insisted, does not destroy nature but perfects it. Further, this radical capacity for union with God
provides the logical basis for Hocking's thesis that all
persons are at least latent mystics and hence that all mystical experience is "ordinary."
Moreover, just as all experience is radically social,
i.e., an interpersonal transaction, so also it is social in
its expression. In the scope of actual life considered in
its integrity there is no purely private and subjective exciple is found in MGHE 274 - 78 •

•
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?erience. Thus mysticism, the epitome of solitary experience,

is in fact "the redemption of solitude,"

1

finding its natu-

ral outgrowth in social activity. (The classical axiom operative here would appear to be agere sequitur esse

what is,

for instance, social in principle will be social in expression.)
Both arms of this case have empirical minor premises:
the fact of social experience in the first instance and the
fact of mystical experience in the second. What Hocking
needed to clarify perhaps more than he did was the difference between social experience and intersubjective experience. As he used the term, social experience is clearly a
wider notion and empirically subsequent: actual social experience is a development of radical intersubjectivity.
Briefly, intersubjective as a quality of experience refers
to the "I-Thou" awareness (or at least a dim version of it)
a more or less direct and immediate but not necessarily
reflective apprehension of the Other as "Thou." Social, on
the other hand, includes some reference to the totality of
human relationships in society, including the I-It relationships which refer to other persons indicatively. The syntactical difference here points to the distinction between social experience as a function of one dimension of the nuclear triad (Self-World) and true intersubjective experi1 cf. MGHE 404, etc.
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ence (Self-Thou). Social experience also connotes, contextually, the quality of experience as determined or influenced
by institutions, customs, values, goals, etc. which reflect
human interactions in a remoter sense.
Thus not all social experience is intersubjective,
but all intersubjective experience is social. Nevertheless,
and more importantly, the possibility of any social experience in the broader sense is dependent upon the prior fact
of a special mode of intersubjectivity. The consubjective
"we-consciousness" constituting true community on whatever
level is the condition necessary for the emergence of society both in the history of the race and in the life-history
of each person. Hocking's distinctive contribution in articulating the concept of intersubjectivity, as noted by Harcel,1 is that there is an intersubjective ground necessary
as the condition for the first instance of human "I-Thou"
relationships. This is the relationship between the Self and
the divine Field of experience, the "intersubjective Thouart" which establishes the possibility of any and therefore
of all communication. All experience is therefore both theistic -- related to God as its ground, and dialogical -- a
dialogue with God as Thou. Hence also the characterization
of mystical experience as an extension of the ordinary act
of worship.
1 Marcel, "Solipsism Surmounted," PRCWC 23 - 31.
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Other theses flow from Hocking's main contention,
i.e., that mysticism has an integral, social (intersubjective) dimension, raised to explicit consciousness from a
primordial but dim apprehension of God's presence in the
depths of the Self and the World.
First, God can be both directly and immediately experienced in mystical encounter even though all experience
is mediated. For immediacy as existential space-time proximity is not antagonistic to mediation by idea or feeling.
Thus God could be immediately and directly present, for instance, in the burning bush without being the bush. God can

..

be no less present in the consciousness of one's own psyche
or in experiences of Nature or in the awareness of social
obligations, love, etc. "Natural" religion is therefore not
only possible, but the prior condition for the possibility
1
of revealed or "supernatural 11 religion. That is to say,
the religious capacity must be present in the World as well
as in the Self before explicit consciousness of God can becqme meaningful. This capacity is the radical presence of
God in the depths of the human Self and also in the structures of the World, including the social world. All mediation, as a form of communication, presupposes a common
field of reference.
Second, if mysticism can accurately be described as

1

e£.

MGHE 390 - 91,

ewe

99ff.
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the development of nuclear experience by means of the interpretation of the various media of God's self-disclosure,
then mystical experience cannot be intrinsically extraordinary, as Rouner, for instance, occasionally asserts.

1

As ar-

gued by Hocking, mystical experience has precisely this origin as the basis of its manifest forms. In fact, all manifest experience is rooted in the manifold, grounded I-ThouIt relationship. Extraordinary instances of mystical experience, that is, unusually intensified or otherwise exceptional states of God-consciousness, serve mainly to point out
the triadic and mystical dimensions of ordinary experience. 2
In stressing this

point~

Hocking found himself in accord

1 But not consistently. Thus: " ••• the experience of
the classical mystics of whatever religion is extraordinary,
and the whole point of Hocking's 'mysticism' is precisely
its ordinariness. It is the basic, common experience of everyman to which he appeals." (Rouner, HHE 242.) "Hocking's
appeal," he adds (ibid.), "is not to some esoteric, specialized mystic vision. 11 However, in earlier treating of James'
influence on Hocking, he wrote, "The religious experience
of the mystics ••• is therefore not to be regarded as an aberration, radically distinguished from the religion of Everyman. It is rather the 'original source' of ordinary, conventional religion." (Ibid., p. 23.) Hocking, he went on, argued "that the 'true mystic' is the one most acutely aware
of the 'original sources• of Everyman's knowledge of God."
(Ibid. Cf. also pp. 123, 242, 302.) If Rouner means by extraordinary merely "most acutely aware," then his characterization of mysticism as estraordinary in intensity is accurate enough if somewhat misleading. To pit that against Hocking's "ordinary" mysticism is, however, erroneous. If Rouner
means "of a different kind, 11 then he is plainly at odds with
Hocking. It seems to me that Rouner in fact uses the term
in both senses somewhat indifferently, thus rendering his
argument at least ambiguous.
2

C£. MIHE 216.
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with the major trend of Western and many Eastern traditions
for which raptures, ecstacies, visions and the panoply of
strange physical and mental phenomena commonly associated
with mysticism are considered to be of little value if not
downright harmful.
Third, and for the same reasons, every human person
is potentially a mystic, for God is always present in human
experience.

1

The media of God's self-disclosure are the com-

mon inheritance of the race: self-consciousness, the World.
of Nature and Society, and especially felt obligation and
love.

More specifically, the "occasions" of mystical experi-

ence, even in

11

extraordinary" cases, are found in fact to be

both ordinary and common, such as friendship, music, prayer,
sickness, bereavement, flowers, animals, the sea. All experience thus has a mystical dimension or capacity. Further, every person has the ability to develop that native capacity
given the will and the opportunity to do so. Accordingly,
mysticism can only be incidentally elitest and esoteric. History shows that, in fact, most·mystical movements were wide2
ly catholic.
Fourth, in so far as nuclear experience comes to full
awareness in the common experience of worship as an explicit
dialogue with God (which can be mediated in any number of
ways), mystical awareness is an extension of ordinary reli-

1
2

ef. MGHE 402ff., ewe 73.
ef. MGHE 398, nMS" 189.
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gious experience, differing in degree rather than kind. For
worship is not only the chief act of religion, the explicitation of the personal bond between the Self and God as
"Thou," it is also the basis of mystical experience in its
implicit form, as we have seen. That worship involves a dialogical relationship with God should be evident from considering any basic definition of prayer, such as "the raising
of the mind and heart to God.'* That mysticism is a heightened
form of worship should also be clear inasmuch as the objective of the mystic's quest is communion or even union with
God, that is, transcending the objective consciousness of
the Self in an intersubjective experience of personal immediacy and intimacy, possibly eventuating in the undifferentiated consciousness of consubjectivity. 1
This conclusion implies that all mysticism is fundamentally religious. The explicitation of the religious dimansion of experience is a social contingency, however. That
is, it is dependent upon culturally available and personally
acceptable categories of interpretation. Thus, a given interpretation of mystical experience, influenced by social ''pressure" or personal decision regarding, for instance, the antecedent improbability of the existence of God, may well eventuate in a form of "atheistic" mystical experience. Such
1

In this regard, Hocking directed a new generation of
readers to the works of his younger contemporary, Martin
Buber. (Cf. MGHE xiii.)
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forms have been defended by philosophers such as Stace,
Russell, Huxley, Scharfstein and others, as we have seen.
For Hocking, however, such an interpretation, while
deserving respect, need not be definitive. For as contingent,
all interpretation is corrigible, although the "original intuition" remains unaltered as a fact. 1 From his metaphysical
viewpoint of mystical experience as the explicitation of the
encounter between God, the Self and the World in nuclear experience, there is no room for non-religious mysticism. But
from an empirical viewpoint and especially by conceding to
the mystic the first word in interpreting his experience,

2

Hocking would seemingly leave open the possibility of nonreligious interpretation of mystical experience. This he
does by adverting to the "dimness" of the perception of God
in our on-going experience. The "God" encountered in such experiences may be anonymous, that is, unrecognized in religious terms, but does not thereby cease to be God.
Given Hocking's fundamental position regarding the
structure of experience, then all mystical experience, indeed all experience, remains an implicit encounter with God,
whether brought to consciousness as such by the mediation of
religious concepts and symbols or not. 3 Thus while not all
lCf. "INR" 588f.
2C£. MGHE 369, 389.
3Cf. "MSu 189.
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mystical experience nor mysticism need be explicitly religious, both remain structurally theistic and thereby implicitly religious.
Having established the cogency of Hocking's argument
for the social character of mysticism as a common and ordinary dimension of human experience, we can now turn in concluding this study to the question of Hocking's own mystical
status. In the light of his analysis of the meaning and
structure of mystical experience, we shall also evaluate
his teachings on mysticism with respect to contemporaneous
criticisms and ether, more recent investigations of mystical experience.

il~

II

CHAPTER IV

i
1[
I

HOCKING RECONSIDERED: AN EXPERIMENTAL FAITH
Having considered Hocking's teachings on mystical experience by analyzing its characteristics, elements, structure, meaning and value, two questions remain for us to consider: whether Hocking was a mystic himself and whether he
was correct in his appraisal of mysticism, that is, whether
his concept was at variance with the received notion of mystical experience as Rouner implies.
C0 nsequently, in this chapter I shall evaluate Hocking's major theses as I have articulated them in terms of
his own status as a mystic, other contemporaneous views of
mysticism, critical objections and a representative selection of more recent investigations. It is my contention that
Hocking was a mystic and that his philosophy was substantially mystical. Further, his views on mysticism, while deficient in some respects, nevertheless possess considerable classical as well as modern support. Moreover, I believe that
Hocking not only recovered the classical Western concept of
mysticism but also anticipated many later "discoveries." As
a consequence, his dynamic model of mystical experience represents a valuable instrument for organizing past findings
and directing future explorations into the field of mystical
experience and mysticism.
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I. HAS HOCKING A MYSTIC?
As noted earlier, denials that Hocking was a mystic
and that his philosophy was in any substantial sense mystical have been issued by various commentators. 1 )•Jhile somewhat tangential to the central argument of this dissertation,
these denials are nevertheless relevant for they implicitly
challenge the adequacy of Hocking's understanding of mysticism, his self-understanding, and his understanding of the
intention and character of his life's work.
Against these views, I contend that Hocking was indeed a mystic according to his own definition and by his
virtual admission. Further, Hocking should be considered a
mystic on the basis of the experiences he related as significant in his own life as well as in regard to his teachings.
The latter, as

X

shall substantiate, incorporate important

elements he identified as mystical and conform in major respects to mystical teachings identified by other investigators.
Among recent commentators denying Hocking's mysticism,
Hal Bridges simply dismisses the issue on the basis of an
alleged cognitive bias.

2

However, he fails to provide even

minimal grounds for his claim. Consequently, given Hocking's
emphasis on feeling as the "most important element in experi1 see above, pp. 8ff.
2
cf. Bridges, op. cit., p. 7.
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ence," 1 and his explicit rejection of the adequacy of conceptual knowledge in the apprehensivn of God, Bridges' claim
can be dismissed as beside the point. Leroy

s.

Rouner, while

not in doubt that Hocking's philosophy included a great many
references to mysticism, also denies, if as we have seen
somewhat ambiguously, that Hocking himself was a mystic or
that the mystical element in his philosophy wa-s more than
incidental.

2

For although able to admit that Hocking could

be called a mystic in some sense,

3

Rouner claims that it is

not the ordinary sense, which is to say as extraordinary.
Here, clearly employing a concept of mystical experience at
variance with Hocking's, he writes (cleaving mysticism from
prophecy) that
The mystic is a key figure in the dramatis personae of
[Hocking's] religious dialectic-- along~ the prophet. The mystic is, if anything, even more important
to his philosophy of history, for it is the mystic who
best apprehends the emerging elements of world faith.
Hocking himself had one or two experiences of extrasensory perception, and he did indeed have a good old-fashioned conversion experience when he was a boy. But the
experience of the classical mystics of whatever religion

1 LRWF 48. Cf. MGHE 64 - 72, 137.
2 see above, pp. 8ff., 311.
3

cf. Rouner, WHE 51- 52: "In spite of his 'mysticism,'
or perhaps because of it, the thrust of Hocking's meaning is
always toward the specific and the concrete." In his dissertation, Rouner was less equivocal about Hocking's mystical
status: "If I labor the significance of prophecy in his
thought it is because I think it is easily missed in concentrating too exclusively on the fact that Hocking is a mystic." (Op. cit., p. 105.)
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is extraordinary, and the whole point of Hocking's 'mysticism' is precisely its ordinariness. It is the basic,
common experience of everyman to which he appeals.l
Claiming {but without substantiation) that Hocking's
interest in mysticism was not intrinsic to his philosophy,
Rouner goes on to question whether he was a mystic at all:
Despite the fact that Hocking has written a great deal
about mysticism there is no developed mysticism in his
own philosophy. I think Hocking had moments when he
would have liked to have been a mystic; those times in
his own experience when insight became a "searing flame"
helped him appreciate mysticism as "a momentous thing."
But he remains an outsider to the mystic vision.2
As noted before, Rouner's argument is at least ambiguous. For in order ultimately to claim Hocking as "a Methodist, not a mystic,"

3

he is forced to fall back on a concept

of mysticism explicitly rejected by Hocking. That is, Rouner
believes classical mysticism to be essentially extraordinary
and an elite

~

of religious experience opposed to the

common experience of everyman. He thus misses the whole
point of Hocking's teaching on mysticism with regard to the
1 Rouner, \ffiE 241 - 42; emphasis added. He continues,
"Hocking's appeal is not to some esoteric, specialized mystic vision. His appeal is simply to what we really see in
our first wide open look, before we start narrowing down to
our own specialized corner of the field." (Ibid., p. 243.)
Rouner seems not to have perceived that Hocking saw his "reconception" of mysticism not in radical discontinuity from
the classical tradition, but as a development of it. For
Hocking, classical mysticism is the basic, common experience
of everyman, focused and concentrated.
2
Rouner, WHE 242.
3

Ibid.
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very ordinary media of God's felt presence in beauty, both
in Nature and as culturally embodied in music and art:
Hocking wants a religious sensitivity which feeds its
vitality into the workings of the world. He wants men
like Dag Hammarskjold who work at day in the frenzy of
the U.N. and chart their Markings in the still of the
night. But when Hocking's own telephone was stilled and
the visiting delegation departed, he was not usually to
be found in his closet at prayer, or recording an intensely spiritual journey. One might have found him listening to Tchaikovsky, or watching the last touch of the
sun on the peak of Mt. Washington: but he was usually in
his study philosophizing on what it all meant. It is misleading to call this 'mysticism.•!
It is difficult to grasp the intent of Rouner's conclusion here, much less follow it, given Hocking's great emphasis on the mystics' quest for meaning. Two of his own
most important works, both dealing with mysticism, contain
the word "meaning" in their titles. In so far as the mystic
is a philosopher, his whole enterprise can be seen as a
quest for the meaning of God and of human life. For Hocking
himself, mysticism was undoubtedly a philosophy, as noted
before.

2

Some of the greatest mystics were philosophers,

endlessly seeking to discover "what it all meant"-- Plotinus,
Augustine, Eckhart, Spinoza, the Cambridge Platonists, Nicolas of Cusa, Jonathan Edwards, Goethe, Novalis, Schelling,
Emerson and Rufus Jones among them. Hocking himself possessed
at an early age what he called

11

the mystic's sense of the

1 Rouner, WHE 244.
2
Cf. TP 255, cited above, p. 186.
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.
..1
unJ.verse.

The meaning sought by the mystic is not

abstr~ct,

how-

ever. It is concrete, religious and primarily expressed in
action, not concepts. Moreover, meaning is often conveyed by
the ordinary media of Nature and Society, in truth, beauty,
2
and goodness found in pleasure, art, music and friendship.
It is far from misleading to call such a quest mystical.
Rouner nowhere explains

~

it should be misleading

to call such an experience of natural beauty, music or the
quest for meaning "mystical." Hocking himself, further, had
expressly taught that such media were capable of communicating the very presence of God. 3 Finally, inasmuch as Hocking
had consistently identified mysticism with the quest for
meaning in the whole of experience, it is difficult to see
Rouner's concept of mysticism other than as embodying the
historical misunderstanding Hocking had endeavored to ccrrect.4
In brief, Rouner's assertions are warranted neither
by the facts of Hocking's own experience nor by his teaching
l"SSP"' 388.
2

ef. MGHE 418, 422; ewe 101, 138f. For some major references on meaning and mysticism, cf. MGHE 97, 362, 388,
428, 452, 460; TP 56, 62, lOOf., 116, 132, 262, 314; ewe 23,
99, 122n., and MIHE 96, 97, 98, 159 and 162.
3

4

See above, pp. 210ff., 216f., 234, 282 and 291.
cf. TP 314, MIHE 159.
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as noted by Rouner

himself~

In fact, the very evidence

Rouner marshalls against Hocking 1 s mysticism-- his love of
nature, music, art and philosophy -- strengthens the case
for it, as I shall substantiate more specifically. Moreover,
on the basis of Hocking's own testimony, the conclusion is
evident that according to his own criteria and somewhat reticent admission, he was not only a mystic but that his metaphysics was substantially mystical as well.
To begin with, unlike William James, Hocking never
denied that he was a mystic. Coupled with a somewhat periphrastic admission that he indeed was a mystic, this non-denial assumes greater positive force. In a revealing comment
from the 1963 preface to his magnum opus, Hocking referred
to his two-fold philosophical agenda in highly personal terms:
Modernity completely failed to resolve the dilemma of
"solipsism 1' : and with its inability to find an experience of other selves would follow its deeper inability
to find an experience of God~ I had for some time been
of the belief that these barriers could be surmounted
and that they would fall together. In my own experience
they did; this book is to that extent autobiographical.!
Given the impo.rtance Hocking immediately and pervasively attached to mystical experience in his major work, this reference assumes greater significance.
In similar fashion, virtually the opening lines of
"Some Second Principles" find Hocking claiming an immediate
1MGHE xii.

323
and ineffable sense of the worth of existence, a characteristic he would single out as mystical:

1

The peculiar coloring of immediacy which belongs to religion, the pervasive sense of an unevident value in existence, cannot be precisely transmitted. But it is sure
to be recognized, thought about, sought after. It is almost as sure to be critically regarded at some time or
other, to be analyzed and explained away or rejected, as
a preliminary to independent building. This was my own
very ordinary experience.2
In a review from 1933 appended to
Civilization,

~what

~

Coming World

if God is Gone?", Hocking added a valu-

able· footnote to his personal understanding of the meaning
of mysticism, alluding to his own mystical tendencies in a
remark introducing a letter from one of the authors of the
book in question, Max

c.

Otto:

am impelled to share [the letter] -- first for what i t
says about him, his extraordinary willingness to reconsider a firm position, and then for the evidence it
brings that what I have called the recognition of mystic
by mystic, and their rapprochement across apparent gulfs,
are not limited to relations between avowed faiths.3
I

This remark must be interpreted in light of Hocking's reference to his claim that "The true mystic will recognize the
true mystic across all boundaries and will learn from him."
Possibly the most convincing proof of the mystical
character of Hocking's position is conveyed by his explicit

1
2
3

cf.

MIHE 157 - 58.

"SSP" 385. Cf. CWC lOOf.
cdC 190.

4 cwc 141.

4
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endorsement of theses cited by him as mystical. In referring, for instance, to his magnum opus in the preface to Living Religions and

~

World Faith, he stated, as we have al-

ready seen, that
I was attempting to present a realistic mysticism, one
which turns its back on circumstance and the world's
concerns only to find the Real, and thereby to renew energy and grit for the particular task, and to regain
certitude in action, that detailed action whose integral
sum is history.l
In Types of Philosophy he similarly adopted as his
own the realism of the mystic.

2 He also claimed a mystical

idealism, which constituted with mystical realism the nucleus of his philosophy. 3 Further, he clearly espoused the mystics• tenets that the world is charged with unfathomed significance and value,

4

and that the world is a Self "infinite

in its depth and mystery."

5 In "Some Second Principles,"

Hocking openly admitted that his philosophy incorporated a
"tentative mysticism, .. reaffirming his own belief in the inadequacy of conceptual knowledge to grasp reality in its fullness.6 In~ Meaning of Immortality in Human Experience, as
1 LRWF 7.
2

cf. TP 318.

3 cf. TP 320, MGHE xxviii.

4 cf. TP 314 - 15.
5
TP 315; cf. "SSP" 397, GL Mar. 18, 1938.
6 cf. "SSP" 397.
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in Strength of Men and Nations, Hocking reiterated his conviction that the mystic was right in asserting the total
meaning in life.

1

He also affirmed the mystic's sense of des-

tiny, not so much in terms of his own life as of that of his
generation.

2

Likewise, in the earlier book, he stated of the

mystic, "In my judgment, he is right in his primary assertions, that there is a total meaning in things, and that we
are always dimly aware of it, and may thus be certain that
it exists ... 3
Other instances can be brought forward more systematically with respect to Hocking's inclusion of the principal
teachings of the mystics as he specified them in his own
teaching.
First, Hocking expressly testified in several works
to his belief that "God is and God is One."

4

He also main-

tained in various places that it is possible to be one with
God.

5 Elaborated in the form of the three mystical .. axioms,"

with their corollaries, Hocking's assent to these fundamental theses of authentic mysticism can be briefly indicated:
1

c£.

MIHE 159, SMN 210.

2

c£.

MIHE 96 - 97, SMN 218.

3

MIHE 159; c£. TP 320.

4

cwc

149; cf. "MM" 55, MGHE 409 - 10;

5

c£.

HGHE xxviii, HNR 352,

C\'iC

198.

ewe

198.
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I. Reality is ultimately One (in God), etc. 1
II. It is possible to be one with God by following the
right moral discipline.2
III. All oppositions are reconciled in the One. 3
Hith respect to his life-experiences, inasmuch as he
stated his belief that all men are "avowed or unavowed mystics, -- even the Schopenhauers,"

4

there is no reason to as-

sume that Hocking meant to exclude himself. More to the
point, apart from his early conviction that

the mystic's
5
sense of the universe is in substance a true one," the spe11

cific experiences in his life that can be adduced in support
of Hocking's mysticism include the encounters with Time
(1892) and Space (1941} recorded in The Heaning of Immortali-

~ in Human Experience, 6 which gained for him at least a momentary certainty of immortality. Both experiences were mediated by Nature, involving situations of great beauty and an
1 Axiom: TP 275, "FFD" 525. Corollaries: HS 368, TP
316, CWC 184; "MGHE" 65, "MS" 191; TP 315, "SSP" 397, GL Mar.
18, 1938; HNR 410 - 11, TP 318, "SSP" 397 - 98.
2

Axiom: LRf~ 280, CWC 198. Corollaries: MGHE 376 - 83,
RM 45-46, LR~iF 227, CWC 138- 39; SBF 169, 173; ":t-1S"' 190.
3

Axiom: MS 343, TP 276, 316, "SSP" 397 - 98; MIHE 99 100. Corollaries: SBF ix, 31, 34, MIHE xv - xvi, 216; LRWF
105 - 06, C\'lC 123, 149; CiiC 101; "MGHE" 65, "HS" 190.

4 TP 314.
S"SSP"' 388.
6

MIHE 215 - 16,

XV -

xvi.
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insight into some truth about the world. Other experiences
include his conversion at age twelve, which Rouner perhaps
exaggerates as

11

probably his most important 'mystical' ex-

perience";1 his love for Agnes Boyle O'Reilly {the basis, as
we saw, of the famous passage in his magnum opus); his interest in and practice of art and music.

2

Hocking's active ca-

reer as a teacher, soldier, political analyst, writer, reformer, farmer, churchman and citizen testifies eloquently
to the excursive, prophetic aspect of his life. 3
In sum, Hocking can safely be called a mystic according to his own criteria and somewhat oblique confession as
well as on the basis of his teachings. Similarly, his reticence itself can be considered a mystical attribute.
Hocking indeed resisted the temptation to articulate
a mystical ontology until long after the main lines of his
general metaphysics were set, although there is ample evidence that he had long studied the mystic's metaphysics both
under Royce and on his own. Further, when he did take up the
metaphysics of mysticism, he did not hesitate to disagree or
1 Rouner, WHE 2.
2Cf. Rouner, PRCWC 7.
3 Hocking's diverse involvements in the world are reflected in the variety of the 294 items in Richard Gilman's
bibliography, of which roughly 56 concern political issues,
71 religion and the philosophy of religion, 131 other aspects of philosophy, law and mathematics, with 36 others
dealing with science, education, architecture, farming and
similar interests.
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to correct or even to amend when he saw fit.

1

As we have

seen, Hocking espoused a tentative pluralism, if also one
which was in many respects still too committed to a rationalistic vision of the cosmos. Unlike James, Hocking seems
discontent with the prospect of real loss in the evolution
of the universe. There is little of the shadow of tragedy in
his writings that haunts the pages of 1-Jhi tehead • s metaphysics,
however. Like the mystics about whom he wrote, Hocking was in
the final analysis

incu~ably

optimistic. But nowhere does

he indicate that he understood his "ordinary" mysticism to
differ in kind from that of the classical mystics he so long
studied and undertook to interpret. I submit that however reticent his admission, Hocking conceived of his own religious
experience in terms of continuity with the mystical tradition
of the West. The often remarkable concurrence between his
account of the tenets of mystical teachings and the components of mystical experience with those of other serious
students of mysticism indicates that in this estimation of
his place in religious history, Hocking was not in error.

2

Thus, however one wishes further to distinguish the
meaning of the term "mystical" with respect to Hocking's experience, it can safely be concluded that Hocking was a mys1
2

cf.

TP 275 - 76, "SSP" 397 - 98.

c£. in this regard the works cited by Bertrand Russell, Evelyn Underhill, Lawrence LeShan, Georgia Harkness
and Margaret Lewis Furse.
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tic in his own eyes and in terms of his conception of the
classical Western tradition, and also that his mysticism was
not idiosyncratic, as Rouner implies.

II. HOCKING AND HIS CRITICS
In the later years of Hocking's long career, critical
estimation of his interpretation of religious experience and
mysticism tended to be benign and favorable.

1

the years immediately following publication of

2£

However, in

!£! Meaning

God in Human Experience, critical reaction_was less posi-

tive, much of it founded upon what was held to be Hocking's
continuation of a form of idealism growing rapidly more unfashionable in American philosophical circles.
Ralph Barton Perry • s caustic r.eview of Hocking's major work, largely a critique of his alleged identification
of the real and the ideal, first attacked the conception of
God as the Other Knower of our common World. Content, however, merely to characteriz-e as "obscure" the connections by
which Hocking achieved the transition between "other mindu
and Other Mind, Perry passed on to accuse Hocking of promoting a conception of God having the "social value of a com1 c£. The Development .91. American Philosophy, Walter
Muelder and Laurence Sears, eds. (Boston: Houghton Mifflen
Co., 1940), pp. 487£.; Joachim Wach, Types of Religious Experience, op. cit., pp. 17 - 21, 230 and passim; Urban, op.
cit., pp. 169n., 257; Rouner, 11 Rethinking Hocking," Religion
in Life, 32 (1963), pp. 553- 63; Reck, op. cit., pp. 48- 64;
Schneider, op. cit., pp. 176- 77, 206- 07, 234; Raymond E.
Gibson, God, Man and Time (Philadelphia: United Church Press,
1966), pp. 53£., 60£.; Charles A. Moore, 11 Professor Hocking
and East-West Philosophy," PRCWC 342; R. H. L. Slater, "Religious Diversity and Religious Reconception," PRCHC 260££.;
H. P. VanDusen, "A Half-Century of Hocking's Reflection, 11
330
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panion in misery. u.l As for the report of the mystical consciousness, Perry simply dismissed the whole business as an
experience of subjective conviction. Further, "The conviction itself is more simply accounted for [as a psychological
reaction] than by the reality of the object which it reports."2 In its immediacy, the mystical experience remained
for Perry equivocal and variable.
Hocking did not reply formally to Perry's article, as
far as I know.

3

He would no doubt have acknowledged his col-

league's accurate perception of his passage beyond James's
reluctant concession of ontological objectivity to the mystics' report, appealing to their own metaphysical reticence
but also noting their widespread empirical consensus on the
minima of mystical theory: God is and God is One. More impprtantly, he might have simply stated that Perry missed the
whole point of his definition of religion as the anticipa-

!i£n

of attainment -- a present awareness and even tentative

possession of what would be fully achieved only at the telos
and therefore a goal to be striven for and a ground for hope,
not for supine acquiescence in present evils.
PRCWC 179, 182; D. s. Robinson, Royce and Hocking-- American
Idealists (Boston: The Christopher Publishing House, 1968),
pp. 79 - 121; John E. Smith, Themes in American Philosophy
(New York: Harper Torchbook~, 1970}, pp. 155- 58, 163;
ARdrew Reck, "Idealism in American Philosophy since 1900, 11
Contemporary Studies in Philosophical Idealism, ed. cit., pp.
24 - 25.
1
2
Perry, art. cit., p. 386.
Ibid., pp. 388f.
3

cf. however "INR" 587 - 88.
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While extreme in several respects, Perry's reaction
nevertheless touched upon a problem other critics would note
and which I believe Hocking never satisfactorily resolved.
It can be granted that all experience is intentional, even
metaphysically so: ideas are of something other than themselves, ultimately of Being. But as the study of illusions,
delusions and dreams has shown, the actuality of the objects
of ideas is not guaranteed by merely entertaining their
ideas. Clarity is not immediacy.
To be sure, Hocking frequently acknowledged the force
of the realist's objection. Further, his elevation of the ontological argument to the status of a special case shows that
he was fully alive to the dangers inherent in attempting to
infer existence from abstracted mental aspects of experience. However, if the nuclear I-It-Thou triad as Hocking expunded it accurately represents the structure of human experience, then the direct concepts of Self, of other Self or
"Thou,

11

of the World as a whole and of God as the Field of

experience are always rooted in present experience and therefore intentionally objective. But such ideas or concepts,
when adverted to

~

concepts, that is, when the object of re-

flexive consciousness, are always more or less inadequate,
especially in the case of the Whole and of God. Further,
Hocking's insistence that we can be more certain in experience that God is than what he is suggests that essence and

,
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existence can be differentially intuited whether ontologically united or not and that, moreover, existence has an empirical priority at least with regard to the knowledge of God if
1
not also to that of the s-elf, other selves and the World.
The cognitive distance introduced by reflexion, whereby direct concepts (what we think with: the God-idea, the
whole-idea, etc.) are made the content or
concepts (what we think

2f:

obje~t

of other

the idea of God, the Whole, etc.),

occasions the inadequacy that renders conceptual knowledge
of one's Self, Others, the World and God always provisional,
corrigible and uncertain. In this respect, the mystical discipline of suppressing conceptual thought can be seen as an
attempt to enhance the direct immediacy of the God-concept,
Self-concept and Whole- concept

co~present

as the structural

components of consciousness itself. The distinctively religious character of meditation and its unitive consummation
is constituted by our awareness, however peripheral, that
God is the Field uniting I-It-Thou(s) and simultaneously the
Thou grounding and addressing us through that relation. Meditation is thus functionally an effort to raise the Godconcept {or even the Self-concept or Whole-concept) to fullest consciousness without thinking reflexively about "God,"
that is, employing a concept of God.
If this extrapolation of Hocking's teaching on medi-

1 cf. "ORE" 60 - 62.
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tation is correct, then the problem of interpretation as an
extrinsic factor in experience is partially solved. For the
culturally determined concepts of God to which the mystic
sometimes resorts in attempting to articulate his experience
are precisely those he attempts to suspend in repressing
conceptual reflexion. This allows for originality both in
the experience itself and also in subsequent reflection, as
the socially-funded concepts of God are compared to the Godconcept raised to fuller consciousness by the meditative
process. Conversely, of course, the mystic can also evaluate·
his God-concept in terms of the accepted doctrine of God in
his culture or religious tradition. But it does not follow
that the mystic's previously-held cultural concept is fully
determinative of his articulation of his God-concept. And
thus the interpretive process includes a "free" dimension
the God-concept itself as a factor in experience which exercizes a critical function in later reflection. Further, it
is important to note that for Hocking this operational Godconcept is God as cognitively present to the mystic in the
very structure of consciousness itself. This, I believe, is
the basis for HocKing's original treatment of the ontological argument.
Hocking's insistence on the necessarily empirical
character of our knowledge of God was taken up in a more
stringent if less acrimonious critique by a Yale colleague,

,
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c.

Douglas

Macintosh. Macintosh more fully appreciated Hock-

ing•s reljqious realism. He took issue, however, with his adherence to an idealistic perspective and his epistemological
intuitionism, particularly with respect to the "most primitive and fundamental of all intuitions, the intuition of the
whole ••• the ess€ntial thing, it is claimed, in the religious
experience of the mystic." 1 For Macintosh the idea of the
Whole lent no more force to the reality of the Whole than it
did to the equally likely mystical claim that "reality" is
illusory. 0 ere Macintosh taxed Hocking for not taking his
principle of empirical duality further:
There is equal justification for the view that the relative unreality or merely ideal existence of the physical
and the finite, and the absolute perfection and timelessness and practically undifferentiated divinity of the
Whole, together with other features of absolute idealism which seem to be confirmed by the mystical experience,
are mistaken applications to the object of what is simply
a transient modification of the subject.2
A still more fundamental criticism dealt with Hocking•s supposedly too-exclusive identification of religious
experience with the mystical phase of that experience. This,
Macintosh averred, underplayed the all-important role of
morality in "practical religion'': "Indeed our contention
would be that, so far from the distinctly mystical experience being the only phase of religious experience, it is not
1 MacJ.'ntosh, art
2

Ibid.

I

p. 40.

•

c~t
.&.

•

I

p•

39 •
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even its primary phase." 1 Thus Hacintosh concluded that the
ontological argument can have any force only in so far as it
is buttressed fore and aft by "practical religion," not mere.
1
ly b y a rnys t ~ca

.

consc~ousness.

2

In his large volume, The Problem of Knowledge, which
incorporated much of the preceding article, Macintosh added
a critique of Hocking's doctrine of social experience

the

immediate awareness of another Self (other mind) through
sharing common objects. 3 While sufficiently penetrating to
have earned Hocking's later concession of inadequacy regarding the spatial metaphor in the celebrated passage of his
maqnum opus~Macintosh's refutation was based on the mistaken
assumption that Hocking's argument rested on "an immediate
inner experience of other mind" in the sense of a non-mediated intuition of another Self. In the experience of loving,
there was indeed for Hocking a direct intuition of the

·~sub-

stance" or "idea" of a person, but one not only mediated by
objects, but as ineffable as the God-concept or one's own
Self-concept. 5 Nevertheless, both in his magnum

~

and

1 Ibid., p. 41.
2
3

Ibid., p. 45.
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1915).

4 In a letter to D.s. Robinson almost fifty years later
Hocking wrote in this regard that 11 The spatial language of my
report in The Heaning of God is both inadequate and misleading. Yet it is hard to find an equivalent for the metaphorical 'within.' Whitehead finds the same difficulty •••• " (D. s.
Robinson, op. cit., p. 168.)
5 cf. MGHE 432ff.
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elsewhere Hocking explicitly denied the possibility of an
immediate and meaningful experience of another mind apart
from the contents of that mind.

1

He later went on to insist,

"Human beings can approach each other only by way of third
objects.u 2
Although Macintosh's criticisms were based solely on
Hocking's major work, his trenchent observations retain something of their force even considering Hocking's later clarifications. For instance, while in subsequent ,..-orks Hocking
stressed the mqral aspects of mysticism, it is nevertheless
true that he tended to grant mysticism a place of importance
over other aspects of religion which needed to be carefully
established rather than presumed. But it should be clear
from the preceding analysis that Hocking did not simply
equate religion and mysticism nor did he claim mysticism to
be the "primary phase" of religion.
Second, although Macintosh's discussion of Hocking's
nascent doctrine of intersubjectivity was off-center regarding an imputed "inner experience" of another mind, he nevertheless hit upon a fundamental weakness in Hocking's theory
of immediate social (i.e., intersubjective) experience, especially as grounds for the validity of the ontological argument. As we have noted elsewhere, Hocking's case for the so1
2

c£.

HGHE 256 - 69 and "MGIM" 453, 459.

LRHF 33. Cf. also 34, 227 and "MGIM'• 451.
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cial character of experience (and against solipsism) is summarized in his claim that the "Idea of a social experience
would not be possible unless such an experience were actual."

1

But it is not the same thing to say that "In any sense in
which I can imagine, or think, or conceive an experience of
Other mind [sic], in that same sense I have an experience of
2
Other Mind, apart from which I should have no such idea ...
While it might obtain that my idea of other mind rests upon
the presence to my mind of Other Mind, that does not give me
the factual experience of other mind(s). Only concrete, particular encounters can do that, as Hocking himself admitted. 3
The capacity for all social experience may well be founded
upon the continuous presence of God as Other .Hind (thus also
providing the ground for the ontological argument as an empirical proof for the existence of God); but actual social
experience can only be accounted for in terms of itself. In
this respect Whitehead's apodictic "Hang it all! Here we
are: we don't go behind that, we begin with it •••• " is possibly a more honest admission of the antecedent improbability
of solipsism than an appeal to Hegel's universal spirit necessarily clothing itself with particulars.

4

In life, as

1 MGHE 274. Cf. 273: "If, then, experience ever becomes
social, it has, in more rarefied condition, always been so;
and hence is, in the same fundamental sense, continuously so."
2
Ibid., emphasis added. Cf. alsop. 282.
3
cf. l-1GHE 279, "MGI:W' 459.
4

on 'i'ihitehead's remark, cf. C~>TC 27, TP 309,

11

MGIM" 451f.
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Hocking once said, immediate experience is always better
than proof. 1 But as a philosopher, Hocking necessarily concerned himself with proof, that is, with the reasons why
solipsism is antecedently improbable. He discovered them, I
believe, by going "behind" experience and articulating the
primordial intersubjectivity of nuclear experience. In this,
following Marcel, Hocking was perhaps first effectively to
refute subjective idealism.
Thus, intersubjectivity in the sense of actual human
I-Thou encounters is both an achievement and a condition.
Human experience is antecedently intersubjective radical..ly
and necessarily inasmuch as it is a

11

dialogue with God" as

a unique Thou. In so far as nuclear experience is also a
Self-awareness and an awarenes5 of the World as a whole (It),
the QOssibility of particular experiences of others is a
real one. But their actual presence, unlike that of God, the
Self and the World-as-a-whole is neither assured nor continuous. It is, in short, contingent. Human intersubjectivity presupposes not only the existence of the

11

Thou's" but

also immediacy. The vocative case is a response to a perceived presence.
Hocking, of course, realized that even the infant's
first experience was social, if not precisely intersubjective
in any conscious sense. He was intent on uncovering the meta1 cf. MIHE 213 - 14, cited above, p. 7.
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physical ground of that sociality, which, in the form of the
mystical I-Thou encounter of nuclear experience, I believe
he did. But a ground need not be a cause. It may well be a
condition for the possibility of any event in particular,
and so, I believe, is the mystical dialogue in nuclear experience. But the other condition necessary for the actuality of social

~

intersubjective experience is the realistic

premise that other selves in fact exist independently of my
own mind. As we have seen, Hocking did adopt this realistic
perspective. For him, the transition from the possibility to
the actuality of particular intersubjective experience is
achieved just as is that regarding any other particular experience-- by the course of experience itself as a reciprocally active and receptive meeting of the Self with the
World which makes differences.
As might be expected, one of the strongest attacks on
Hocking's treatment of mysticism came from James H. Leuba,
to whose reductionistic interpretations Hocking had taken
continuous exception from his earliest writings on the subject. In his lengthy book, The Psychology of Religious Mysticism, which incorporated most of the preceding article on
the immediate apprehension of God according to James and
Hocking, Leuba, like Perry, centered his major objection on
Hocking's willingness to accept the mystic's interpretation
of his experience as indicative of the reality of the object

,
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encountered. To account for the mystical experience in terms
of an encounter with God was for Leuba, moreover, a regression to "causal thinking."

1

For Leuba, as for Perry, the ex-

planation was far simpler: the interpretations of the mystics .. are unavoidable products of the psychological condi2
tion in which an entranced person finds himself."
Curiously, Leuba never seemed to perceive the irony
of prohibiting the mystic from engaging in causal explanation while doing so himself. It should be observed, however,
that nowhere did Hocking speak of

11

causality" with regard to

the mystic's claim of an immediate experience of God, nor
did he countenance the inevitability of inference. Rather,
Hocking spoke of "recognition .. or "realization," further requiring that interpretation be included structurally within
experience itself as the correlate of mediation -

at least

as I read him. The "occasions" of mystical experience are
the elements of experience itself: Self-awareness, the presence of natural and social agencies and the Field of experience.
Hocking's teaching on mysticism emerged relatively
1Leuba, art. cit., p. 710. In his book, Leuba softened his charge to one of confusing nan immediately given
and invulnerable revelation of the nature of God 11 with an
inference imported from previously accepted beliefs. (Cf.
p. 312.)
2

Leuba, art. cit., p. 711. In his book, Leuba was
more specific: "many of the curious phenomena to which most
great mystics owe in great part their fame or notoriety are
due to perturbations of the sex function consequent upon its
repression." (Op. cit., pp. 119 - 20.}
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intact from these critical encounters,

1

especially to the ex-

tent that he was able to develop his doctrine in later works.
But it is important to note that in regard to his articulation of mysticism, none of his strongest critics faulted him
for misrepresenting its character as traditionally received,
however they evaluated it themselves. Most of them objected,
rather, to his use of mysticism to bolster the sagging theses of idealism. Leuba in fact regretted Hocking's failure
to reconceive mysticism according to the reductionist model
of the psychologist.

2

Much later, a critic with the advan-

tage of thirty years more of Hocking's writings would tax
him, curiously, not so much for misrepresentation as underrepresentation: "It may be remarked that liocking limits himself to one type of 'valid' mysticism, which is activistic,
and moralistic." 3 In fact, while Hocking included references
to over t\venty classical mystics in his magnum opus alone,
1

In 1915, Hocking's interpretation of the ontological
argument was subjected to a brief criticism by John E. Russell, which need not occupy us here. ("Professor Hocking's
Argument from Experience," Journal of Philosophy, 12 [Oct.
14, 1915], pp. 68- 71.)
2

3

Leuba, op. cit., pp. 316 - 17.

James A. Martin, Jr., Emoirical Philosophies of Religion (Morningside Heights, N.Y.: King's Crown Press, 1945),
p. 15. Martin further comments, "If one seeks an empirical
grounding for a philosophical or religious concept, it is of
dubious value to appeal to a selected type of experience,
since the selection itself indicates that the validity of
the experience is bound up with the validity of its interpretative concepts." (Ibid., cf. alsop. 27.)

•
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the majority of citations are from the writings of St. Teresa, Tauler, Eckhart and Madame Guyon. Further, although
Martin's evaluation of Hocking's selectivity is perhaps exaggerated, Hocking did not attempt or at least publish a
comparative survey of the mystics' teachings on either practice or theory. Moreover, the sources Hocking drew from were
also cited by almost all contemporary students of mysticism
from the French alienists to Leuba. Thus, while somewhat diverse, the range of variation among these classical representatives is not as great nor as illustrative of the nature
of mystical experience concretely as it would have been had
Hocking taken a wider sample, as James had done.
However, adverting to the virtual unanimity of the
mystics concerning practice and theory, Hocking went beyond
James 1 tentative proposals and disregarded both James' and
Royce's disclaimers concerning the metaphysical validity of
the mystics• reports. As more recent research suggests,
Hocking was on surer ground methodologically and philosophically than his critics were able to concede. 1 In fact, however, few if any of his critics faulted him for that, preferring to fall back on the antecedent improbability of his
being correct in view of his adherence to the tenets of
idealism.
1

Cf. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, op. cit., and
the works cited by LeShan, Capra and Furse.

f
III. MYSTICISN RECONCEIVED: HOCKING AND ':'HE CLASSICAL CONCEPT

The failure of even his sternest critics to tax Hocking for distorting the meaning of mysticism strongly suggests
that Rouner•s

dis~unction

of Hocking's mysticism from clas-

sical mysticism is ill-founded. Having thus surveyed the
critic isms of his cont.emporaries, we may pursue this line of
inquiry further by a survey of the classical tradition itself.
1. Classical Western Mysticism
The comprehensive and critical study of Western mysticism hardly antedates the late nineteenth century, as I
pointed out in the Introduction. But to his classic Christian Mysticism (1899), Dean Inge was able to append a list
of twenty-six lengthy definitions or descriptions of mysticism emanating from that century alone-- of which only Inge•s
need concern us here:
Now it will be found that these men of acknowledged and
pre-eminent saintliness agree very closely in what they
tell us about God. They tell us that they have arrived
gradually at an unshakable conviction, not based on inf~rence but on immediate experience, that God is a Spirit with whom the human spirit can hold intercourse; that
in Him meet all that they can imagine of goodness, truth,
and beauty; that they can see His footprints everywhere
in nature, and feel His presence within them as the very
life of their life, so that in proportion as they come
to themselves they come to Him.l
1

rnge, op. cit., p. 325.
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;lilliam James, it is noteworthy to recall, declined
to define mysticism, but characterized it by its four "marks"
of ineffability, noetic quality, transiency and passivity.

1

However, he did associate religious mysticism with what he
called a "sudden realization of the immediate presence of
God."

2

Similarly, a contemporary and life-long student of

3
mysticism, Rufus Jones -- a Quaker and himself a mystic -stated in his Studies in Mystical Religion (1909) that
I shall use the word mysticism to express the type of
religion which puts the emphasis on immediate awareness
of relation with God, on direct and immediate consciousness of the divine presence. It is religion in its most
acute, intense and living stage.4
In her monumental work, Mysticism (1910}, Evelyn
Underhill offered the following observations:
I understand it to be the expression of the innate tendency of the human spirit towards complete harmony with
the transcendental order; whatever be the theological
1 James, op. cit., pp. 292- 93.
2

Ibid., p. 302.

3 cf. Bridges, op. cit., pp. 25 - 26.
4 Rufus Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion (New York:
Russell and Russell, 1970 ed.T; p. xv. Cf. also his ~ Exponents of Mystical Religion (London: Epworth Press, 1930T;
pp. 31 - 32: Mysticism uis a form of religion that builds
primarily on consciousness of acquaintance with God through
direct and immediate experience of Him, instead of on logical and forensic arguments about Him, or on scribal interpretation of ancient records that tell of Him." (Emphasis
added.)
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formula underwhich that order is understood. This tendency, in great mystics, gradually captures the whole
field of consciousness; it dominates their life, and, in
the experience called "mystic union," attains its end.l
Among Catholic writers, Dom Cuthbert Butler, in his
Western Mysticism

(1922) wrote,

the mystics' claim is expressed by Christian mystics as
"the experimental perception of God's Presence and Being, .. and especially "union with God" -- a union, that
is, not merely psychological, in conforming the will to
God's will, but, it may be said, ontological [,] of the
soul with God, spirit with Spirit. And they declare that
the experience is a momentary foretaste of the bliss of
heaven.2
Similarly, Fr. Joseph Marechal, in his Studies in the Psvchology of the 1-lystics ( 19 2 7) , quotes with approval the opinion
of his fellow Jesuit of a generation before, Auguste Poulain,
that mystical states represent

"~

experimen.tal intellectual

knowledge of this presence [of God]." 3
1 underhill, op. cit., p. xiv. Later she described mysticism as "that organic process which involves the perfect
consummation of the Love of God: the achievement here and
now of the immortal heritage of man. Or, if you like it better -- for this means exactly the same thing -- it is the
art of establishing his conscious relation with the Absolute."
(Ibid., p. 81. Cf. also pp. 68, 72 and passim.) In Practical
Mysticism (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1915), she wrote,
"Mysticism is the art of union with Reality. The mystic is a
person who has attained that union in greater or less degree;
or who aims at and believes in such attainment ... (p. 3.)
2

wester~ Mysticism~ foreword by Dom David Knowles
{New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968 ed.), p. 5.
3Marechal, op. cit., p. 102, citing Poulain, ~
Graces of Interior Prayer (1912 ed., p. 64). He added, "This
is, in truth, the fundamental mystical phenomenon -- the di-
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In 1932, the eminent philosopher and theologian,
Jacques Haritain, described mystical experience as
experiential knowledge of the deep things of 2.2£, .2£
suffering of divine things, an experience which leads
the soul through a series of states or transformations
until within the very depths of itself it feels the
touch of divinity and "experiences the life of God." 1

~
~

A more recent writer, Dom Illtyd Trethowan, describes
mysticism as "an awareness of God which, although mediated
by the finite, is nevertheless in itself a direct knowledge

~ contact with him." 2

of him,

From this brief survey of representative authorities
on mysticism, there is no evident reason to conclude that
any fundamental disparity exists between Hocking's concept
and the so-called "classical" concept as articulated within
the Catholic and Protestant traditions. For, as we have seen,
Hocking also held that mystical experience was an immediate
intuition or perception of God's presence (Inge, James,
Jones, Butler, Poulain, Marechal) mediated by the natural
and social World (Inge, Trethowan), including among other
characteristics ineffability, noetic content, transiency,
and passivity (James) and marked by an awareness of goodness,
truth and beauty (Inge), an unshakable conviction (Inge)
tending toward personal union with God through a progressive
rect feeling of God's presence, or the intuition of God as
present." (Ibid.)
1M
2

'
arl.. t aJ.n,
op. cit., p. 247.

Trethowan, op. cit., p. ix.

,
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transformation of experience (Underhill, Butler, Maritain).
Many of Hocking's other salient teachings also find
support among these and other writers, both traditional and
recent. Of these, it is illuminating to note the widespread
agreement that the essential experience of the mystics is
not to be identified in itself with the extraordinary or
even "supernatural" phenomena that sometimes accompany the
1
higher forms of mystical union. Mystical experience, as we
shall note again, is the common capacity of everyman according to the classical tradition as well as Hocking.
2. The Recovery of the Classical Concept of Mysticism
Rather than departing from the classical concept of
mysticism, I believe that by emphasizing the continu-

~<vestern

ity of the mystical life with religious life in its ordinary
manifeatations, especially that of worship, Hocking in fact
1

The "ordinariness" of mystical experience, that is,
its essential difference from highly unusual states of consciousness or the awareness of strange aspects of reality,
is supported by the following authors, taken here as representative of the Western (Christian) tradition: Underhill,
Mysticism, op. cit., pp. 72ff., and her introduction to her
edition of The Scale of Perfection by Walter Hilton (London:
John M. Watkins, 1948-ed.), pp. xxxf.; Reginald GarrigouLagrange, O.P., Christian Perfection and Contemplation, op.
cit., pp. 46, 235ff.; Marechal, op. cit., pp. 176 - 77;
Maritain, op. cit., pp. 247, 259; Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 51 - 55; Bridges, op. cit., p. 6: Johnston, Silent Music, op. cit., pp. 72ff, here following Joseph
de Guibert, S.J., The Theology of the Spiritual Life (New
York: Sheed and Ward, 1953).
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recovered a tradition common to the Christian world from the
third through the sixteenth centuries.
After the controversies and condemnations surrounding
Quietism at the end of the seventeenth century, this ancient
concept had been severely modified as Catholic spiritual
theologians began to distinguish sharply between the "ordinary" life of the Christian and the "extraordinary" stages
of mystical experience with its special graces, odd phenomena, etc. l

Similarly, under Calvinist and later Lutheran

influence, Protestant theologians had already all but stifled the mystical element of religion in Germany, England
and the Low Countries.

2

Despite the protests of many great

mystics and theologians, the tendency to reduce mysticism to
the quaint, odd or pathological and thereby to the irrelevant periphery of ordinary life continued both to divide
Catholic

11

ascetical" and "mystical" theology and also to pit

Protestants against each other regarding mysticism versus
prophecy well into the twentieth century. At that time, the
1
Garrigou-Lagrange ironically summarizes the attitude
of those authors who "thus distinguish[ed] a unitive life
called 'ordinary,' the only one necessary, they say, to perfection, from a unitive life called 'extraordinary,' which
according to them, is not evenEquired for great sanctity.
From this point of view, asceticism does not lead to mysticism, and the perfection, or 'ordinary' union, to which it
leads, is normally an end and not a disposition to a more
intimate and elevated union. 11 (Garrigou-Lagrange, Christian
Perfection and Contemplation, op. cit., p. 28.)
2

cf. Happold, op. cit., pp. 294, 306; and~ Protestant Mystics, op. cit., p. xi.
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work of both Catholic and Protestant scholars (and mystics)
began to reverse the trend.
By emphasizing the continuity of religious and mystical experience, Hocking supported and (in 1912) even anticipated the agruments of Catholic theologians such as GarrigouLagrange. In some instances he went beyond them in recovering the authentic tradition of Christian mysticism, as in,
for example, his insistence that human experience as a whole
was at root mystical. For by this contention he returned to
the pre-Enlightenment understanding of the progressive unity
of the Christian life. He also regained the ancient Christian tradition of the Greek Fathers, namely that mystical
refers to the quality of the whole Christian life in its
rootedness in scripture, the liturgy and the uinner" experience of the Spirit of God.

1

This tradition has been pre-

served in an apparently unbroken continuity only in the
Orthodox Church, which still recognizes the radical commonness of the mystical life.

~riting

in 1944, the theologian

1 Fr. Louis Bouyer, the liturgical historian and spiritual theologian, clearly affirmed this as the common teaching of the early Church: "The Christian texts, in fact, in
which the word mystikos is acquiring the particular religious and doctrinal meaning which it has never had before
may be classed, roughly speaking, in three great groups: Biblical, liturgical and spiritual. The most ancient texts are
found in the first category; those which have a liturgical
character come later, and last of all appear those which belong most decidedly to the third group •••• But-- and this
is most important -- it is evident that nowhere can a clear
boundary be drawn between these three different uses of the
word. We pass from one to the other without any breach of

p
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Vladimir Lossky noted that

~If

the mystical experience is a

personal working out of the content of the common faith,
theology is an expression, for the profit of all, of that
which can be experienced by anyone."

1

Hocking can thus be said not only to have been in fundamental agreement with the ancient and classical Christian
tradition, East and West, but to have recovered it to a
large extent by departing from the later, reactionary conception. He did not deny the extraordinary aspects of ultimate mystical union with God. He did, however, deny that
these aspects constituted either the whole or essence of mysticism. These were, rather, rooted for him in the common capacity of everyman -- not those only of the Christian faith
if they in fact reached a climax in Christianity unequalled
in many respects in other traditions, as Bergson would also
conclude.

2

3. The Social Dimension of Mysticism
As I noted before, I am unaware of any philosophical
attempts prior to Hocking's to explicate the tendency of myscontinuity ... (Louis Bouyer, "Mysticism': An Essay on the
History of a Word," ~lystery and Systicism, op. cit., pp. 123f.
Cf. also lnge, op. cit., pp. 349 - 55.)
lvladimir Lossky, The Hystical Theology of the ~
ern Church (Cambridge: James Clarke and Co., 1957 ed.)pp. Sf.
2
Henri Bergson, The ~ Sources .£!. Horality ~ Religion, R. Audrey Audra and Cloudesley Brereton, trans. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., n.d.), p. 227.
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tical contemplation to express itself in action as an integral part of the structure of the process of mystical development itself, although the relationship between action and
contemplation had long been part of the Christian tradition.

1

In 1932, Bergson observed that Plotinus had actually dis2
paraged action as 11 a weakening of contemplation.n As aresult, "mysticism in the absolute sense in which we have
agreed to take the word, was never attained by Greek thought." 3
He likewise claimed that Hindu and Buddhist religion, while
achieving true mysticism, nevertheless did not achieve the
complete mysticism of action, creation and love.

4

For Berg-

son, the completion of the historical development of mysticism occurred only with the advent of Christianity, as was
the case for Hocking.

5

1 Hocking based his "principle of alternation" on the
psychological research of Delacroix and Godfernaux. Evelyn
Underhill also noted the presence of activity in the lives
of mystics as a function of what she called "conation," but
she did not attempt to develop the matter much further. (Cf.
Mysticism, op. cit., pp. 46f., 67, 83.) For her, the five
stages of mystical development were complete with union. And
although the unitive life in fact leads to action (pp. 172ff.),
Underhill did not account for this fact other than as an expression of the wholeness of Christian mysticism which, perhaps following Delacroix, she, too, found largely superior
to non-Christian mysticism. (p. 172. Cf. also pp. 416, 436.)
2

Bergson, op. cit., p. 221, citing The Enneads, III,

viii, 4.
3 Ibid.
4
5

Ibid.

I

p. 225.

Ibid.

I

p. 227. Bergson noted here the work of Dela-
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Bergson's position, while illuminating and in many
respects strikingly parallel to Hocking's position in the
Gifford Lectures and Living Religions and !!, Horld Faith,
noted the fact of activity in the mystic's life but, like
Underhill's, did not account for it by showing its necessary
function in the mystic's development.

A more recent writer,

Dr. Kenneth Wapnick, also adverting to the constant tendency
of the great mystics to express their vision in action, suggests a structural modification of the model of their development as proposed by Underhill, that is, sudden conversion,
purification, illumination, the "dark night of the soul" and
union. 1 To these Wapnick adds a sixth, a "return ••• to the
requirements of social living," which, he claims, "constitutes the most important part of [the mystic's] path."

2

In a passage highly reminiscent of Hocking's ascetical principle, Wapnick observes that
croix and Underhill. The apparent source he gave for the
mystics' activity was "their increased vitality" unleashed
by the Christian belief in the efficacy of action and which
"radiated an extraordinary energy, daring, power of conception and realization." (Ibid., pp. 227- 28.) Their accomplishments in the field of action represented "the culminating point of the inner evolution of the great mystics."
(Ibid., p. 228.) Paramount here were the functions of teaching and the creation of small groups of disciples whose survival and proliferation would eventually lead to a "radical
transformation of mankind." (Ibid., pp. 233, 236.)
1 cf. Mysticism, op. cit., pp. 169ff.
2

Kenneth Hapnick, art. cit., p. 53.
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The mystic now no longer finds his involvement with the
world to be abhorrent, but, in fact, seems to welcome
the opportunity to move in the social world he had abandoned. This seeming paradox becomes understandable when
one considers that it was not the world the mystic was
renouncing, but merely his attachments and needs relating to it, which precluded the development of his personal, asocial experience. Once he was able to abandon
these dependent, social needs, and felt freed of the
pull of the social world, he experienced the freedom to
live within society in conjunction with his inner strivings, mther than experiencing society's customs and institutions as obstacles to his self-fulfillment.l
On the basis of clinical research as well as a comparative study of the mystics, particularly of st. Teresa,
Wapnick observes that their return to the world constitutes
the ultimate purpose of withdrawal. But in order to return
to the demanding world of social action, the mystic must
first acquire the ability to face the prior demands of "inner" experience:
The entire mystic path may be understood to be a strenthening process whereby the mystic gradually develops the
"muscles" to withstand the experiences of this "inner
world." It is this strengthening that is responsible for
the long periods of suffering and fallowness that are
often the mystic's fate, as well as the mystic's faith
in the positive outcome of his experience.2
The mystical path, from Wapnick's perspective, is a
psychological strategem for ensuring effective presence in
the social world. l/lhat endows mysticism with the ability to
1

Ibid.

2 Ibid., p. 63.
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1.'1

achieve personal integration of "inner" and "outer" experi-

II

'li
I!

I

ence is its structured, gradual approach to the expansion of

II

consciousness involved "until its utmost depth is reached,

I

I
1!

i,..l·

what [the mystic] usually refers to as the Self or God,
wherein he feels at one with the universe."

1

Wapnick's emphasis on the requirement of social inte-

1,1

ljII:

1I

gration for full human life, an integration which mysticism
1

pre-eminently facilitates, supports Hocking's similar con-

1'1.

I,

li

tention. Nonetheless his account falls short of Hocking's
in that it lacks reference both to the mystic's own motivation for his return to society and also to the reciprocal
character of all human operations which provides the dynamism of processive advancement. Wapnick also fails to note
the actual contributions distinctive of the mystic's return
to the world, giving the impression that mysticism is functionally a religious form of preventive psychotherapy evolved
to promote social adjustment, whereas in fact the mystic
often returns to society as a reformer and revolutionary,
not merely a more adequately adjusted wheel in the social
machinery.
Another recent discussion of the social dimension of
mystical development can be found in William Johnston's
study of meditation and mysticism, Silent Husic. Even more
than Underhill, Bergson and Wapnick, Johnston notes the inte-

II
II

,..
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gral character of social activity in the course of mystical
development based on twelfth century Chinese Buddhist texts
1
and the writings of St. Teresa. He does not, however, provide an explanation of the phenomena in terms of the structure of mystical development other than, as for Underhill,
the increased compassion of the mystic as a result of his
unitive vision. Similarly, W. T. Stace, in his study Mysticism and Philosophy, devotes several pages to a consideration of the ethical elements in mysticism. But although he
adverts to the active character of the mystic's response to
his awareness of the oneness of all and repeats the judgment
that Christian mysticism appears superior in this regard to
other forms, he, too, fails to account for the active phase
of mystical development in terms of the structure of that
process itself in its social context.

2

Thus while adducible in support of Hocking's articulation of the integral character of action within the overall development of the mystic, these studies generally lack
either Hocking's clearly expressed accounting for the return
to the world in terms of the structure of experience or of
the motivational elements such as love and the desire for
justice as well as the need to communicate his vision which
1 Johnston, Silent Nusic, op. cit., Chapter 7: "Return
to the Market Place," pp. 80 - 90, especially pp. 86 - 87.
2

- 40.

Cf. Stace, Hysticism and Prophecv, op. cit., pp. 323
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impel the mystic to return to the World.
In my opinion, Hocking's association of alternation
with motivation was consequent on his insight into the social character of mysticism, in the context of which the mystic's return to the World can be seen to be part of the dynamic structure of social development itself. In contrast,
all the above-mentioned theories were proposed from the viewpoint of individual development only, without taking into
consideration the social aspect of mysticism both historically and contemporaneously. Finally, while each of the interpretations we have considered affirms the social effects of
mysticism, none includes the antecedent social aspect of
mystical experience, the intersubjective relation of the
Self and God in the depths of all human experience.

1

4. Mysticism and Prophecy
Much as Hocking's case for the social character of
mysticism, at least in its manifest expression, finds support from other and more recent studies, so also his dialectical identification of prophecy and mysticism as aspects of
1 stace acknowledges that to assert that "mysticism is
ultimately the source and essence of all religion" would require maintaining that umystical experience is latent in all
men but is in most men submerged below the surface of consciousness." (Hysticism and Philosophy, op. cit., p. 343.)
He declines, however, to assert more than a close "association" between religion and mysticism, thus declining in effect to elaborate and defend the hypothesis. (Cf. also Underhill, Hysticism, op. cit., p. 68.)
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a unified process can be supported by an appeal to the understanding of prophecy on the part of many modern biblical
scholars.
Hocking himself first defined the prophetic consciousness in terms of its historical and active character:
I mean the knowledge that this act of mine which I now
utter is to succeed and hold its place in history. It
is an assurance of the future and of all time as determined by my own individual will, embodied in my present
action.l
The prophetic consciousness is realized, however, in the
felt presence of God.

2

Thus the prophet is the mystic in ac-

tion: ,.The prophet is but the mystic in control of the forces of history, declaring their necessary outcome: the mystic in action is the prophet." 3
Among modern scripture scholars, several are in more
or less evident agreement with this view. B. Napier, for instance, adverts to the mystical dimension of prophecy in discussing the prophet's title

of~:

prophet and seer, by either signation, were understood
Lby the Hebrews] as exercizing in common the function of
1 MGHE 503.

2

cf.

MGHE 508.

3MGHE 511. Hocking added, characteristically, "In the
prophet, the cognitive certainty of the mystic becomes historic and particular; and this is the necessary destiny of
that certainty: mystic experience must complete itself in the
prophetic consciousness." (Ibid.)
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'seeing,• --i.e., apprhending that which is not normally accessible and 'speaking forth, ' proclaiming, that
which is thus seen and apprehended •••• His function, prophetism, is never reception alone, but reception-articulation.l
In a passage recalling Hocking's concept of Destiny,

J. Lindblom affirms that
a prophet may be characterized as a person who, because
he is conscious of having been specially chosen and
called, feels forced to perform actions and proclaim
ideas which, in a mental state of intense inspiration or
real ecstasy, have been indicated to him in the form of
divine revelations.2
H. H. Rowley defines a prophet not only as "a man who
knew God in the immediacy of experience," and felt "an inescapable constraint to utter what he was profoundly convinced
was the word of God," but also was ''a true prophet and the
measure of his experience was the measure of his receptiveness and his response."

3

John L. McKenzie even more explicitly recognizes the
mystical aspect of prophecy:
The only satisfactory parallel to the prophetic experience is the phenomenon of mysticism as described by
writers like Teresa of Avila, John of the Cross and
1 Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, 3 (Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1962), p. 897.
2 J. Lindblom, Prophecy in Ancient Israel (Philadelphia:
Muhlenberg Press, 1962), p. 46, original emphasized.
3 H. H. Rmvley, The Servant of the Lord (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 45.
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others. They affirm that the immediate experience of God
is ineffable; like the prophets, they must employ imagery and symbolism to describe it, with explicit warnings
that these are used. They describe it as a transforming
experience which moves one to speech and action beyond
one's expected capacities. It grants them a profound insight not only into divine reality but into the human
scene. Thus the prophetic exoerience is such ~ mystical
immediate experience of the reality and presence £f God.
The prophets disclose the nature and character of the
God so experienced, and they state the implications of
the divine nature and character for human thought and
action.l
Hocking's argument for the dynamic and intrinsic connection between mystical and prophetic experience thus finds
solid support among outstanding Protestant and Catholic biblical scholars. Not all contemporary writers on mysticism are
of this mind, however.
In sharp contrast to the scripture scholars, the eminent philosopher of religion, Ninian Smart, still maintains
a radical division between mysticism and prophecy. In his
article "Interpretation and Mystical Experience," he writes,
for instance,
mysticism is not prophetism, and can be distinguished
from devotionalism or bhakti religion (though mysticism
often intermingles with these forms of religious life
and experience). I would propose that the following are
not mystics in the relevant sense in whicr. the Buddha
and the others are mystics: Isaiah, Jeremiah, Muhammad,
Rarnanuja, Nichiren and calvin.2
lJ o h n L • .;.'!C.t\enz~e,
v ~
.
S • J • , Dictionary of the Bible (New
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1965), p. 697, emphasis
added. Cf. also p. 698.
2

Smart, art. cit., p. 75.

f
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Similarly, in his article on mysticism in the Zncyclopedia

£E.

Philosonhy, Smart reiterates his position:

11

there is

auite a difference between mystical experience and prophetic
and, more generally, numinous experience, but it is not easy
to bring out this phenomenological fact in a short definition."1
Whereas in the former article, Smart adduces no reason for his sundering of mysticism and prophecy, he indicates in the encyclopedia that although
the experiences·of Old Testament prophets, those of
Muhammad, and the theophany described in the BhagavadGita [can be included under certain definitions2] these
differ so markedly from the interior illumination of
such figures as Eckhart, Teresa of Avila, Sankara, and
the Buddha that it is misleading to bracket the two kinds
of experience.3
Herein lies one clue to Smart's insistence on the difference between mysticism and prophecy. For him, as for Russell, Scharfstein and others, mysticism is essentially an
''interior" event, a subjective experience having its origin
and term within the mystic's consciousness. In his earlier
article, Smart wrote,
For the purpose of this article, I shall treat mysticism
as primarily consisting in an interior or'introvertive
1

smart, ed. cit., Vol. 5, p. 420.

2

For instance, that of Sidney Spencer: 11 What is characteristic of the mystics is the claim which they make to an
immediate contact with the transcendent." (Ibid., p. 9.)
3

J:bi.d •.

....
,,

,I
!
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quest, culminating in certain interior experiences which
are not described in terms of sense-experience or of
mental images, etc.l
In Reasons and Faiths, Smart likewise espouses an operational description of mystical experience.

2

In The Reli-

gious Experience of Mankind, however, although he avoids exact definitions of either mysticism or prophecy, he clearly
indicates the reasons for his disjunction between them:
First, the mystic looks within, into his own soul and beyond. In this imageless state he expericnes something ineffable and blissful. But the prophet, such as Isaiah,
has a vision that seems exterior to himself •••• Second,
mysticism can occur ••• in a context where there is no
concept of a Creator God and where the experience is not
brought directly in relationship to, or interpreted as,
an experience of any deity or numinous being. But it is
nonsense to try and conceive of a prophetic experience
which does not involve such a concept. Of course, mystics often find in their own experience a strong intimation of the divine presence operating inwardly. But this
is not universal.
Third, the language of the prophet, and especially
of the prophets of the Hebrew tradition, is strongly personal, even anthropomorphic ••• while contemplative language is frequently impersonal ••••
Fourth, the Jewish prophets taught a way of life
1

2

Smart, art. cit., p. 75.

"Let us say that a mystical experience is one which
is reported by a class of persons generally referred to as
'mystics' -- such as Eckhart, St. John of the Cross, Plotinus,
the Buddha, Sankara, and so on. Such men are characterized
by spirituality and asceticism and pursue a certain method."
(Reasons and Faiths, op. cit., p. 55.) He adds, however, "For
a most important characteristic, one which we may regard for
the purposes of linguistic legislation as the defining characteristic, of the mystic is that he undertakes a certain
sort of mystical discipline.•• (Ibid.) The evident circularity
of his definitions may present no linguistic problem, but it
remains unclear what warrants calling a discipline "mystical ..
or a class of persons "mystics."
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that was powerfully dynamic and activist: typically,
though not universally, the mystic aims at stilling activity.l
While interesting, these characterizations hardly provide solid grounds for a radical disconnection of prophecy
and mysticism. First, we have little or no evidence about
the interior states of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Muhammad or other
prophets with which to form a true comparison. We even lack
such information about most of the mystics. Further, the mystics in fact often report visions or other experiences which
indicate realities "exterior" to themselves. Moreover, whereas it is possible to grant that not all mystical experience
involves explicit theism, this need mean no more than that
the unavailability of appropriate interpretive schemata by
which the religious character of the mystical experience can
be recognized impedes not only that recognition but even the
expression of that experience in activity. But in fact most
of the great mystics were religious figures par

excellen~.

They were also effective agents of social change, as pointed
out by Hocking, Underhill, Bergson and others-- not perhaps
universally, as Bergson noted of Plotinus, but at least in
the West, typically. Mystical language, in addition, while
sometimes impersonal, is, as Hocking and others have amply
shown, more frequently personal, especially with regard to
1

Ninian Smart, The Religious Experienc~ of Mankind
(London: Collins, 1971), pp. 366- 367.
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Almost a point-by-point refutation of the theses this
dissertation concerns, Smart's treatment of mystical experience as a wholly

11

inner" event betrays an inadequate concep-

tion not only of mysticism but also of experience. He fails,
further, to place mystical experience(s) in the context of
the mystic's life as a whole, socially and in an historical
perspective, thus isolating particular episodes as "mystical"
while ignoring their antecedent conditions and their effects.
The disjuction Smart proposes between mystical "stillness"
and prophetic activism arises out of this selctive inattention to development.
Thus, Smart's separation of mysticism and prophecy
does not appear to be well-founded. It clearly departs in
significant respects from the views of many outstanding biblical authorities as well as students of mysticism. The reason possibly lies in Smart's covert adherence, like that of
Rouner, to a concept of mysticism tainted by reaction. It is
possible, however, to grant to Smart that mysticism and "prophetism" are conceptually distinct, although in actual experience, especially when viewed developmentally, they are not
only associated (as Stace might allow) or·intermingled (as
he admits), but are conjoined as internally related moments
in a unified process, prophetic activity being the natural
outgrowth of mystical receptivity as McKenzie insists and
Hocking consistently maintained.
1

1

In her otherwise excellent study, Margaret Lewis
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5. The Elements and Structure of Mystical Experience
Despite the widespread agreement Hocking claimed to
exist among mystics regarding practice and theory, the study
of mysticism has yet to produce an extensive consensus among
investigators as to what those areas of agreement are, although various schools of thought exist, as Staal has shown.

1

""'
/
Rather than attempting a detailed resume
of various points

of agreement and disagreement between Hocking and other writ2
ers, some of whom were admittedly influenced by him, I shall
simply note agreement with respect to several major features
of Hocking's teaching.
We have already examined in some detail the social
and prophetic characteristics of mysticism as presented by
Hocking in view of more recent studies and have noted in passing a tendency toward affirming that at least in principle
all are possessed of the capacity for mystical experience.

3

Furse similarly overlooks the intrinsic connection between
mysticism and action, despite her reliance on some of Hocking's writings. Cf. Furse, Mysticism, op. cit., pp. 13, 142f.
1 staal, op. cit., pp. 68 - 122.
2
E.g., Bennett, Wieman, Urban and Hartshorne.
3 Regarding the social (i.e., prophetic) dimension of
Christian mysticism, cf. ~Mystical and Political Dimension
.2f the Christian Faith, ed. cit.; for the commonness of mystical experience as a capacity of human nature, see Urban,
op. cit., pp. 422, 434ff., 443; Harkness, op. cit., pp. 16 17; Hartshorne, art. cit., p. 467~ Hilliam Earle, "Phenomenology of Mysticism," ibid., p. 520; Lossky, op. cit., pp. 8 9; Johnston, The Still Point, op. cit., pp. 26 - 27; Illtyd
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Other topical areas in which recent writers concur with Hocking include the metaphysical and theological intentionality
of mystical experience,
ence,

1

mediation as a factor in all experi-

2

the ordinary as opposed to an "extraordinary" charac3
ter of true mysticism,
and the differential certitude of
the mystic regarding the perceived existence and essence of

God. 4 The practical aspects of mysticism, especially the
function of the "negative path" in renunciation and meditation has recently been subjected to examination in regard to
dishabituation (or

11

deautomatization") by several psychologi-

cal writers. 5 The dynamic explicitation of the latent capacity for mystical experience into manifest and theologically
expressive forms has been noted by Urban, who acknowledges
Trethowan, Mysticism and Theology (London: Geoffrey Chapman,
1975), pp. 80- 81.
1

Cf. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, op. cit., pp.
146ff., Trethowan, op. cit., pp. 4, 23ff.
2

Cf. Urban, op. cit., pp. 428 - 29; Trethowan, op.
cit., pp. ix, 50; Asher Moore, "Mysticism and Philosophy,"
The Monist, ed. cit., p. 499.
3 ct. Stace, Hysticism and Philosophy, op. cit., pp.
47 - 55; Trethowan, op. cit., pp. 47, 80 - 81; Johnston, ~
Still Point, op. cit., pp. 26 - 27; Underhill, ed. and intro.
to~ Scale of Perfection of ~alter Hilton, op. cit., pp.
xxxf.

4

c£. William Johnston, S.J., The Mysticism of the
Cloud of Unknowing (New York: Desclee-ind Co., 1967T, pp.
47 - 48.
5
cf. Deikman, art. cit., pp. 324 - 388; Edward w.
Maupin, "On Meditation," Charles Tart, ed., Altered States
of Consciousness (Garden City, N.Y. Doubleday Anchor, 1972),
pp. l81 - 190; Claudio Naranjo and Robert Ornstein, On the
Psychology of Meditation (New York: Viking Press, 1971):-P.s.
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in this respect his debt to von HUgel, Underhill and Jones.

1

Buber, of course, developed a comprehensive account of the
I-Thou relationship(s) available to human persons in terms
2
similar to those elaborated by Hocking. Likewise, the concept of intersubjectivity, especially as developed by Gabriel
Marcel, not only bears a resemblance to but has its origins
at least partially in Hocking's metaphysics of experience. 3
Hartshorne's social theory of reality was also influenced by
Hocking, if less openly acknowledged as such.

4

The theoretical aspects of mysticism, specifically the
principles that

Al~

is One, that the way to union with God is

by non-conceptual knowledge and love, and that opposites are
reconciled but not abolished in the one, are found in many
writers in various combinations and permutations. 5 Other elements articulated by Hocking which find contemporary support
include the "dim" awareness of God always present in experi1 urban, op. cit., pp. 434ff. Urban makes no mention of
Hocking in his chapter on mysticism.
2
Martin Buber,! and Thou (1923), Walter Kaufmann,
trans. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970). Buber, however, tended to oppose I-Thou relations to I-It relations,
whereas Hocking saw them as conplementary and conjoined.
3Harcel, "Solipsism Surmounted," PRCWC 23ff.
4

Hartshorne, op. cit., pp. 18 - 19.

5 cf. Stace, Hysticism and Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 6467, 79, 131; Russell, op. cit., pp. 17- 19, 20- 22; Moore,
art. cit., pp. 495- 96, 505; LeShan, op. cit., pp. 44ff.;
Urban, op. cit., pp. 431, 446; Harkness, op. cit., p. 58;
Gilson, op. cit., pp. 115 - 126.
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ence,

1

the fusion of fact and being,

2

and the theory of in-

terpretation as an integral part of experience.

3

The point of citing these references is not to "prove"
somehow that Hocking was correct because of the corroboration that can be marshalled on behalf of his· teachings, but
to suggest, mther, that these teachings, while expressly divergent on some issues from almost all the authors cited,
are nevertheless harmonious with the general drift of recent
studies. In some cases Hocking was clearly ahead of that
drift. Further, no recent author seems to have suggested or
implied that Hocking's approach or findings departed from or
misrepresented the traditional concept of mysticism.
Hence, on the basis of this comparison with contemporaneous and recent authorities, I conclude that no compelling
reason exists to doubt Hocking's essential continuity with
the classical tradition of Western mysticism. His differences from the tradition, especially his corrections of it
in light of the pragmatic-realistic perspective of American
philosophy, fall \-Jell within the scope of typical variability.
1

Cf. Trethowan, op. cit., pp. 17, 110; Hartshorne,
art. cit., p. 465.
2
c£. Urban, op. cit., pp. 257, 431.
cf. Stace, Mysticism~ Philosophy, op. cit., pp.
31 - 38; Smart, art. cit., passim.
3
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Furthermore, his correction of the idealistic bias of previous mystical theories by the incorporation of pragmatic
and realistic elements brought the philosophy of mystical
experience closer to rather than farther from the earliest
strands of classical Western mysticism.

1

1

In this regard, compare the work of Trethowan, op.
cit., passim.

III. CONCLUSION: THE ACHIEVEMENT OF WILLIAH ERNEST HOCKING
Despite Hocking's reconception of mystical experience
along lines more in accord with the classical Christian concept of the West and congruent with many subsequent studies,
as opposed to the exotic and reactionary notion generated between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, there are
some deficiencies in his treatment worth noting.
To begin with, Hocking's reliance upon the Christian
mystics from the third ·to the sixteenth centuries, while enabling him to establish continuity with the major Western
tradition, also restricted the range of his investigation to
classical sources somewhat unduly. His major reconception
was largely finished before he had widened the scope of his
inquiry to include the mystics of Eastern and even less Catholic Western traditions than those drawn on in his magnum
opus. Moreover, unlike James and more recent investigators,
Hocking paid little attention to contemporaneous instances,
the mystical experiences of ordinary men and women and the
analogues found in drug-induced and other non-religious forms
of ecstatic experience. Hocking was particularly attentive to
metaphysical mystics like Eckhart and the classic Hindu exponents of absolute monism, whose philosophical tenor was
more or less proximate to his own. Thus, Hocking was less attentive to the variety of mystical experiences than a com370
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prehensively representative account requires.
In general, Hocking's philosophical sensitivity to
language was noticeably underdeveloped, perhaps as a reaction
against what he perceived as the excesses of the analytical
approach to philosophy. In this he

rem~ined

true to his em-

pirical heritage. But Hocking was perhaps too impatient with
the special problems presented by the mystics• distinctive
use of language, especially the hermeneutical difficulties
of

s~~bolic

discourse and the logical ones pertaining to

paradox, oblique reference and hyperbole. His theory of interpretation was less well-developed than those noted above
by Stace and especially by Smart, although it anticipated
contributions made by both.
Further, a more critical study of the influence of
society upon the mystics and their impact on society and culture, whether constructive or destructive, would have greatly
aided Hocking's analysis of the social dimension of mysticism.
The effect of the mystics on the development of vernacular
literature in the late Middle Ages and their propensity to
gravitate toward heretical movements, at least in the eyes
of orthodoxy, warrant particular attention.
The cognitive priority in Hocking's writings, particularly his earlier ones, should not be decried too hastily,
however. For despite an emphasis on the "discovery" of God
as the Other Knower of our common world, Hocking was consis-
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tently sensitive to the intrinsic connection between idea
and feeling -- eventually characterizing feeling as the most
important element in experience.

1

Moreover, Hocking stressed

the inadequacy of conceptual knowledge as a means of achieving union with God in favor of an immediate apprehension or
intuition of pres-ence and the unitive power of love. Even in
his magnum opus he matched the cognitive awareness of God's
presence with the affective realization of that presence as
an intimate, loving companion. Hocking also gave consistent
priority to the practical aspects of experience. (It should
perhaps be recalled here that Hocking's typical stress on
certitude, while cognitive, was not primarily a conceptual
certainty, but a practical, even existential conviction, if
one which, more than for James, had metaphysical significance
as well as social implications.) Finally, Hocking's God was,
even as the All-Knower, not omniscient in the classical
sense; his knowledge of future events was limited by the
2
fact of human creativity in time.
As I understand it in general, Hocking's conception of
God owes less to Hegel than to the personalistic tradition of
the Judeo-Christian mystics, perhaps especially with respect
to his association with Whitehead, Hartshorne and the beginnings of process philosophy. His God was no "thought thinking

1 cf. LR~~ 48, cited above with other references, p. 318.
2
cf • .HIHE 63.
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itself," nor the ;.bsolute Spirit marching through history
(or out of it, as in Vedanta). Hocking's God was historical,
concrete and immanent, intimately accessible within human
experience rather than

11

\vholly other" in the radically tran-

scendent nee-orthodox sense. Hocking's historical sensitivity led him to place Jesus Christ in the center of history
as

~

mediator between God and the human race, "the human

face of God." But he was disconcertingly reticent as to the
meaning of Christ's divinity, the

resu~rection

and the Holy

Spirit. ·rhe vagueness of his trinitarianism may be overstressed with regard to a philosophy of religion, however;
Hocking nowhere claimed to be doing dogmatic theology. In
sum, his formal concept of God seems largely that of the
liberal Protestantism of the early twentieth century, given
his openness to a God limited by time, as was also true of
James. Hocking, on the other hand, did not fully embrace the
concept of a finite God as found in the later process thought
of Whitehead and Hartshorne.
If philosophical success can be measured by the
achievement of a satisfying account of a problematic situation as well as by exercizing a lasting effect upon subsequent efforts to deal with the same or similar problems,
then Hocking's attempt to develop a rational and socially
sensitive theory of mystical experience and religion can be
adjudged a qualified success. That is, he succeeded in terms
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of elaborating a solution to a problem, as Marcel recognized, but failed to the extent that despite his great influence on many of his contemporaries, Hocking's account of
the ontological argument, our knowledge of other minds, and
even the dialectical connection between mysticism and prophecy have not been widely adopted. 1 (Marcel's puzzlement
at the relative neglect of Hocking in America is perhaps
answerable in terms of his identification with idealism,
which earned him the quick and lasting opposition -- much of
it uncritical-- of some of

~~erica's

foremost philosophers.)

Nevertheless·, if I am correct in my appraisal of Hocking, his development of the concept of nuclear experience,
the intersubjective relation grounding all manifest experience, as an explanation of the eventual social expression of
mysticism can be said to be cogent. His account is likewise
coherent, uniting elements and structure not only meaningfully but in accordance with the facts of actual experience.
Historically, it can hardly be gainsaid that the most
active and effective individual religious figures were in
fact mystics -- if not all mystics have been effective nor
all effective religious figures mystics. Further, the process of mystical development as described by Hocking conforms
in all important respects with the reports of the mystics
1 A recent exception, but one which falls short of adequacy in exploring Hocking's thought is Hargaret Lewis Furse's
Mysticism, op. cit. See especially pp. 13, 142ff.
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themselves and also to those of psychologists who have
studied the dynamics of mystical development in its entirety
and especially in its social context. The counter-factual
instances that can be -- and were -- brought against Hocking's case, Quietism, elitism and extraordinariness, have
been shown to be exceptional rather than typical, representing incomplete development, hypertrophy or partial observation. Authentic mysticism is ultimately activistic in orientation, a common capacity of all persons and as such an ordinary dimension of human experience (even in its extraordinary
manifestations!).
Similarly, Hocking's case for the mystical and social
character of all experience and especially of ordinary religious activity is also compelling despite some remaining obscurities. Moreover, his exposition of the meaning of mysti. cism as its value for

l~fe

as a whole -- that is, as an in-

tegrating power by which the common concerns and partial preoccupations of human existence are evaluated in terms of the
meaning of human life in its totality as an on-going dialogue
with God in individual experience and social history-- effectively linked the basic religious experience of mankind
to the democratic spirit of American philosophy, an accomplishment denied both James and Royce.
In Western philosophical experience, perhaps the most
crucial development since the Cartesian "revolution" was the
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shift in thought from a monarchical, absolutist perspective
to one characterized by the democratic outlook, which recognized the value of the common experience of everyman. Royce
and especially James attempted to secure the success of the
transition in American thought, and with Dewey the achievement can be said to have been consummated. Hocking's accomplishment in this regard can fairly be described as the execution of the crossing with respect to what until his time
was largely taken as a bastion of esoteric elitism, the last
refuge of Absolutism: mystical experience. By democratizing
mysticism and with it the Absolute, i.e., locating them within the experience of everyone, Hocking established the tie
between the classical Western tradition and the spirit of
the New World in the area of religion and religious experience. In so doing, however, Hocking did not, like Dewey, reject the idealistic element in American thought, but included it as a partial aspect of a more adequate because more
realistic view of the experienced world.
In this synthesis of idealism and realism in mysticism, Hocking's insistence on the necessity of mediation was
a key element in his reconception of the absolutist model of
mystical union, often conceived of as an ontological merger
of subject and object. This, I believe, is a point missed by
John E. Smith in his characterization (and subsequent rejection) of mystical union as

11

the individual's merging with an
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ultimate reality or ••• his becoming absorbed in the object
of his quest."

1

Hocking's triadic model of experience pre-

eludes the simple absorption of subject by object in so far
as all experience of an object by a subject is mediated by
"thirds," that is, some other entity. In the integrity of
mystical oneness, God remains God, the creature remains
2
creature.
Given the difficulties still attendent on discussions
of mediation and immediacy, Hocking's treatment of the issues involved is not without significance today, even though
he never fully developed his solution theoretically. Perhaps
it is more significant since it has received scant attention
save

~y

Marcel. Even Hocking's major commentators (notably

in this instance, Rouner, Luther and Smith), while generally
attentive to the theme of experiential immediacy in his writings, manifest a lack of sensitivity to the depth of his
treatment. All overlook his explicit articulation of "relative immediacy 11 and ignore his consistent employment of this
doctrine. Further, many of their objections to his notion of
an immediate experience of God were anticipated and sufficiently refuted by his exposition of the meaning of mediated
1

smith, art. cit., p. 231.

2
cf. especially MGHE 390. For a discussion of the perduring individuality of the Self and God in mystical union,
Cf. Underhill, Mysticism, op. cit., pp. 32, 35, 170f.,-and
passim; Johnston, Silent Music, op. cit., pp. 66, 83, 147ff.;
and Harkness, op. cit., pp. 23ff.
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immediacy.
Similarly, Hocking's largely undeveloped analogy between the structure of social and individual religious history seems a particularly apt paradigm by which to express
the emergence of a world faith out of the common and universal elements in religious experience-- e.g., the felt presence of God as a unifying, non-competitive Spirit and the
development of explicit mysticism from the nuclear experience of God's presence to the Self through the media of Nature and Society. In this respect it is not surprising that
for Hocking the prophet of the coming world faith was the
mystic. It should be recalled, however, that for him the intermediary agencies in the converging religious experience
of individuals and societies are particular religious traditions, especially those with a universalizing tendency-Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, Islam and to a lesser extent, Hinduism. Further, the temporal interaction between
the individual and the group indicates that the analogy is a
dynamic one -- i.e., the terms are mutually implicated in
process. Religious development is thus in factual experience
an interconnected system of individual and social transformations, two phases of an alternating process in time.
Regarding Hocking's own mysticism, although Rouner
erred in denying that he was a mystic in the "classical"
sense, Hocking was clearly not an ordinary mystic. Like
~lato,

~lotinus,

Eckhart and Schelling, he was a philosopher
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a philosophical mystic, then, or a mystical philosopher;
it makes little difference. He was not a religious figure
in exactly the sense than Eckhart was, much less John of the
Cross or George Fox. Yet he was a religious leader in his
time and, as a man of action, both reformer and critic, he
was prophetic.
No one who reads with an open mind Hocking's "Confes~

F; dei '' --

the epilogue to Types of Philosophy -- can

miss the fact that the mystical element of religion as he
exposed it permeated his thought and life extensively. But
Hocking proposed a

11

realistic mysticism" (or a "mystical

realism"-- which also amounts to the same thing). His was a
reconceived mysticism in which the residual absolutism perhaps inevitable in any mysticism was strongly tempered by
the pluralistic realism of everyday experience. Such a mysticism not only accords better with the "Gospel Christianity"
such as Hocking professed, but by its openness also admits
of comparison and exchange with the temperate absolutism he
found at the heart of all great religions.
In sum, beyond recovering the true "classical" concept 'of Western mysticism, Hocking's structural model of the
mystical undertaking as a whole, while never fully systematized, can also serve as a heuristic instrument of

in~er

pretation and evaluation both for philosophical and scientific investigation and for ecumenical dialogue. For it takes
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into consideration above a.ll the structure and function of
social process as well as the psychological motives for
action.
Ultimately and conclusively, Hocking himself, I am
convinced,

ade~1ately

and prophetically embodied the ecumeni-

cal, inquiring spirit of the "mystic of the future" as he
confessed with regard to her personal faith,
We must treat things in the day's work as if they were
independent, naturalistic, over against us, or at least,
not for us. Struggle to build a human habitation in the
midst of an alien universe; unremitting effort to expel
by the aid of science whatever is evil from our point of
view; expecting no good from the universe other than what
we human beings construct in the fa.ce of nature, except
the universe itself; and admitting no wrong as inherent
in the constitution of things: -- this is the program
in which we join the realist.
But who has the eye for this humanistic work, and
the endless patience and energy for it, in view of the
fact that the task defined is nothing short of infinite?
Who can wait until the end of evolution for an achievement which only remote posterity can ever see? Only one
who in some way is at the goal, as the mystic is (who
for us represents the religious spirit). For him,reality
in its fulness is always accessible where he is: he is
always in the middle of time and space and history; he
is never neurotically anxious to catch the dernier cri,
nor hurried on to a remote goal. He alone can labor with
endless resources and patience for what may yet be; for
he knows that the nature of things is with him. He knows
that there can be no incommensurable relation between
the task and the power to deal with it. He knows that
what is in him is the same substance that has set the object and established its over-againstness. He is assured,
with Confucius, that the "good man is a ternion with
Heaven and Earth."l
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FROH THE GIFFORD LEC'l'URES TO "Fl1.CT, FIELD AND DESTINY"

The most important element to emerge in Hocking•s
metaphysics in the interim between 1939 and his revisions of
the Gifford Lectures in 1951 and 1966 was the central category of Field -- a notion present in his thought from his
early career, but which achieved mature development only in
the last decade of his life. The concept of the Self as "a
Field of Fields enabled Hocking to bring together the major
metaphysical elements of his philosophy:: intersubjectivity,
the reality of the objective world, the plurality of space
and time, and the apprehension of God as "Thou in the natural and social experience of mankind.
11

11

However, the connections between mystical experience,
the historical development of mysticism in religion and the
metaphysics of 11 Fact, Field and Destiny .. are not obvious
from a reading of the articles themselves. Yet there is an
important element of continuity between the Gifford Lectures
and the 1958 articulation of Hocking•s metaphysics. I believe that continuity was provided by his abiding interest
in mysticism.
Hocking delivered twenty lectures in two series at
the University of Glasgow which were distributed as a mimeographed summary in seventeen pages. He also prepared summaries of the lectures for the Glasgow Herald and the Edinburgh S~otsman, the former especially appearing with very
minor editorial changes on the day following each lecture.l
Although Hocking intended to publish the Gifford Lectures in book form as a systematic metaphysics, the outbreak
of the Second World War forestalled him. By the end of the
war, the philosophical climate had changed considerably and
Rocking began to plot an extensive revision of the lectures
for publication. The first series was revised and presented
in article form in 1950 and 1951 as "Fact and Destiny (I) 2
and Fact and Destiny (II) .3
11

11

1
The first series, "Fact and Destiny," appeared on
Jan. 18, 21 and 28, 1938, and on Feb. 4, 11, 18 and 25, and
Harch 4, 11, and 18 of the same year. The second series,
"History and the l... bsolute," was printed on nov. 30, Dec. 3,
7, 10, 14 and 17, 19-38, and Jan. 11, 14, 18 and 21, 1939.
2
Review of Metaphysics, 4 (Sept. 1950), pp. 1 - 12.
3

Ibid.,

(March, 1951), pp. 319 - 42.
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The first article related the Gifford Lectures as a
whole to the philosophical situation more than a decade later, dwelling mainly on the metaphysical status of Fact. This
article did not appear in any form in the Herald or the Scots~· The second article, subtitled "Argument of the First
Five Lectures," was thus in fact a revision of only part of
the first series. It must be read in con~unction with a yet
later article, "Fact, Field and Destiny" {1958) in order to
grasp Hocking's revision of the entire first series.
The second series of Lectures, "History and the Absolute," was not published until 1966, when Hocking summarized
and revised it for inclusion in the Festschrift edited for
him by Leroy Rouner PhilosoEhY, Religion and the Corning
World Civilization.~ But Hocking died within the year, leaving unfinished the comprehensive and systematic statement of
his metaphysics he had so long prepared for.
"Fact, Field and Destiny" was the title of Hocking's
presidential address before the Metaphysical Society of
America on Harch 28, 1958. It was published in an abbreviated
form later that year, apparently (at first glance) as a second reworking of the first series of Gifford Lect~res.
Closer inspection, especially in comparison with the Herald
version of the Gifford Lectures and "Fact and Destiny (II)"
indicates, however, that this is not the case. In fact, the
1958 article is the revision of the sixth to the tenth of
the first series of Lectures, expanded to include the concept
of Field. This connection with the Gifford Lectures has, as
far as I know, been overlooked by Hocking's commentators. It
merits attention, nonetheless, at least in connection with
the present subject of investigation.
As noted before, "Fact and Destiny (II)" was identified
as a summary statement of only the first five Gifford Lectures, which Hocking indicated at the time and is mentioned
in mo.st references. 3 Comparing this article with the He.rald
text shows that Hocking actually reworked the first five and
hal£ of the sixth Lecture in "Fact and Destiny (II)," ending
with a consideration of Schopenhauer's notion of the will as
the agency of access to reality, and a brief, proleptic summary of the. remaining lectures in the first series.~ These
l"F>='D"
..
ar t • CJ.'t •
2ERCWC 423 - 463.
3
4

cf. "FD (II)" 319 and PRCW.C 484.
•tFD (II)" 341. The material from the sixth Lecture be-
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were to deal with the logic of the infinite, the tension between the plurality of facts and meaning, and the unity of
the \vorld.l "Fact, Field and Destiny" begins, by comparison,
with a summary but extensive revision of the first lectures
on Fact as a fundamental metaphysical category, followed by
what appears to be a wholly new treatment of the concept of
Field as another such category. Yet it seems evident that
the problems Hocking was considering in the remainder of the
article are, once more, the plurality of Fact(s), the unity
of meaning, and the wholeness-of the world, which, with the
question of character or telos (Destiny), comprised the program of the four concluding lectures of the first series in
1938.2
What is lacking in this program in "Fact, Field and
Destiny" is an explicit elaboration of the logic of the infinite, which occupied half of the sixth and all of the seventh of the first series of Gifford Lectures. Otherwise it
is clear from the content that despite changes of.language
and emphasis, "Fact, Field and Destiny .. continues and develops the Gifford Lectures, particularly the last three lectures, which concerned the problem of the unity of the world
and its character.
This connection between the original lectures and the
1958 article is important for the present study in several
respects. For altough there is no explicit reference to mysticism in the latter piece, unlike the concluding lectures
of the first series, nevertheless the structure and content
of Hocking's argument remains virtually the same. Here, I
suggest, Hocking has translated the earlier references to
mystical experience into less religious language, incidentally providing a clear indication of the relationship between
the empirical content of mystical experience and more abstract metaphysical categories, that is, their fundamental
equivalence. (Hocking's explicit return to the theoretical
and historical_ aspects of mysticism in the 1966 revision of
his second series of Gifford Lectures, History and the Jl4bsolut~" shows that he had by no means abandoned. his earlier
views, as also demonstrated by his intervening writings.)
11

Specifically, in "Fact, Field and Destiny" Hocking
was finally able to connect satisfactorily the empirical,
gins with the section entitled "Teleology of the Particular."

1 cf. "FD (II)" 342.
2 Ibid.
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realistic elements of his philosophy with its idealistic elements by means of the concept of Field, which, in experience, links together human selves, the World and God in a
system of triadic relations ultimately constituting a unified
but diverse Whole.
Hocking identified this connection as well as the clue
to the equivalence of mysticism and metaphysics theoretical~ by expressly relating his concept of Field with what he
had described in his earlier writings as the mystic's "felt
unity of the world." In an important passage he wrote:
He have too long identified- the empirical with the itemized, the separate, the plural aspects of experience.
The illusory attraction of sense-data as the primary
building-stuff of knowledge consists largely in the circumstance that we can count them, identify them, name
them. But there is no law of being that the real, in its
major aspects, must come, as it were, in spots, and unscrambled. For this reason, I have dwelt on the Fieldconcept which underlies all discontinuities, and which,
once recognized, accounts for the simply felt unity of
the world.l
He continued, employing language previously used in regard
to mystical experience, by re-introducing a crucial category
of thought and being, nuclear experience:
Within this felt unity, there is a richness of experience \"'hich is at a disadvantage for recognition, partly
because it is too near us, beneath the level of specific
language, and partly because its aspects are mutually involved. To refer to it, we must use speech; and every
translation into speech does it some injustice.
Let me refer to this region as our nuclear awareness of the world. ~Hthin it there is, for example, a
nuclear awareness of our Self, so central and so engaged,
that Hume and many others after him, interested in separate impressions, not only fail to find it but deny its
existence. There is a nuclear awareness of the intersubjective Thou-art. There is also a nuclear awareness of
bodily well-or-ill being, of certain instinctive powers,
of a general direction of process in time, involving
what is now pertinent to us, a sense of destiny.2
l"FFD" 545.
2

"FFD" 545 - 46.
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The immediate context of this passage should be considered , first of all, the original Gifford Lectures in
which Hocking indicated the overriding aims of the series and
later developed them specifically with respect to mystical
experience. In the introductory lecture, Hocking referred to
the "rational use of intuition," espt:lcially as articulated
by Bergson, as "the opening of a new style of thought" for
the West. It involved two techniques:
(1) The clarification of the theory of the infinite-- a
new distinction between the legitimate and the illegitimate uses of this slippery conception; and (2) the utilization of the insights of mystic and artist in indicating the significant unity of the world. These would form
much of the content of the subsequent lectures.l
"The mystic," the article continues, "might remind us,
among other things, that the world had an aspect of simplicity
as well as of complexity, and that the native certitudes of
the soul could. not be abandoned."2
The theory of the infinite, which occupied more than
two lectures in the original series, survived only in greatly
altered form in the later versions. But mystical and aesthetic experience remained central empirical elements for Hocking
in formulating his metaphysics, appearing most significantly
in this regard in the 1966 revision of "History and the Absolute." It is the development of the notion of mystical experience in the original lectures and the revisions of 1950,
1951 and 1966 that thus provides the link between the Gifford
Lectures and the metaphysics articulated in the 1958 article.
In particular, it is the experience of the underlying unity
of the world that is the common element of mysticism and metaphysics. But with regard to Hocking's own philosophical development, I believe that this connection also indicates that
the most clearly indicated metaphysical aspects of his thought
have their roots in prior mystical aspects of experience.

1 GL Jan. 18
I

2

Ibid.
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